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INTRODUCTION

There are some philosophers who claim that they
appreciate the existential thought of Soren Kierkegaard but
that they reject his religious thought.

They justify such

a claim by saying that for Kierkegaard the existential
refers to the ethical and that the religious is something
other.

The purpose of this thesis is to show that such a

claim is a contradiction in terms.

I will argue that the

religious and the existential are equivalent for Kierkegaard
and that the ethical 1st therefore, not existential except
in so far as it is religious.
In order to defend my thesis that the religious and
the existential are equivalent, I shall focus my attention
upon Kierkegaard's concept of the leap.

For, upon considera-

tion, it is obvious that the leap plays a key role in
Kierkegaard's philosophy.

It is the leap which relates'the

ethical and the religious for Kierkegaard.

If one wanted to

see the differences between the ethical and the religious,
he would do well to consider the leap.

If he interpreted

the existential in relation to the leap, he would then be
able to locate the
and the religious.

exi~tent1al

in its relation to the ethical

Thus, I will examine these notions and

argue that the religious is equivalent to the existential
by showing that they are both equivalent to the leap.

pt

.uu ..
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From the beginning a distinction will be made
between two moments of the leap.

For, the leap according

to Kierkegaard is a double movement leap.

Grounded in this

double movement leap are two moments of the religi.ous and
tw.o . moments of the existential.

Upon clarifying this

distinction. the confusion by which one might come to see
the existential as the mere ethical will be wiped· away.
For sometimes Kierkegaard refers to the first movement of
the religious or religiousness A as the ethico-religious
.and sometimes merely as the ethical.

But, upon seeing that

this "ethical" is really one form of the religious, we shall
see that if one wants to retain the existential of Kierkegaard he cannot reject the religious.
The argument for my thesis will proceed by an
analysis of ten different structures of the leap.

First,

the basic pattern of the double movement leap will be
explicated in terms of the stages on life's way.

Then such

religious themes as love and sin will be interpreted in·
terms
leap.

or·

the leap.

Reason and Fa1 th will be related to the

The existential and the leap will be related.

The

leap will be analyzed even in relation to the incarnation,
temporality and Kierkegaard's style.
the ehief nuances of

t~e

By

such a procedure

religious and the existential will

be brought into focus.
In the conclusion I shall shift my attention from
the evidence for my thesis to the kind of evidence which

••
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Kierkegaard uses for supporting his position.

I shall make

clear just what sort of justification he appeals to.
Finally, in Appendix A I shall clarify my interpretation of Kierkegaard even more by considering some other
prominent interpretations of Kierkegaard.

In Appendix B.

I shall answer an objection to my thesis which might be
raised from what Kierkegaard writes concerning marriage in
his later writings.

In Appendix C I will voice a critical

question which I have concerning Kierkegaard's notion of
the double movement leap.

p!

I

CHAPTER I
THE STAGE STRUCTURES OF THE LEAP

It is in Fear and Trembling that Soren Kierkegaard
describes the double movement leap. 1
the image of the two Knights.

He does this under

The Knight of Infinite

Resignation represents what he will come to call religiousness A or natural religion.

The Knight of Faith represents
religiousness B or Christianity. 2 However, in spite of the

detail with which Kierkegaard describes these two Knights,
we only see them in their leap.
from which they made the leap.

We do not see the paths
It is in The Concept of

Dread that Kierkegaard gives us an important clue concerning
the interpretation of Fear and Trembling and so also the
image of the two Knights.

He writes of Fear and Trembling:

"There the author several times allows the wishful
1deality of the aesthetical to founder upon the
exacting ideality of the ethical, in order by
these c@llisions to let the religious ideality
come to evidence which is precisely the ideality
of reality, and therefore is just as desirable as
'I'

that of aesthetics and not impossible like that
of ethics, yet to let it come to evidence in such
a way that it breaks out in the dialectical leap

p::

. I
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and with the positive feeling "'Sehold, all.things
have become new!" and in the negative feeling which
is the passion of the absurd to which the concept
of "repetition" corresponds."3
What is this collision of the aesthetic and the
ethical out of which arises the .Knight of Infinite Resignation?

How does the aesthetic founder upon the ethical so

as to result in the first movement of the leap?

What is

this way of the aesthetic and this way of the ethical?
The aesthetic represents for Kierkegaard a way of
life or a stage on life's way, depending on whether or not
it has been renewed by the leap.

It is a way or a stage

that has to do with the immediate, the beautiful, and the
artistic.

But it is very complex and contains within it

several essentially distinct ways or stages.

Thus, in

The Banquet dialogue of Stages on Life's Way, Kierkegaard
allows five aesthetic characters to speak their philosophy
of life.

l~

In the first volume of Either/Or Kierkegaard

distinguishes three stages of the erotic, which, in effect,
means at least three stages within the aesthetic stage.5
In the introduction to The Concept of Dread Kierkegaard
argues that for the Greeks even the ethical was within the
aesthetic perspective.' And, of course, religiousness A is
aesthetic religion.
But, Kierkegaard's concept of the ethical stage is
no less complex.

First, we should notice that the ethical

µ: .

L ... "
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as such is never a way, it 1s only a stage.

Because· it

refers to action and never mere conceptualization it
never, as ethical, claims to be a way and thus it is not
a way.

Nevertheless, Kierkegaard distinguishes three very

important types of the ethical.
he means by improper ethics. 6
ground of the aesthetic.

First, he clarifies what
This is ethics on the back-

Its criterion is never merely

the exacting but for it there is always a predominant
longing for the beautiful.
two types of proper ethics.7
rest upon metaphysics.

Next, Kierkegaard distinguishes
The first of these claims to

That is, it claims that reason is

self-sufficient to produce and accomplish the exacting
ideal.

The second type of proper ethics claims to rest

upon dogmatics.

It thinks that reason can never by itself

arrive at a notion of sin and that only faith can ground a
true ethics where sin is a possibility.
The vast complexity of the aesthetic and the ethical
will clarify itself only as we slowly follow Kierkegaard on
his reflective path.

The perfect symmetry, the prodigious

applicability, the fertile simplicity of Soren Kierkegaard's
fundamental philosophic insight will reveal itself only as
we patiently examine it layer by layer, chapter by chapter.
In this opening

pictu~e

of the two Knights we see only the

most general and yet most basic structures of this way of
the leap.

In the Way of Abraham, the Knight of Faith, we

see five essential moments:

(1) He receives the promise,

.. J L a '
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(2) He endures the threats against that promise, (J)·He
receives Isaac, (4) He endures the threat against Isaac,
and (5) He receives Isaac a second time.

The Knight of

Infinite Resignation is like Abraham in the first four
moments but he is lacking in the ftf'th.

If we examine

these five moments in terms of the interpretative clue which
we received from The Concept of Dread, we shall be on the
way with Kierkegaard at least in reflection.
Kierkegaard speaks of the aesthetic as the wishful
·ideality that is desirable.

He exemplifies the first moment

of this wishful ideality in Abraham as Abraham received the
Promise in Ur of the Chaldees.

Kierkegaard will often refer

to this first moment of the aesthetic as the first immediacy. 8
Abraham hears that the promised land will be his.
that he will be the father of many nations.

He hears that

through him all the world will be blessed.
this might be.

It is for him as a dream.

He hears

He longs that
In the first

blush of his childlike enthusiasm he feels as if it already
were.

This is the wish of the aesthete in its first and

si~plest

form.

It is a beautiful wish for the beautiful.

It is desirable that all men should at one time be such
aesthetes.
his way.

The immediacy of the
Abraham

set~

fir~t

dream entices one on

out alone leaYing his family behind

that the beautiful promise might be fulfilled.
But what.did he experience as he separated himself
from the protective

im~ediacy

of his family?

He slowly and

pt..

;

'

.~ '

.

.
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painfully discovered that he was also separated from·the
object of .his desire.

Threat after threat seemed to tell

him that the promise would not be fulfilled.
began to experience the ethical, that

exactin.~

Now Abraham
ideality.

With effort he was faithful to the promise even though it
was threatened.

He began to reflect.

the father of many nations?
one child.

Will I really be

I am not even the fa·ther of

Will I really receive the Promised Land?

got the best part of the land.
·blessed through me?
did not give up his

How will the world be

I will die and be forgotten.
longin~.

Lot

3ut he

In spite of the collision

between his longing and the brute facts of temporal reality
he persevered.

Many men would give in to the threat.

would not even have left the first immediacy.
was seeking and he endured the threats.

Many

But Abraham

It began to seem

impossible that the exacting ideal of hiR dream could be
achieved and yet he continued faithfully on the way.

Even

though it seemed that the path of his longing and the path
which he was treading could never be the same, even though
it seemed that the aesthetic and the ethical could never be
one, he lived as if they were.
And then, when the trial of collision seemed hopeless he received

Isaa~.

Just out of the blue he was

released from the threats and taken up into the second
immediacy.

His long endurance was a preparation that

renewed for him the wishful ideality of tbe aesthetic.
b
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once again through the small voice which said to him,

•sara shall bear you a child" the vision of old was
renewed for him.

And now he saw the direction of the way

even more clearly than he had before the trial.

The exact-

tng ideality of the ethical had strengthened his eyes and
now the vision was so bright that it seemed it would last
:forever.
ment

o~

This was for him the beginning of the r'irst movethe leap.

In his exaltation he rose above the

separated paths of aesthetic longing and ethical demands.
·He saw them as necessary to one another that this new_ and
greater longing might be.
But then, as Abraham trod this path of bliss, a new
threat appeared on the horizon.
sacrifice.
~nd

God demanded Isaac in

At this point the Knight of Infinite Resignation

the Knight of Faith begin to be distinguished.

As this

threat appears they are both in the bliss of the second
immediacy.

They are one with the promise through Isaac.

Now we must look carefully, for what happens as they approach
the horizon distinguishes the two Knights.

This distinction

ls the main focus of attention which Kierkegaard portrays in
his painting of the two Knights.
A~ain

neither

Kni~ht

succumbs to the trial.

see this as a new three.t to the promise.

Both of them are

willing to teleologically suspend the ethical.
both are willing to sacrifice Isaac.

Both

That is,

Notice, this ls another

and even greater level of the collision between the aesthetic

r

'

.

.
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.

!£·'"
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.

and the ethicar."

And because of this collision both Knights

leap higher into the air even to the point of infinity.
once again it seems that the longing after the promise will
be frustrated by the exacting demands of the ethical situation.

But that does not hinder our Knights.

They are still

1n the ascent of the second immediacy and it carries them to
the point of infinite resignation.

But if we watch them as

the paths of the·aesthetic and the ethical are united by the
leap, we see that their leaps are very different.

The

Knight of Infinite Resignation ceases to believe that the
promise will be fulfilled in time.

He thinks that the

ethical demands are really impossible and so he feels that
he will receive Isaac again only in eternity.
perform the second movement of the leap.

He does not

Abraham, the Knight

of Faith, leaps up infinitely resigned, but always, by virtue
of the absurd, he believes that the promise will be fulfilled
even on earth and in time.
does the other Knight.

He does not lose the ethical as

Once again he preserves both the way

of the aesthetic and the way of the ethical.
Kierkegaard. distinguishes these two leaps as the
leap of love and the leap of faith.
Johan.~es

Ee has his pseudonym,

de Silentio, who represents the Knight of Infinite

Resignation write:
"I am convinced that God is love, this thoUJ?;ht has
for me a primitive lyrical validity.

When it is

present to me, I am unspeakably blissful; when it

r
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is absent I long for it more vehemently than does

·.

~.._

the lover for his object; but I do not believe,
this courage I lack.

For me the love of God is,

both in a direct and in an inverse sense,
incommensurable with the

~hole

of reality.

I am

not cowardly enough to whimper and complain, but
neither am I deceitful enough to deny that faith
is something much higher.

I can well endure living

in my way, I am joyful and content, but my joy ls
not that of faith, and 1n comparison with that I
am unhappy."9
In this beautiful pas.sage Kierkegaard distinguishes the
religion of the mystic from the religion of the believer.
He distinguishes religiousness A from religiousness B.

He

distinguishes the single movement leap of the Knight of
Infinite Resignation from the double movement leap of the
Knight of Faith.
Notice what happens in the second movement of the
leap.
happy.

Abraham receives Isaac a second time and he ls
The Knight of Infinite Resignation would have been

unhappy at the second reception of Isaac.

In his mystical

flight he was totally content with the infinite and wanted
no more to be bothered' with the finite.

But it was not just

the reception of Isaac a second time that distinguished the
two Knights.

Abraham had faith, by virtue of the absurd,

that the promise would be fulfilled in time.

It is this
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faith which renews for him the ethical.

Just as the first

movement of the leap gave the Knights the aesthetic a
second time, so the second movement gives Abraham the ethical
·:.

a second time.

Just as he received the aesthetic in double

measure in the first leap, so he now receives the ethical
in double measure by the second leap.

Before the leap the

way of longing was always incomplete as was the way of the
exacting.

They both were in collision.

ment leap they become complete.

They move from being just

·partial paths to being a whole way.
half sufficient.

They are whole.

By the double move-

They are no longer just
They are double. 10

Such then are the stage structures of the leap.
The aesthetic refers to a longing which is immediate and is
related to the perfect or infinite or eternal.
).onging for the beautiful ideal.

It is a

The ethical refers to the

exacting demands of the finite and temporal situation.
These collide.

It seems that the factual situation makes it

impossible for the ideal to be attained.

But through

perseverance in one's longing the collision is overcome and
a new immediacy arises which renews one's enthusiasm for
·his ideals.

However, the temporal or ethical situation once

again makes its challenge and threatens the ideal.

One can,

1n infinite resignatian, freeze himself in a blissful disregard for this new threat and consider only the eternal.
Or he can, by virtue of the absurd, that is through faith,
continue to believe that his ideals can be reached in time.

13
If he so be11:ves then he has received his ideal in time.
In this way Soren Kierkegaard seeks to show that
the either/or of the aesthetic can be overcome by the both and of faith.
~~~''

t;'

',:

.......

By this double movement leap he seeks to

~llow all ways to open into one another.

1ove away the scandal of love.

Now we must turn to his

concentration upon that love as such.

'

Thus he seeks to

14

CHAPTER II
THE LOVE STRUCTURES OF THE LEAP

..,._,.

"

~

A~

.

ranks

~1th

a genius of reflective love, Soren Kierkegaard
Plato, Augustine, Pascal and Scheler.

As with

them his world view was forged in the fires of love.

He

stood alone and longing in that criss-cross of unnamed
paths.

And then that lightning flash of first love lit his

way so that he could never forget the direction.

As he trod

on through the darkness, which was even blacker after that
flash, the light of love within him, clearer even than the
noon day sun, revealed to him even other mysteries of love.
His very double movement leap is simply the leap of love.
It is no wonder then that immediately following
that painting of the two Knights we see in Fear and
Trembling the painting of the young swain and his princess. 1
It is·with·this picture that we are introduced to the love
structures of the leap.

By means of the stage structures

of the lecp Kierkegaard might make his appeal to philosophers,
but by means of the love structures he makes his appeal to
all men.

He reaches out with his stories of eros even to

'
seducers and psychoanalysts.

With his beautiful descriptions

of marriage he might touch any man or wife.

With his auto-

biographical descriptions of erotic inspiration he can

.;
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loosen the deepest well springs of youthful idealisn even
after the manner of a Dante or a Petrach.

His insight into

Christian love is as earth embracing as that of St. Francis
and as profound as that of Scheler.

How shall we begin to

understand then this beautiful but haunting and mysterious
picture of the young swain and his princess?
The elements which Kierkegaard presents to us are
only five:

(1) The young swain meets the princess and loves

ner with all of his concentration.

(2) Through his love for

·her he comes to love the infinite and the eternal, that is,
God.

(3) But he cannot marry her.

(4) Yet he continues to

love her with all of his concentration but with a great
suffering.

(5) Until finally through faith he sees that he

can marry her.

But the questions are as many as the elements:

.(1) What was that concentration with which he loved her?

(2) How did he come to love God by loving her?
could he not marry her?

(3) Why

{4) Why did he continue to love her

and to suffer so even when he knew he could not marry?

(5) How did he finally become able to marry her?
This love which the young swain has for his princess
ls no ordinary love.

We are told how he lets it permeate

every fibre of his body and of his mind.

B:e has the power

"to concentrate the wl'\ole content of life and the whole
significance of reality in one si11,csle wish." 2 But how did
he get such an aesthetic power, such a power of

lon~ing?

To be such an extraordinary young man the young swain must

16
have had an extraordinary upbringing.

What could this have

been like?
In the first volume of Either/Or the young man

interprets the three operas of Mozart in such a way as to
suggest how a person goes through three stages of the
immediate erot1c.3

For the pre-puberty child, the aesthetic

longing is as a dream.

The masculine and.the feminine are

still united within him.

Hence, the boy longs for the

feminine but not as an external object.

However, at puberty

·and through his teens the feminine is separated from him and
his longing for the beautiful ideal becomes a seeking.

But

he does not seek the feminine in a particular person, he
just seeks the feminine as such.

Finally, his longing

becomes concentrated in a definite desire.

He desires the

feminine in a particular woman.
These first three stages of the aesthetic are erotic
e~pressions

of the same three stages through which Abraham

passed. ·when the ideal of the'promise first presented
itself to him it was with the immediacy of a dream.

Then

through many years he went through that period of seeking
the vague ideal which was distant from him.

Finally, that

ideal became particularized for him as he desired it through
the person of Isaac. '
In asking ourselves what the concentration of the
young swain means we are asking about the quality of his
particularization process.

Kierkegaard shows us several

17
ways in which a person can enter this third

erotic.
~arry

~e

sta~e

of the

might enter it·as a Judge William who would

the girl.

seduce the girl.

He might enter it as a Johannes who would
He might enter 1 t as a Victor Eremi ta who

through gallantry would not marry the girl but would preserv'e her as his muse.

Our question is - how might a young

man, who is in the second stage of erotic seeking, enter
into the third stage of erotic desire with the concentration

of the young swain?

Kierkegaard takes great pains to

·describe all the possible nuances of this transition.
First, Kierkegaard describes for us the young man
in that second stage of erotic longing as seeking.

We find

.

him in that condition as he gives his speech at The Banquet.

4

He is one who has never been in love but he is highly interested in it.

It appears to him contradictory and comic.

He

cannot understand how a man and a woman could express their
love for each other in time and space.

For that would be

to reduce the loftiest ideals to the mundane.

It ls in' this

very mixture of the ideal and the mundane that he sees the
ground of the contradiction and the comedy.

He does not

yet concentrate his desire on a particular person.

Therefore,

he is open to the ways of the other pseudonyms.
Judge Willlam,represents the ethical way in which the
young man might put an end to hi_s erotic seeking and become
mature in the desire of one woman.

Marriage is the univer-

sally accepted way for a young man to settle down and attain

18

.

his goals 1n the finite and temporal.

Through a decision

of positlve resolution, the young man will eventually be
\.'

able to end his seeking and become happy.

Thus, the second

part of Stages on Life's Way and the second volume of
Either/Or are appeals to the young man from the Judge, so
that when he finally meets the right girl he might. become
an ethically solid citizen of the earth.
· H°"ever, there are other appeals.

Johannes the

Seducer, in his speech at the end of The Banquet and in his
·diary at the end of the first volume of Either/Or, presents
the beauties of his way of desiring the beautiful.

His way

is an exception to the universal order but it is interesting.
He will not allow the gods to catch him on the fish hook of
marriage whereby they sap him of his creative energy.
~

•

.

No,

.he will just suck the delicious bait, which is the sweet and
tender virgin, off of each hook and then in glee leave the
hook dangling there bare.
So, the young man is faced, as he goes seeking on
his way, with the two conflicting paths of the ethical and
the aesthetic.

They seem again to be locked in the utter

contradiction of the Either/or.

But like Abraham he pursues

his goal with perseverance.

When we meet him once again he

has finally fallen in,love.

And, oh, what a love it isl

It is the very love of the young swain for his princess.
It is in Repetition that Kierkegaard tells us of the detail
~f

this story of his love,

19
In Repetition we see that the young man is not
following the way of Judge William or the way of the seducer.
Rather he is following the way of Victor Eremita, the
victorious hermit.

Victor appears explicitly as the editor

of Either/Cr and as the third orator at The Banquet.

How-

ever, the way of life which he symbolizes is that of the
young swain or Knight of Infinite Resignation in Fear and
Trembling and that of Quidam in Stages on Life's Way.

Even

Johannes de Silentio and Johannes Climacus keep quiet his
·secret and have climbed up by his leap.

It is into the

position of Victor Eremita that the young man is taken up
in Repetition.

Thus, this one aesthetic position appears in

all the early works of Kierkegaard's aesthetic authorship
and it is the central position which he there seeks to
For, it is precisely the position of the religious

~larify.

aesthete.
we might assume that Victor, as editor of Either/or,
has some sympathy for both the way of the aesthete and the
way of the ethical man.

If we look carefully at his philo-

sophy of life as it is manifest in his Banquet oration, we
see that this is so.

He is one of the aesthetes.

fully accepted as an aesthete by the other four.
he is very different

f~om

the others.

He is
And yet

In his gallantry he

always stay::; at a distance from the one whom he loves that
she might be his muse.

Lnot

to marry.

In short, he has made a resolution

This is a very ethical undertaking.

As Judge

20

w1111am explains 1n the ethical section of StaQ:;es on .Life'·s

war.

it ls precisely resolution which characterizes the

ethlcal.5- That resolution can be of two types, either the
positive or the negative.

Victor Eremita is the personifi-

cation of negative resolution.
swain.

So it is with our young

He loves 'W'ith such a concentration that he cannot

even marry.

And· how did that concentration arise?

AR we

look at what is common to Victor Erem1ta and the young man
we can finally answer that question.
In short, we can account for the intensity or the
concentration of the young swain by two factors:

immersion

in the tradition of eros and immersion in himself through
chastity.

As we listen to the young man in his Banquet

oration and in Repetition and in the first volume of
Either/or, we see that he has read and tholight through the
whole of the literature on Eros.

And just as Victor was

very careful to protect his ideal through celibacy, so the
young man sought his ideal by striving for purest chastity.
He even says such things of himself as the following:
"I have never, because it was smart, challenged a
woman by a glance, but I have cast my eyes down,
unwilling to abandon myself to an impression
before I have clearly made out what is the sign1-

'

f!cance of that power under the dominion of which
I am about to let myself fall. " 6
During this period of longing as seeking he sought to feel

21

and express the ideal love.

He sought to be chaste until

the right moment came that it might·be the greatest of all
moments.

He sought to be a poet that he might express it

in the most beautiful of WDrds.

In this way our young man

prepared himself to become a Victor Eremita •. Without such
immersion in tradition and
love would not be possible.

with~ut

such chastity such a

And what was this love?

was a love of prodigious concentration.

It

Through his reading

and his thought and his striving for purity, the young man
·had opened within himself the capabilities for all that

intensity of feeling which we see in the young swain.
what did that intensity imply?

But

It implied that through his

love for the princess the young swain would even come to
love God.

What does that mean?

In Reoetition we see that the young man did not suck
the bait off the hook as did the seducer, but rather the girl
was for him the fishing fly by which God caught the young man
for himself.?

In The '9anguet Victor tells us that by loving

with gallantry a man could become a genius, or a poet, or a
knight or a saint.
centration.

This gallantry is another word for con-

It was made possible for Victor by the tradition

of chivalry and by his chastity.

And we know that our young

swain comes to love God as he loves his princess.

Why and

how does erotic inspiration open a man to God so that with
'

i

l

Johannes de Silentio he can say those beautiful wordss

".
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"I am convinced that God is love, this thought has
for me a primitive lyrical validity. 118
It is the young swain's love for the princess that gives
him this conviction.

What is the structural force of that

pri,mitive lyrical validity?
This phenomenon of discovering God in erotic love
is the phenomenon of platonic love, which Socrates describes
in his second speech of the Phaedrus.

It is the same

phenomenon which Dante experienced when he fell in love with
-Beatrice and which Petrarch experienced when he fell in love
,

with Laura.

It is the phenomenon which Soren Kierkegaard

describes again and again showing now these nuances now
those.

It is the central phenomenon of his aesthetic

literature and especially of Repetition.

In short, this

J.

falling in love with a girl so as to fall in love with God,

t

even to the point of becoming a poet and a saint, is the

~

first movement of the leap.

~-

f.

The young swain loved the princess with such concentration that he discovered within his relationship to her
the infinite and the eternal.

During this period of trial

he sought to be in the company of the holy ones who lived
as chastely, of the poets who sang as purely.

He tried to

immerse himself in the, tradition and in the chastity to
which it admonished him.

But while he knew these so as to

seek them, he could not bend himself to them so as to live
Lthem.

He was not concentrated.

His energies were dispersed
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in distraction.

The goal which he sought with so much

longing seemed that it could never be his.

He must have

prayed, as did the holy ones whom he read about, but without
their total abandon.

That abandon was his one and only wish.

He must have struggled in his idealistic moments for purest
chastity just as did his heroes, but he was without their
constancy.

That constancy

wa~

his one and only wish.

He

must have tried to express himself with "the rhyme, the
rhythm, the carol, the creation"9 of his idols but he was
without their poetry.

That poetry was his one and only wish.

And then, when it seemed that he could never attain his goal,
when it seemed that the ethical demands of time and space
would always make impossible his aesthetic ideals, there
appeared the princess.

Just as Isaac came to Abraham, so

the princess came to the young swain and he entered into
that new immediacy. 10 Before it had always seemed to him
that a particular woman would be a temptation.
always cast down his eyes.

He had

But now he looked into her eyes

and he found that she was his saving angel. She was not an
occasion of sin. She was his sacramenta1. 11 She was his
way to the divine.

From her streamed out the eternal and

the infinite.
All of a sudden chastity was no longer difficult.

'
He never even felt it as.a
problem.

He was so concentrated

1-'

t
~-

upon her beauty that there could not enter his mind the

I
L i g h t e s t temptation to impurity.

All of a sudden he loved

..

24
God with total fervor.
ienced.

He felt her in all that he exper-

How he praised that God of Beauty who shone forth

in splendour out of all beings.

-·

How he thanked that

gracious God who had fulfilled his farthest longings.
Through the princess there came to the young swain a new
mood of euphoric glory and power.
perfect.

She was to him infinitely

Through her he saw the whole world as perfect.

every~hlng

In

in the world he experienced the infinite per-

fection of God..

He knew that his love for her was eternal.

·There could never be an end to this absolute bliss as long
as he loved her. He felt this with that primitive lyrical
validity. 12 Now he experienced first hand the eternal
itself.

Thus, in praise and thanksgiving, in glory and in

power, the young swain, with his every breath, lived and
~oved

and had his being in the infinite and the eternal.

No wonder then that pure poetry came rushing forth from
within him.
to be.

Now through her he was all that he ever wanted

God had revealed himself through his goddess.
So, our young man has reached the threshold.

He has

fallen in love and upon leaving that aesthetic stage of
longing as seeking he has now passed into the path of desire.
But, before he knows it, new· problems arise.
only one way here.
marriage.

There is not

There is the path of the judge or

There is the path of Johannes or seduction.

There is the path of Victor or gallant celibacy.

We know

that the young swain chooses the path of Victor.

Johannes
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de s11entio writes of him:
"Love for that princess becane for him the expression

tor an eternal love, assumed a religious character,
_,

was transfigured into a love for the Eternal Being,
which did, to be sure, deny him the fulfillment of
his love yet reconciled him again by the eternal
consciousness of its validity in the form of eternity,
which no reality can take from him." 1 3

we know that Victor thinks that marriage is fudge, that
·seduction 1s fudge, and that even the way of the ladies'
tailor is fudge. 14 To him only one way is heroic and that
is the way of celibacy.
argument for celibacy?

What is Soren Kierkegaard's
Even to the end of his life he saw

celibacy as of great value and as a vital need of his times.
In the satirical writings of his last years he even condemned
marriage in order to show the necessity of celibacy. 1 5

Why was he so concerned about this matter?
Soren Kierkegaard's answer to this great question is
quite simple and it must not be blurred over with excessive
words.

He thought that celibacy and chastity are so impor-

tant because it is through them that the majesty of God
reveals itself • 1 6 Of course, he does admit that there might
be other ways that are,just as effective. 1 7 But for
Kierkegaard the majesty of God became real for a man most
oft~n

in chastity and celibacy.

this happens often.

That is not to say that
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This majesty of God refers to H1s infinity and
eternity,, to :r1s power and glory, which one experiences in
erotic 1nsp1rat1on.

Through the ideality which the beloved
.
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brings the lover, he ls convinced of immortality
and
exalted to 1nf1nity. 1 9 He experiences the divine power in
poetic creativity and the divine glory in all that exists.
Victor knew that chastity made this erotic inspiration
possible and he knew that celibacy would preserve it.

He

wanted this ldeallty as his highest value and, therefore,
. celibacy became for him a necessity, even an easy necessity.
The peculiarity of Kierkegaard's notion of chastity
is that. it is not only compatible with erotic love but fully
possible only through it.

Of course, this notion would not

have been peculiar to Plato or Dante or Petrarch but it is
to most other people.
follows:

The detail of the dialectic is as

the young man through the tradition in which he

was steeped sought to be a pure and poetic lover of infinite
perfection.

This was his greatest longing.

not attain it.

But he could

Then he fell in love with a girl.

She

became a princess and he the young swain.

Through his

f

chaste love for her he had all he wanted.

She brought him

f

love of God and ascetic victory.

1;

~:.

Through her he became the

~:

r
'·

victorious hermit.

~

forever in this state of erotic God intoxication.

.
L

'

H~

knew that if he wanted he could live
All he

would have to do would be to preserve his erotic love for
the princess.

That he would do through celibacy.

His very
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love for her gave him the energy and concentration which
made this celibacy easy.

Thus he became a Knight of

Infinite Resignation.
The young swain is now at that point of the new
immediacy in its fullest bloom as was Abraham when he
possessed Isaac without threat.

But then as he is leaping

blissfully along his way it again begins at times to appear
like the path toward marriage.
stronger and stronger.
·arisen.
swain.
Abraham.

This impression becomes

And before long a new threat has

Just as Abraham was challenged, so is the young
It seemed that the sacrifice would take Isaac from
Now 1 t seems that marriage must take away the

princess and make of her a housewife.

Victor knows the

necessity of celibacy and. it is even easy.

Why does the

.temptation of marriage with all of its suffering even arise?
Again, Kierkegaard is very clear in his answer to
this question.

Something arises in his love relationship

for which the young swain had not bargained.

The girl falls

in love with him and even though it is possible that she too
might enter the order of knighthood 20 it seems to the young
swain that she will want to marry.

He comes to think that

she suffers because of unfulfilled love and his sympathy for
her suffering becomes,for him a momentous torture. 21 It is
primarily because of sympathy that the erotic love is first
led in the direction of marriage. 22
There seems to be a natural tendency within the
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aesthetic which again and again brings it into collision
with the ethical.

His new suffering aggravates the young

swain to even greater and greater poetic expression,

It

ls as if the only way he can express his love to his lady
is through poetry.

But, of course, this only causes her to

love him the more and, hence, him to suffer the more.

In

his sympathetic imaginings he even begins to consider the
joys of married life.

The· beautiful descriptions of

marriage 1n the second volume of Either/Or and the second
·part of Stages on Life's Way are such poetic overflows.
The judge, as he claimed, was really showing the aesthetic
beauties of marriage.

A fully ethical man could not separate

himself from marriage in poetic rhapsody, he would just fully
live in the temporal and the finite,
And so it is that the· young swain again comes to
suffer.

Even the most noble of aesthetic paths becomes

trapped in the circle of the unhappy search for beauty.
Two ways split the heart of the young swain.

Shall he

sacrifice his muse and marry, or shall he sacrifice his wife
f

f·

and remain a Knight of Infinite Resignation?
he will be guilty in either decision.

It seems that

To marry would be to

follow the ethical way of universal order but it would be to
betray the higher law '\qithin him.

Not to marry would be

unfair to the princess and would deprive him of his natural
happiness in the finite and temporal world,
;'

'

L

This new

suffering of his conscience only aggravates him the more.
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Kierkegaard's thought;;1s that when this decision
presents itself to a man he should choose the aesthetic
way and teleologically suspend the ethical.

That is, a man

should become a Knight of Infinite Resignation.

He must

fully make the first movement of the leap by saying no to
the universal.
In Stages

Kierkegaard. argues for this with great skill.

·.·

on~Life's

Way he shows the values of negative

resolution 23 and even has the judge argue for a higher way
than that ~t marriage. 2·4 This way is the way of the
·justified· exception.

And not just any exception to the

ethical order is justified. ·The way of the ladies' tailor
and the way of the seducer are not justified.

Kierkegaard

works out a set of very_ rigid and exact criteria whereby he
will allow one to follow the higher way and rebel against
_the universal order.

The last half of Fear and Trembling

shows the nature of such a rebellion.

But it is at the end

of Repetition that Kierkegaard gives us the most succinct
and picturesque summary of his criteria for the justified
exception. 25 In this beautiful image of the wrestling match
Kierkegaard shows us how the individual arises in his
struggle with the universal order and how even the universal
profits thereby.
So then,

Kier~gaard

demands that one suspend the

ethical in terms of his criteria.
which this can be done.

!3ut there are two ways in

The young swain can choose not to

marry just as a Knight of Infinite Resignation or also as a
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.Knight of Faith.

In either case he must choose not to marry.

For even if he is to be a Knight of Faith, he must first be
a Knight of Infinite Resignation.

Kierkegaard always

insists that religiousness A ls necessary for religiousness B
and he insists with special emphasis in the story of the
·-.
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young swain.
This means, if one is making the leap
.
through love of a woman, that if one is to enter into
Christian marriage, .he must first have decided to be a
ceil-.bate.

In short, Kierkegaard sees it as necessary for

.the,: fught of' ~Falth that he must first experience the divine
majesty.
But now a new problem arises.
"·

.i~·

The young swain

. decides to be a cell bate and yet he gets married.

How does

>

that happen?

What ls this leap of faith by which he first

renounces earthly marriage and then at the same time has it?
Does Kierkegaard think that one can be in a state of erotic
inspiration and be married at the same time even to the
same woman?

From what he tells us in Fear and Trembling

his answer seems to be in the affirmative.

But it is only

in The Works of Love that he begins to explain the inner
structures of' this Christian love which can retain both the
aesthetic and ethical at once.
In Fear and

T~embling

we see that the second move-

ment of the leap is made by virtue of the absurd.

It seems

that one will decide for celibacy knowing all the while,
through faith, that he will be able to marry his love.
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This is a contradiction introduced and overcome only by
faith.

N'o human calculation can see how the marriage will

come about but one trusts that it will through a power
greater than human calculation.
a gift of God.

That power, therefore, is

The Knight can make the first movement of

the leap completely by his own power.

'Sut all of his energy

is concentrated on giving the girl up.

It is through a gift
of grace that he believes he will receive her. 27. As long as
he believes he will receive her he still lives in time and
'fin1tude.

He is not just a Knight of Infinite Resignation.

When examining the stage structures. of the dialectical leap with the example of Abraham, we saw how the
aesthetic and the ethical became new.

We saw how something

of each was preserved even to the extent that·it became
~oubled.

But that is only part of the dialectic for there

is also a cancellation.

When one makes the second movement

of faith, it is not as if he has erotic inspiration and
married love joined together without any change at all
taking place within them.

No, certain elements of each are

cancelled and certain elements are preserved.

This cance-

llation and elevation takes place in the leap of Christian
love which is a new and higher love.
preserves elements of 'he lower loves.

It both cancels and
How does this

dialectic of love take place?
In Works of Love Kierkegaard writes:
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•What is it that really binds the temporal and
the eternal?

What is it other than love, which

therefore ls before everything else and remains
when all else is past?28
We have seen that the temporal is connected with the ethical
and the eternal with the aesthetic. 2 9 What is this love
that is before them and which binds them and which remains
when they are past?

Once we have seen its nature and have

seen how it differs from erotic and married love, then we
can see how it cancels and preserves them •
. Soren Kierkegaard's meditation upon Christian love
centers on the commandment - "you shall love your neighbour."
The essence of Christian love is shown in its contrast with
erotic love, friendship, and married love.
1.oves are preferential.

All of these

That is, my erotic feelings are

directed only to one or a few as are my feelings of friendship.

Likewise I only marry one or a few.
...

love ls to be directed to all humans.

No preference on the

basis of neighbourly love is possible.3°
beloved or the friend.
neighbourly love.

But neighbourly

One admires the

But no admiration is necessary for

One has self love in his love for his

beloved and his friend.

They are truly the alter ego.

But

neighbourly love cast~ out this egoism.
Love of neighbour also differs from these other loves
in that it is God mediated.

As Kierkegaard writes:
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"Worldly wisdom thinks that love is a relationship
between man and man.

Christianity teaches that

love is a relationship between:

mar. - God - man,

that is that God is the middle term • .,31
Christian love is not merely love of all men but it is love
··· of all men because God has commanded it.

In order to be

love of neighbour, Christian love must first be i'ove of God.
Mere humanitarianism again is a preferential love, it is a
group selfishness.

In it one may prefer to love all men

·but when·the motive is not rooted in the God command it can
never be a true I-thou love.3 2 Altruism that is not God
mediated will always be egoism even if it is the alter ego
whom I love.
It is the command that distinguishes Christian love
:from all other loves.

Those 1"7ords - "you shall" - indicate

that Christian love is not preferential but ls instead God
mediated.

When one loves his

neighbo~r

because he ls

motivated by this command, he is taken beyond egoism.

When

one is motivated by this command of God, God is always
present in his action.
"you shall love!"

But, how strange are those words -

To eros and friendship this command

would be an affront.

No poet who sin;s the beauty of these

loves would ever consider them as rooted in duty.
beautiful precisely in their very spcntaneity.

They are

It is this

command to love that makes Christian love different from
all other loves.
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY.
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But just because it is different does not mean
that 1 t is not related to the other loves.

As ·we have

seen, Kierkegaard thinks that eras can prepare the way for
Christian love.

We are now seeking to understand how

Christian love cancels and yet preserves erotic and married
love.

But be:fore we do that, let us first recall how eros

can prepare the way for this Christian love.
Kierkegaard's theory was that one must first make
the leap o:f the Knight of Infinite Resignation before he
·can make the leap of the Knight of Faith.

Cr, putting it

more exactly, the leap of faith includes that of resignation.
In terms of love, this means that Christian love first of
all depends upon chastity even to the point that it results
in erotic inspiration and its accompanying celibacy.

This

celibacy is a necessary condition, therefore, of Christian
love but it is never a sufficient condition.

It is merely

human and could never bring one to an awareness of Christian
love.
God.

That can only arise with faith which is a gift of
Only if one believes will he know of that command -

"you shall love your neighbour."

It is the collision of

erotic inspiration, wherein one wants to marry but wants to
be celibate, that opens a person to receive the gift of
Christian love.

And

~'lllhat

condition of collision?

does this gift do for him in his
It enables him to receive both

loves anew just as faith enabled Abraham to receive Isaac a
second time.

We are now ready to understand how this

r

f'::;..

~;;.
~·-~

~~"·· .·.
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Christian love precedes the aesthetic and ethical 1 ove and
.

how 1 t binds them and how it remains even when they are

(.:.

i,i

·1

past.
For one living within the Christian tradition,
there are two meanings in the idea that neighbourly love
ls before everyth1ng·e1se.

First, if one grows up in that

tradition and learns of its ideals, then he will in some
vague way seek after this ideal of neighbourly love.

He

may confuse it at first with the other loves but eventually
his confusion will bring him to contradictions.

The implicit

goal will be first in his intention even though it is last
for him in explicit execution.

Secondly, this idea means

that if one comes to understand the command, then his
neighbourly love will be the foundation for his other loves.
-It will be first in order of-importance.

As Kierkegaard

writes:
"Everyone as an individual, before he relates
himself in love to a beloved, to a friend, to
lovers, to contemporaries, must first relate
himself to God and to God-demand • .,33
If he does this, then the eternal and the temporal
will become something new for him even in such a way that
they can be

compatibl~.

Erotic inspiration made the

eternal meaningful to our young swain as he discovered the
majesty of God in his chaste love.

But then through

sympathy he needed to marry and possess her temporally.

J6
But that would take from him his constant awareness
eternity.

of

However, if he loves out of duty he will also

1ove eternally.

For,

•only when it is a duty to love, only then is
love eternally secured against every change,
eternally made free in blessed independence,
eternally and happily secured against despafr."3 4
Neighbourly love reveals the eternal even in a new and.
fUller way.

The eternity of erotic love can easily pass.

·But 1f one loves out of duty, he will love forever.
love of neighbour is also very temporal.

But

It is accomplished

only in the works of love whereby I love my brother right
here and now.
temporal.

Thus neighbourly love is both eternal and

The aesthetic and ethical are united within 1t.

When neighbourly love is seen as the most important
love, that is as the first love, then it will offer the
chief values of the other loves, that is, an awareness of
eternity and the ability to love in time.

Once a man•s· most

fundamental needs are satisfied by this love, then he is
free to love erotically and in marriage without fear that
one will destroy the others.

The point is - if neighbourly

love is placed first, then it can unite the most important
elements of the other,two loves and preserve them.
Neighbourly love, thus, cancels out the selfishness of
erotic and married love.

But it preserves the awareness

of the eternal, that is God's majesty, and the ability to
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appreciate the temporal and the finite.
Thus, while Kierkegaard demands celibacy for all
Christians, he does not at all condemn erotic love or
marriage.

He even writes of the Middle Ages as having

created a "cleft between body and spirit" and as having
"despised love as sensuality."

But he saw this as "a mis-

understanding, an extravagance of spirituality."J5

Because

of the double movement leap, Kierkegaard can write:
••You shall love your neighbour•.

Just as this

command will teach every man how he ought to love
himself, likewise will it also teach erotic love
and friendship what genuine love is:

in love

towards yourself preserYe love to your neighbour,
in erotic love and friendship preserve love to
your neighbour ... 36
In loving away the scandal of love he does not have to say
that there are many contrary ways.

He can, through his

synthesis, bind them all together.

His philosophy allows

him that beautiful harmony whereby he can write:
"Love your beloved faithfully and tenderly, but
let love to your neighbour be the sanctifier in
your covenant of union with God; love your friend
honestly and dev6tedly, but let love to your
neighbour be what you learn from each other in
the intimacy of friendship with Godt"37
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I will not even comment upon those words of Kierkegaard
lest I take something from them.

'

;.

~

L
.

I say only - amen,

r

J9

'
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CHAPTER III
THE !'.::XPERIENTIAL STRUCTutES OF THE LEAP

. In the great gallery of Fear and

Tremb1in~

there

i~

·the painting of the two Knights making the leap. This
.
.
painting reveals the s·tage structures of the leap.
Immediately after it, there is the: painting of the young
swain and his princess which reveals the love structures of
the leap.

But preceding both of these and at the very

beginning of the gallery we see the fourfold painting of
Abraham and Isaac at the sacrifice.

1

This painting right-

fully comes first for it reveals the experiential structures
of the leap.

Soren Kierkegaard did not arrive at his central

insight only through philosophical speculation and historical
analysis.

First and before all else, he acquired his vision

through a reflection upon his own life.

By interpreting the

double movement leap in terms of his life and his life in
terms of the leap, perhaps same further light can be cast
upon each.
In the fourfold painting of Abraham and Isaac, we see
four possible ways in which -the sacrifice could have been
made.

If

The first and the fourth possibilities show two

possible results for Isaac.

The second and the third

possibilities treat of two possible results for Abraham.
In the first of the four pictures, we see

L

~hat

we might call

"the noble 11e."

At first the father tries to explain to

the child why the child must be sacrificed.
cannot understand.

But the child

So then the father pretends to be an

idolater· and the child, while not understanding his father,
at least has faith in the God of Abraham.

In the fourth

picture Isaac loses his faith because he sees that his
father hes1ta tes _just for

~

moment in doubt.

In ·the second

picture, the father becomes disillusioned because God has
demanded this sacrifice of him and he can no longer live
-with joy.

In the third picture, the father thinks that he

is guilty of a great sin in being willing to sacrifice his
son.

Thus, in the painting we see how reason presents

contradictory sets of possibilities.

Isaac's faith might be

lost if the father does not carry out the sacrifice with
absolute obedience.

But, on -the other hand, the whole

sacrifice might only be a temptation which would plunge
Abraham into greatest sin.

Such is the collision.

And it

might. be so great that it will ruin Abraham no matter what
the outcome.
This witch's cauldron of writhing snakes is not just
a product of Kierkegaard's imagination for it was his way of
life day after day and hour after hour.
pictures he paints

th~

Here in these four

great collision of the aesthetic and

the ethical as he does in the picture of the two Knights and
in the picture of the young swain anc

hi~

princess.

But, in

this fourfold painting of Abraham and Isaac one can feel the
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suffering and magnificence of Kierkegaard's own life even
l

-

more than_ in those other two

palntin.~s.

_ For in this painting

of Abraham and Isaac we have a double symbolism which brings
to mind not only his relationship with Regina but also his
relationship with his father.

His relationship with Regina

and with his father were the main events of his life.

All

of his other relationships were greatly influenced by them.
His very notion of the double movement leap grew out of these
two relationships.
Kierkegaard had five kinds of human love relationships
which were all interconnected.

There was parental love,

erotic love,- married love, friendship, and neighbourly love.
Throughout all of these loves developed his love for God and
his love· for God influenced all of these loves.

Why were

his love for his father and his love for Regina so important
for all of these love relations?

Can one describe in detail

the interconnections of his loves?

Perhaps with the aid of

his concept of the double movement leap this can be done.
Perhaps the central insight of his philosophy will clarify
some of the enigmas of his life.

And, of course, while this

clarification is being made, the very notion of the double
movement leap might become more meaningful.

Our task is not

that of the biographer"°

Lowrie has written two wonderful
biographies of Kierkep;aard. 2 Our task _is to better understand
Kierkegaard's basic philosophical insight; and in so doing to
perhaps clarify some of the· mysteries which a biographer of
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Kierkegaard must face.
It is the fourth picture of the painting that most
brings to mind Soren's relationship with his father.

:aere

we see the great influence which the father has upon the
faith of the

so~.

Abraham was very calm and serene in

preparing the sacrifice but as he raised the knife he
clenched his left hand in despair and a tremor passed
through his body.

Isaac saw it and that was enough.

In

spite of all the rest of his father's shining example, Isaac
.lost his faith.
The only pa.rental love which Kierkegaard discusses
is that of his father for himself.

He does not seem to take

up his relationship with his mother at all,

One can find a

good summary of the chief elements of Kierkegaard's relation
with his father in Lowrie's Short Life.
phases of this relationship:
iation.

There are three

unity, separation and reconcil-

The pertinent elements in the early phase of the

relation seem to be the following:

(1) Kierkegaard was·a

very serious and religious man who, because of success in
busines~

could retire early and devote himself to philosophy

and theolcgy.

(2) The father instilled an ethical punctua-

lity and discipline in Soren so that the young boy would
study as if it were

hi~

sacred duty.

(3) The father was a

source of shame for the boy so that he never invited anyone
to his strange home.

(4) The father contributed toward the

..

development of a prodigious dialectical imagination in the
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boy.

(5) The father inculcated within the boy a great

religious idealism.
se~l

purity.

(6) The father was concerned about

How do these details further clarify the

stage and the love structures of the leap?

What do they

indicate concerning Kierkegaard's further development?
r11 thin

the context of this paternal 1 ove, Soren was,

from the beginning, introduced to the religious and the
ethical.

Of course, he was a child and could relate to it

only with aesthetic immediacy.

But for a clear understanding

·of the relation between the stages, it ls important to note
that the religious and the ethical were there in an implicit
way from the beginning.

In fact, they even precede an out

and out aesthetic life which would come along in his late
youth.

Thus, his father introduced him to a certain severe

.interpretation of the Christlan tradition and was the source
of a great discipline and idealism within the boy.

From his

earliest years, the boy immediately followed ethical demands
and admired religious heroism.

He greatly admired his

father's piety and his father's thoughts.

l
~:

please his father and to imitate him.
. . .··~· '·

He wanted to

And yet still there

was an ambivalent mixture of shame in this child's pious
admiration.

The father was not like other

father~

dressed and treated the boy unlike other boys.

and he

Already in

the child some collision was starting to brew, a collision
that was handed down from the father.
~

'

L

When treating the love structures of the leap, •-re
saw how one could make the transition from immediate erotic
love to full erotic inspiration only if he were introduced
to the ideals of a tradition and only if, because of these
.ideals, he strove for chastity.3

How this concretely takes

place one can see 1n the details of Kierkegaard's own life.
Through the example and co!lstant teaching of his father,
Kierkegaard was early introduced to a religious and ethical
tradition and to some desire for purity.

His imagination

.was quickened and all of this prepared him for that great
concentration which the young swain must have if he is to
love as Kierkegaard. loved.
Thus, the father gave the boy a clear direction in
life.

He set the little one going on that path which was

!eligious.

He gave the boy a· great strength of concentration

and imagination.
heroic.

The boy was interested in the ideal and the

He could not see the end of the path.

beyond him.

It was far

The father even gave the boy a great energy by

which he sought that God which his imagination set so high.
And yet, at the same time the boy was different and ashamed.
So it was that he entered the world outside of his home and
began to make his friends.

His friendships and all of his

lmres would be forever, marked by his relationship with his
father.
The father had carried the boy in his strong arms of
piety and
L

ima~ination

and idealism but the boy felt some
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sli~ht

trembling of weakness,

But

~radually

the boy. started

to walk on his own, to stand side by side with other boys
and with other teachers and to appreciate the world withe
them.

As he jo1ne4 arms with others the more firmly, the

more certainly did he feel the weakness of his father's arms.
Finally, when he was seventeen, Soren entered the university
and for the first time pursued the study of liberal arts and
he was truly liberated toward the aesthetic.

With his new

friends he now came to appreciate music and poetry and
mathematics and science.

But this only separated him from

his father's way the more.

Two paths were growing out of

the one and the collision was becoming more and more explicit.
Friendship and erotic love were beginning to make their
appeal.

He was awakening from the dream of the child to the

seeking of youth.
Finally, the split with his father became complete.
Kierkegaard came to a crossroads and he abandoned the path
of the religious and followed the path of the aesthetic.
He calls this occasion the great earthquake and writes about
it in Quidam 's Diary in Sta5es on Lit"e • s ~-lay. 4 There he
points out how horrible it is to have to be ashamed of one's
father whom one loves so deeply,
the father, and

Solo~on,

Under the image of David,

his son, Kierkegaard paints another

'
of those magnificent pictures
and this time he shows how a
son can lose his faith because of the sin of his father,
Her·e we see the very same sentiment that we saw expressed in

l

46
the fourth of the Abraham Isaac pictures.

Isaac

faith because of the tremor in Abraham's body.

lo~t

his

Solomon

lost hls faith because of. the sobbing in David's repentant
body.

Kierkegaard at the age of 22 explicitly and clearly

faced the guilt of his father and, in disillusionment, he
left his former hero and followed the aesthetic path with
Solomon.
Thus, for three years, from his twenty-second birthday 1n May of 1835 until he was twenty-five.did he follow
.the path of longing as desire.

He abandoned not only his

father but also his father's religion.

He immersed himself

in the aesthetic tradition of Don Juan and Faust and the
Wandering Jew.

He asserted that philosophy and Christianity

were not compatible and he chose philosophy.

However, as

much as he tried to abandon himself to the aesthetic, he
could not forget his father and religion.
tempting him back.

Christianity kept

In leaving his father, Kierkegaard did

not escape the collision.

It only became greater and greater.

As could be expected with Kierkegaard, the collision
centered around the problem of sexuality.

Lowrie points out

how Kierkegaard considered himself to be uncommonly erotic.5
Then Lowrie writes that this must be taken with a'grain of
salt for those who knef him best thought of him as an
uncommonly pure man. 6 But, there is no reason to speak of a
grain of salt here.

As in the case of Plato and Augustine,

a great eroticism and a great purity are by no means contra-

L

47
dictory but rather it ls possible that they can even. foster
each other.

Lowrie keeps buzzing around Kierkegaard's

se}.."Uali ty like a bee around a flower but he never does quite
draw out the honey. 7

Lowrie even mentions that .Kierkegaard

saw himself as "an extraordinary combination of purity and
impurity."

8

But then, Lowrie dilutes this by saying that

Kierkegaard. has a rare sense of shame.
true.

Undoubtedly that is

But that need not· imply, as Lowrie seems to imply,

that he was not very erotic •
.·So Kierkegaard went further than did Abraham and
further than did the young man.
went seeking.
abandoned.

Abraham left his father and

But he did it for a new faith that he never

The young man left the dreaming immediacy that

he displayed at The Banquet and sought the feminine by
.falling in love.

But he never lost his purity.

Kierkegaard,

however, as his biographers agree, not only suffered the
guilt of his father but the dread which arose from his
father's guilt precipitated his own fall into sin.9
As a result of his momentous tension between purity
and impurity, Kierkegaard went through a nightmare of
struggling and falling.

Time after time he made resolutions

to sin no more but as Lowrie so nicely puts it "so many
resolutions would notichave been needed if he had not been
continually relapsing."lO

This does not mean, of course,

that Kierkegaard was a frequent fornicator or adulterer.
~

~

No, his falling must have been of a more secret and shameful
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type.

A Don Juan

mi~ht

boast of his escapades and Faust

would not mind if others knew that he seduced Margaret.
But I(lerkegaard could only hide

hi~

sin in lonely shame.

Kierkegaard himself even writes about:
"visiting one of those places where, strangely
enough, one gives money for a woman's
despicableness. ,.11
But he could never write about the cause of his many renewed
resolutions.

That is, unless he hid it under the symbol of

·"thorn in the rlesh."
In any case, the problem was no light one.
Kierkegaard even thought of suicide.

But precisely at this

moment he experienced a new and partially saving love.

In

June of 18J6, his friend, Paul Miller, must have given
Kierkegaard some boost.

For,· as Lowrie points out,

Kierkegaard refers to MszS'ller as "the mighty trumpet of my
awakenlng." 12 In September of 1836 Kierkegaard discovered
George Hamann who, although he lived before Kierkegaard,
became one of Kierkegaard's great dead friends.

As Lowrie

puts it - these friends planted seed thoughts in
Kierkegaard's mind. 1 3

Through them K1erkegaard began to

become intellectually convinced that Christianity was the
right way of life.

On~e

again as a result of these friends,

Kierkegaard began turning toward the relieion of his father.

But the path back was not easy.

Though he was intellectually

free, he could still not morally free himself.

His despair

even became the greater.

3efore the trumpet blast of his

:rrtend.s, 14 he was at least wholly on the aesthetic path
even though he was ashamed of it.

But with the sound of

the trumpet, his mind and his heart were now split asunder.
Now he did not even believe in the aesthetic way but helplessly he could not abandon it.
In the summer of 1837 when he was twenty-four and

1n the midst of his despair, he fell in love at first sight
with Regina Olson, a girl of fourteen years.

Less than one

year later he became reconciled to his father and to his
religion.

The great question is - was there a relationship

between his erotic love and the renewal of his love for his
father and for God?

Lowrie is aware that some great

religious experience took place on May 19, 1838, at 10:30.
/

He is aware that on July 6 Kierkegaard went to confession.
Lowrie wonders about what happened in this experience of.
indescribable joy and he thinks that Kierkegaard never
revealed what happened.

But is that true?

Is it not very

probable that it was Kierkegaard's love . for Regina that
occasioned his reconciliation with his father and with God?
As we pointed out in the last chapter, Kierkegaard frequently
writes of the poetic and religious inspiration that can come
from eros.

The first'movement of the leap can be made

through erotic inspiration.

This was the case with Victor

Eremita, the young man in Renetition, the young swain in
Trembling and Quidam in Stages on Life's Way.
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Would 1 t not be very strange indeed if 1 t ·were not
Kierkegaard•s love for Regina that occasioned this great
religious experience?
What must have happened is this.
with Regina in 1837.
upon him.

He fell in love

Slowly this began to have its effect

His love for her and her love for him must have

given him a new euphoria.

He must have begun to recognize

with that primitive lyrical certitude as he says in Fear
and Trembling that God is love.

Re must have warmed not

·only towards God but also toward his father.

Finally, it

must have all become explicit in that double forgiveness of
father and son on May 19 of 18J8.
ment of the leap.

Kierkegaard now experienced the joy and

the power of the eternal.
.confession.

This was the first move-

He even had strength to go to

In all likelihood, he was now so snatched out

of boredom and dread that impurity was not even a problem
for him.

Regina was truly his Regina.

She was his princess

who saved him from that which he hated most, his impurity.
She was the occasion of his reconciliation with his father
and with God.

Friendship had occasioned his intellectual

conviction of the rightness of the path of religion.

But

only eros could convince him emotionally, as it did.

An

aesthetic love had made possible religious love.

They were

not conflicting paths after all.
Of course, like his pseudonyms, Kierkeeaard did not
only

b~come

a religious man as a result of his love for
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Regina.

He also became a poet.

Ee 'l':rote his dissertation

with as much ease as he loved God and with as m.1.rnh ease as
he was morally pure.

Regina enabled him to be the perfect

aesthete, the perfect ethical man and the
man.

pe~feet

religious

Or so it seemed for a while - for, just as Abraham

received his Isaac and was then called upon to sacrifice
him, so was Soren called upon to sacrifice his Regina.
Now we cast our eyes upon the first of the four
pictures.

There we see Abraham gazing down upon his son

·with wildness and horror in his face and in his body.

He

grabs the boy by the throat and flings him to the ground
screaming to his son that he himself is an idolater.

In a

few brief months, Soren will find it necessary to do this
to his tender and loving darling, to his princess and his
~ife

to be.

What happened to bring about this new and even

more dreadful collision of the aesthetic and the ethical?
Why could Kierkegaard not marry Regina?

Why did he break

his engagement?
Kierkegaard thought his way into the love of marriage
as one who did not marry. 1 5 Just why he did not marry can
be seen through a careful analysis of Quidam's Diary. 16
Here we can see how the second great collision between the
aesthetic and the ethical arose.

Basically there are five

interconnected reasons which Quidam gives for not marrying.
They have to do with:

melancholy, the meaning of life, the

divine counter order, the apex of desire, and the inspiration
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of his erotic love.
Melancholy is a tremendously complex and technical
term for 'iUerl<:egaard.

He sees 1t as arising out of his
relationship with his father. 1 7 It is a faithful mistress
to whom he must be faithfu1. 18 It can bring a man to
resolve not to marry because he must always battle with his
melancholy and therefore could not be properly attentive to
his wife. 1 9 It gave him a heaviness which did not fit with
Regina's lightness.

In some way he feared that he would

-lose his melancholy if he married.

He was his melancholy

and he wanted to be faithful to it and to himself and to his
father.

Marriage would make him unfaithful.
He connected this melancholy with the meaning of his

life.

He thought that if he did not suffer in this melancholy way, the meaning of his- existence would disappear. 20

He could not stand t.o have his life become empty and have no

~-·

I

I

I

meaning at all.

21

with meaning.

But he was afraid that in marrying her, he

His love for Regina had filled his life

would become too content and the meaning would flee.

The

meaning that came from eros seemed to depend upon the
mystery and distance of celibate love.
from sublimation,
ment would mean a

It seemed to come

He seemed to believe that sexual fulfilllos~

of the fulfillment of his life's

meaning.
But this not marrying was not just a plan of hi::: own
device.

He connected it with what he called a divine counter
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order.

This divine counter order did not come in a dream or
1n a vision. 22 It had to do with a collision between repentance and existence.
~,

While he was in this collision, he was

in a suspended state and could not marry.

But as soon as

the divine counter order would be lifted, he would be able
to marry.

Thus, he felt that he would possibly be able to
marry some day. 23
This divine counter order was clear and specific in
his mind by means of what he called "the apex of desire."
·The meaning of his life came through a melancholy longing
for the infinite.

As long as he needed Regina at a celibate

distance in order to bring this about, the divine counter
order was dear.

He could not marry.

She was the source of

what he called the elasticity of passion.

She stretched out
his mind so that he longed for the eterna1. 24 He knew that

another way of keeping himself at the apex of desire might
come and when it did, he could marry her.

But, until then

he must preserve her as his muse.
So the whole reason that he could not marry her at
the ti::ne was that he could not afford to lose her as his
source of inspiration.

She was the source of all that he

held dear - his aesthetic and ethical and religious
excellence - and he v:ranted this even more than he wanted

l
¥•,

her as a wife.

For years he had struggled for this in near

t

~-

despair and now through her it was his.

He did not want to

lose it by entering the contented state of mere ethical
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hanoiness.
·However, he knew that in some way both could be
...
his.

He knew that the divine counter order could be lifted

and that he could still be in cont.act with the magnificence

3ut now was not the time for that and so - he had

of God.

to break his engagement.

The terrible scene of

Abraha~

pretending to be an idolater shows us what that break meant
to Kierkegaard.
As he began to consider the break, his sympathetic·
feelings opened out to Regina and he could scarcely bear her
·suffering.

He thought he could spare her by this noble lie.

He tried to appear to her as a sadistic and fickle rogue.
But still she believed in him.

Now we can cast our eyes

upon the second and third pictures.

Would he be able to

bear this new and unexpected collision of the aesthetic and
.ethical?

Would he not be gui"l ty even before God by not

marrying her?

Gull ty or not guilty?

through reason where he stood.

He could not know·

On the one hand there was

the divine counter order which bade him preserve his infinite
resignation.

On the other hand, there was the feeling of

his dearly beloved, her family, and the universal ethical
order.

He was torn between them in a way he had never been

torn even in his previous days 0f impure isolation and weakness.

Now in his strength he suffered more than he had in

his impotence.

Would he collapse under the burden of this

collision and come again to disillusionment?

L

even a more terrible sinner?

He did not know.

Was he now
Such were
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the. poss1b111t1es of his new found aesthetic religion.
In such a state Kierkegaard contemplated the meaning
of marriage.

He knew full well that some day perhaps he

could marry.

He knew the way of the Knight of Faith and he

at least knew that the divine counter order could be lifted
even if one would not want to say that he believed that it
would be lifted.

In Repetition we see him grasping after

that belief as he waited for the lifting of the ban in the
thunderstorm.
-else.

But then Regina became engaged to someone

At this moment we can feel the full significance of

the four Abraham-Isaac sacrifice pictures.

Kierkegaard not

only lived through the horrors of sacrificing Regina and
being sacrificed by his ·own father, he even felt himself as
a sacrifice which God offered up for mankind.

A~

he puts

it in Point of View:
"The thought goes very far back in my recollection
that in every generation there are two or three who
are sacrificed for the others, are led by frightful
sufferings to discover what redounds to the good of
others.

So it was that 1n my melancholy I understood myself as singled out for such a fate." 2 5
Such is the meaning of the four pictures of the sacrifice.
Perhaps KierkE\S'aard was just approaching the moment
when he could marry and he discovered that Regina would
marry another.

In any event, the meaning of the rest of

his life in its key events is clear when we see it in the

r

~:
;,;;;
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light of the double movement leap.

In a general way,

~!'·.

:':.,'.:·

;;;.-

:~:,~ .

l

Kierkegaard knew that the divine counter order could be
lifted as early as Fear and Trembling in 184).

I'his is the

whole point of the double movement leap and as a result he
wrote in his diary of this time - If I only had faith I
could marry her." 2 6 It is certain that by 1847 he knew
concretely that· it was.neighbourly.love that could permit
one to marry.

As we have seen, neighbourly love is the
synthesis of the eternal and the tempora1. 2 7 One can stay
in contact with the eternal as long as he has neighbourly
love.

And yet, at the same time he can marry, he can live

in the temporal.
But did Kierkegaard make the double movement leap?
Of course, his answer to this would have been - no.

It is

.not something one can make, it ls something one, with the
grace of God, must always be making.

This he and God did.

In Point of View he writes about the role that divine
governance played in his life and there he discusses his
authorship and the Corsair Affair.

There are two events,

together with his belief that he could marry, that are
evidence of his making the second movement of the leap.
"Sut the whole movement became explicit in his second great
religious experience

~f

1848.

Just as the first movement

of the leap was focused in the experience of May 19, 18)8,
so the second movement was focused in the experience of
Soly Week of 1848.

Finally, there was his attack upon
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Christendom which 1'ras a further deYelopment of this second
movement of the leap.

So our question is - what do his

authorship, the Corsair Affair, the experience of 1848 and
the attack have to do with the second movement of the leap?
As we have said, the second movement of the leap is
a return to the earth which is made possible by neighbourly
love.

This is a God given gift that ls possible only if

one has made the first movement of the leap.

Soren

Kierkegaard did that through his erotic love for Regina
which brought him to the point of infinite resignation.
The second movement is a reclaimin,g of the ethical after it
has been suspended even so that it is doubled.

He began to

do this by his eventual belief that he could marry.

But he

continued the burial of himself in the earth through his
·authorship.

This was a work of neighbourly love that bound

him to men in time and space.

As his authorship progressed

through the aesthetic to the religious, it became more and
more temporal.

He moved from an aesthetic indirect

communication to a more ethical and Christian form of
direct communication.
In the Affair of the Corsair he became even more
bound in the temporal and the earthly.

He learned the

meaning of witness and!C martyr and saw how this was demanded
by neighbourly love.

By the time he finished the

Post~crint

he thought that he could fully enter the earth by becoming a

l

country pastor.

But this was not for him as he was snatched
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up by the Corsair Affair.
Then there was that enigma.tic .. thorn in the flesh"
which kept Kierkegaard bound to the earth.

The great

experience of Easter Week 1848, wherein he felt that God
not only forgave his sin but forgot it, had to do with this
thorn in the flesh and with poverty.

Just as the experience

of •38 had to do with "the thorn in the flesh" and poverty.
He lost his money and he came to be able to live with
himself, even his thorn in the flesh.

This .. thorn in the

· nesh" has something to do with his melancholy and probably
his shame.

In any event, 1848 marks the full return of

Kierkegaard to the earth.

He even started using direct

communication.
Finally, in his attack he continued to make the
·second movement of the leap even more magnificently.

That

is, just as one could not tell the Knight of Faith from the
ordinary man of the street, so it was hard to distinguish
Kierkegaard from an enemy of the church.
he was more fully a witness.

Through his satire

In the last years of his life,

Kierkegaard became a witness to the necessity of the first
movement of the leap and thereby made the second movement
of the leap.
In such a way'did Soren Kierkegaard develop through
five stages of love.

As a child with his father, he longed

for the infinite as in a dream.

3ut then he left his father

and went seeking the infinite with friends.

l

At first these

,.......,

r:·r:lr
jl,"

?r
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friends led him along paths contrary to that of his father
and his father's God.

But .then other friends came a.nd with

a trumpet blast intellectually
way.

recall~dhim

to his former

But morally he could not abandon the new found

aesthetic way of seeking.

However, on this very way he

discovered erotic inspiration and as he came to desire one
girl infinitely, he even became reconciled with his father
and his father's God.

But, then in not being able at once

to marry he faced a new collision wherein he had to teleo·logically suspend the ethical and he did not know whether
he was guilty or not guilty.

Finally, he discovered neigh-

bourly love by which he was able to reconcile the aesthetic
love of eros and the ethical love of marriage.

In dethron-

ing both of these loves, neighbourly love could even preserve
them both together.
Thus, in Kierkegaard's own life we see an example
of the double movement leap.

Through the collision of his

aesthetic and ethical loves, he discovered that love which
transcended and cancelled both and yet at the same time
preserved them even to the extent that it doubled them.
But, we have only bei;un to see into the intricacies and the
all embracing potentiality of this central insight of Soren
Kierkegaard.

So far

w~

have emphasized his treatment of the

leap as it appears in his early aesthetic literature, now
we are ready to move on and see how he analyzes this leap in
his predominantly philosophical literature.

L

Here we shall
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analyze the leap with Kierkegaard in its sin, reason, and
existential structures.

'

CHAPTER IV
THE SIN STRUCTURES OF THE LEAP

As one studies the life and thought of Kierkegaard
it becomes evident that for him there are different levels
or gradations of guilt.

When he was in the mere aesthetic

stage he felt guilty about his impurity.

After he fell in

love with Regina he felt guilty about his teleological suspension of the ethical when he broke his engagement with her.
Even as he made the second movement of the leap, he always
felt guilty and needed not only that God forgive him his
sin but that God forget it.
various gradations?

What is guilt and what are its

How does one make the transition from

one gradation to the other?
As one begins to peer into this very complex and

interesting problem 1n the life and thought of Kierkegaard,
he immediately sees that it has to do with the leap.
Kierkegaard first begins discussing guilt in a thematic way
in The Concept of Dread, and

the~e

he constantly affirms

that sin comes into the world only through the qualitative
leap.

We must not avoid the obvious question.

We must ask

and try to answer that ' puzzling and awkward question - ls
the fall into sin the same as the leap of faith?

~

Surely

~L;..

there are not two different leaps are there?

\

whereby one sins be different from the leap whereby he

Can the leap
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believes?
As one tries to answer the above questions he will

find that it is necessary to raise another - how does
Kierkegaard define and distinguish original sin and personal
sin?

His whole discussion of the gradations of sin and the

transition between them involves a treatment of original
sin.

When he examines the leap whereby one makes the

transit1o.n, he again is involved in the problem of original
sin as well as that of personal sin.

These three questions

·concerning the gradations of guilt, the transition from one
grade to the other through the leap, and the distinction
between original sin and personal sin are so intimately
bound together that Kierkegaard does not unravel them one
by one but rather all together.

We, too, while trying to

be ever clear, shall take this approach.
once again as we wander through the gallery of Fear
and Trembling we find another painting that will suitably
launch us on our way into a meditation upon sin. In the
sketch of Agnes and the Merman, 1 Kierkegaard begins to
suggest to us the sin structures of the leap which he will
discuss in The Concent of Dread and in the second part of
Sickness Unto Death.

we begin to look at this picture
we shall pay attentio~ only to the footnote version. 2
A~

Merman is a seducer but an unhappy one.
and wants to be saved.

i

L

maiden can save him.

He feels guilty

He thinks that only a beautiful
He spies on Agnes, then arises up
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out of the swamp to take her in his arms only to be saved.
But, she looks down into the violent sea and longs for him
to seduce her and take her to the bottom.
paths lie open to him.

Now a variety of

Many new levels of guilt beckon to

him. · Now we must carefully examine his first guilt that
brought him to Agnes.

We must question each nuance of

these new possible guilts.

We must even ask about the

guilt of Agnes as she wished to be seduced.
We have seen how in the first volume of Either/Or
·Kierkegaard distinguished three stages of the immediate

concentrated in desire only for his son.
the young swain.

So it was with

In his childhood the masculine and

feminine were united within him in the immediate longing
of a dream.

Then as the young man he began to seek the

meaning of love.

Fin~lly,

his longing became concentrated

in the desire for his princess.
experience it was the same.

In Kierkegaard's own

In his childhood with his

father, the aesthetic and ethical were united for him the
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immediacy of a dream.

But then he separated himself slowly

:from his father and. religion and ethics and his aesthetic
longing became that of seeking.

Through this period he was

constantly tempted and was miserable in his guilt.

Finally,

he :fell in love with Regina and he gained the second
immediacy of love.

And, so it is in this picture of Agnes and the

old guilt.
Merman.

He desired only her and was beyond his

Agnes represents the innocence of childhood's

dream just as it makes its transition to the guilt of
·seeking.

In the Merman's arms she looks down into the

depths and longs to be seduced.
her loss of innocence.

That is the beginning of

But Merman has fallen prey to the

temptations of seeking relief through a new and innocent

r

love for A$z:nes.
immediacy.

We first see him on the verge of his second

What is this first collision of the aesthetic

and ethical that leaves a man guilty?

What is the nature

of the guilt in the stages of first immediacy?

How does

one succumb to it?
Agnes gazes down into the depths and longs to be
taken there and seduced.
Dread.

This is Kierkegaard's image of

In the Concept of Dread he writes:

"One may liken dread to dizziness.

He whose eye

chances to look dbwn into the yawning abyss becomes
dizzy.

But the reason for it is just as much his

eye as it is the precipice.
not looked down.

L

For suppose he had

"Thus dread is the dizziness of freedom which occurs
when the spirit would posit the synthesis, and
freedom then gazes down into its own possibility,
grasping at finiteness to sustain itself.
dizziness freedom succumbs.

In this

Further than this

psychology cannot go and will not.

That very

instant everything is changed, and when freedom
rises again it sees that it is guilty.

Between

these two instants lies the leap, which no science
has explained or can explain.

He who becomes guilty

in dread becomes as ambiguously guilty as it is
possible to be." 4
Kierkegaard. explains the transition from innocence
to guilt in terms of dread and he thinks that it is only
through dread that one becomes guilty.

So the first

collision of the aesthetic and ethical is an experience of
.;:

·~

~:··

sinking into one's dread.

And what happens in this

succumbing is that one gains a certain knowledge of the
distinction between good and evil.

Innocence is ignorance.5

In perfect innocence there is that dreamlike blending of
good and evil.

The movement into dread separates them and

brings one to the state of seeking•':.w' Bttt ·w!!at is this dread
which entices one to t,ha t guilt· ridden knowledge of the
distinction between good.and evil?
This dread arises because of the commandment.

'
L
.

arises because of tradition.

It

Kierkegaard. thought that if
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from childhood one were commanded not to do something,
then he would be in dread of it and this dread would
entice him to do it. 6 Adam was told not to eat of the fruit
of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.

But this

commandment, through the presence of Eve, preyed on his
mind and he succumbed.

Kierkegaard's Christian tradition

commanded him to be pure and thus it was possible that
sensuality could be for him sinful.7

The Greek tradition

too had its commands and thus one could succumb even there
·1nto a kind

of guilt.

Thus, a distinction emerges between two kinds of
guilt which are possible within the spheres of the immediate
erotic.

Within the natural tradition which Kierkegaard calls

the Greek, there is a different kind of dread and guilt than
there is in the Christian tradition.

Agnes and Merman

could not have existed within the Greek context just as a
Don Juan or Faust could not have appeared in a non-Christian
8
tradition.
The two different traditions give rise to two
different kinds of guilt.

But before we clarify this

distinction we should first pay attention to the next level
of guilt which we see in the sketch of Agnes and the Merman.
For the same distinction applies at this second level of
guilt.

'
So Agnes loses her childhood innocence by succumbing

~.'"

~·

i.

to dread.

She does this w1 thin the commands of her tradition

L a n d thus her gunt would differ from that of the Greek at the

same level.

Such is the first level of guilt.

But then we

see the Merman at even another level of aesthetic guilt.
As a seducer he had been guilty.
as that into which we see
to be cleansed.

stepping.

A~nes

He is cleansed.

immediacy of love.

This guilt was the same
But then he comes

He enters into the new

However, a new level of dread comes.

He has a new guilt to bear.9

He makes Agnes unhappy.

He

cannot take her to the bottom of the opean, to that place
for which his temptation had occasioned her to seek.
-we see the teleological suspension of the ethical.

Here
Just as

Kierkegaard felt guilty in breaking his engagement, so the
Merman experiences the horror of a new and greater guilt.
Here we see the second coll1s1on of the aesthetic and the
ethical.
Both of these collisions take place within a predominantly aesthetic context.

Both of them take place

before the second movement of the leap begins.

The first

leve_l. of guilt is there before the first movement of the
le~p~. - rt···-arose out of the collision which called forth the

need for the first movement of the leap.

The second level

of guilt arose as a result of the first movement of the
leap.

Within the Christian tradition it calls forth the

second movement of

th~

leap.

But it is the second movement

of the leap which is of vital importance here.
it does guilt become true sin.

Only through

The second movement of the

leap is the transition from mere aesthetic guilt to true

L
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Christian sin.

It is the transl ti on between the two

different traditions.

We must now take great care to

clarify this leap which is the fall into sin.
So far we have pointed out that there are two

different kinds or dread which are rooted in the Greek and
the Christian tradition.

Kierkegaard refers to these as
objective and subjective dread. 10 In the Greek context
one is in dread but he is not aware of it as an 1ndivi dual.
Thus he can be guilty but never a sinner.

For this reason

·Kierkegaard refers to Greek ethics as improper ethics.
Greek can be either a sophist or a Socrates.

The

He can be

totally unaware of ethics or he can be a profoundly ethical
man.

He can live before or after the first movement of the
leap. But in either case he is primarily an aesthete. 11
Even his religion is an aesthetic religion.

Of course, the

aesthetic exists within the Christian tradition too.
it has different possibilities.

But

One can become aware of

his dread as an individual and thus sin can become a possibility.

The subjective dread of Christianity is a possi-

bility for Agnes and the Merman.

Thus, their earliest

moments of aesthetic or objective dread are already touched
by a glimmer of subjective dread.

Hence, there are two

levels of guilt possible in the Greek context and three
levels possible in the Christian context.

Because of the

level of sin within Christianity, even the first two levels
differ between the two contexts.

L

So.what is the meaning of

r-,,~
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the great distinction between objective and subjective

[!;.;'_'

~~-,.:
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dread?

Between the levels of mere guilt there is only a
quantitative difference, but between mere guilt and sin
there ls a qualitative difference. 12 Thus, real.sin has
two important elements, namely, both a quantitative and a
qualitative increase over mere guilt.

Real sin involves

both a temptation, the quantity, and a free giving into it,
the new quality.

In order to understand the difference

·between mere guilt and sin, we must nol'r explicate both the
quantitative and the qualitative increase.
Kierkegaard's meditation upon original sin reveals
to us three important aspects of the quantitative increase.
First, he points out that sin can come into the world only
through sin.

That is, there cannot first be innocence and

then some gradual development of a flaw within innocence
until it reaches the point that it is sin.
a mere quantitative increase.

That would be

No, original sin could come

into the world only if Ad.am really sinned.

That is, he had

to make a real qualitative leap beyond innocence.

enter the world only through a qualitative leap.

Sin can
The

quantitative element is a necessary condition of sin but
it is not a sufficien~ condition. 1 3
But, the second point is, men inherit the effects of
original sin and this can contribute to their sinfulness.
From their fathers and from their tradition men receive

L
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those commands which bring them to the .edge of the precipice

'

.
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wherefrom they gaze into dread.

Hence, original sin can be

inherited in greater quantity by one man than it is by

1:'1.: ·_
~.,-.
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another.

The quantity of sin refers to the tempting power

of inherited dread.

Some men inherit far more tradition

and far more dread than others.

Some men even inherit the

Christian tradition which can give even a different kind of
dread.

The Christian tradition can make possible not only

an objective dread but also a subjective dread.

Thus, men

inherit the quantitative determinants of sin either with
the Christian or a non-Christian context and within those
contexts in greater or lesser amounts. 14
And, the third point is, that in some strange way
original sin had the effect that it rendered man incapable
of true sin unless he was given some special new grace that
would make him capable of sin.

This idea follows from the

fact that those in the Greek tradition cannot sin while
those in the Christian tradition can sin.
command of God, Adam could sin.

Because of the

But then the effects of

his sin brought a loss of this ability to sin to his offspring.

They were no longer before God to the extent that

they could sin.

Thus the Greek could not sin.

But the

Christian through his tradition becomes again like Adam.
He can stand once more ' before God and thus be capable of sin.
So the quantitative effects of original sin are different
tor the Greek and for the Christian.

The Greek stands in
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a tradition of innocence.

The Christian, through the

atonement of Christ, once again stands in a tradition where
he can leap beyond innocence into sin.

For this reason,

Don Juan and Merman can exist in the Christian tradition
but not in the Greek.

The Greek context is too innocent to

produce the idea of a Don Juan or a Merman.
So this brings us to the clear insight that the
qualitative leap is the only sufficient condition to account
tor sin.

The quantitative condition of tempting dread is

.necessary but it cannot alone account for sin.

It is certain

that one needs the special grace of Christ in order to sin.
One must make the second movement of the leap in order to
sin.

Or, shall we say in sinning one makes the second

movement of the leap?

In answering this question we must

be very careful for as Kierkegaard points out in the Merman
sketch - "it was not by sin that Abraham became an
ind1vidual."l5

What is the difference between the leap of

faith and the qualitative leap that is necessary that one
might sin?

Our answer which we shall now go on to explicate

is - there is no difference in the beginning of the leap,
but there is a difference between what Abraham and the
sizmer do after they start to leap.
that needs

It is that difference

~larificatipn.

After Merman is saved by the innocent Agnes, he
begins sympathetically to feel the unhappiness he has
brought her.

Kierkegaard describes three paths that now
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open out before him. 16

He can try to save her by hfs .

deceit as did the Abraham of the first picture.

But to do

this would be to fall into the sin of the demoniacal.
can cease to worry about her and let God save her.
sta7 1n his .state of infinite resignation.

He

He can

But by this he

would sin in such a way that he would be lost for the world.
Or he could believe that God will save both himself and
Agnes.

In this way he would not sin.

Toward the end of

Sickness Unto Death Kierkegaard labels these two sins as
.the sin .or despairing over one's sin and the sin of despairing of the forgiveness of sin. 1 7 Thus, as we think our way
into Kierkegaard's concept of sin, we must from the beginning
realize that there is more than one kind of sin.
So, sin is despair before God.
gaard's technical tem for guilt.
God ls sin.

Despair is Kierke-

Any guilt that is be'fore

And what is despair or guilt?

It is a break in

the relationship which is man.

Kierkegaard defines man as a
relationship which is related to himself and to God. 18 That
is, in his 'fullest capability he is aesthetic - he is a
relation, he is related to the other.
ethical - he is related to himself.
he is related to God.

But he is also
And he is religious -

If he should be so aesthetic that he

is not ethical then ht\ is guilty.

He is in despair.

If he

sho111.d be so ethical that he is not aesthetic, then he is
in despair.

If he should be so religious that he is not

both aesthetic and ethical, then he is in despair.

So guilt
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is a failure to live up to one's full potentialities.
Guilt is an emphasis of one of man's relations to the
extinguishing of another relation.
But in order for guilt or despair to become sin,
it must be possessed in the presence of God.

Despair is

possible for all men but sin is possible only if one is
before God.

Thus, ·being in the presence of God is the

decisive determinant by which one leaps into the conscious-·
ness of his sin. l 9

Thus, the man who has only made the

.first movement of the leap cannot really sin.

This man of

religiousness A ls not before God, he ls God.

The mystic

qua mystic is so united with the divine that he cannot even
sin.

It is as a man of faith and not merely as a mystic

that one stands apart from God but still before God and
thus becomes capable of sin. 2.0
But when one is in the presence of God, how can he
d~spair?

Kierkegaard's answer to this question is to be

found in his notion of dread.

We have seen how Adam was

issued a command and how he looked down into his freedom
and succumbed.

In such a way did the fascinated Agnes look

down from the arms of Merman into the depths of the ocean.
But what ts it that happens when one passes from objective
dread to subjective
constitutes sin.

dr~ad?

For it is this movement which

The aspect of dread which makes this

possible is scandal or the offence.

This is the great con-

cept which Kierkegaard has worked out in such detail and by

·,
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which he shows how the leap of sin can take place.

Jesus

Christ and his tradition can be offensive either in a lofty
or in a lowly way.

Just as the Pharisees were scandalized

by Jesus because he looked like a mere.man but claimed to
be God, so can·any man be offended by Christ's promise. 21
One can be afraid to take the risk and believe that Christ
will really give him the Kingdom of Heaven.
ls too lofty for his understanding.
1t and turn away.

This promise

He can be offended by

But, on the other hand, of one believes

in the loftiness of Christ, he can be offended by his lowliness.

Just as Peter denied Christ thrice before the cock

crew, so one who believes in Christ's divinity can be
offended by his humanity. He can refuse to accept the
earthly. 22 The two kinds of sin-despair over one's sin and
despair over the :forgiveness .of one's sin - are rooted in
the two types of offence.

If God ls too lofty then the

sinner sees himself as too lowly.
lowliness.

He despairs over his

But if God appears as lowly and one ls offended

by the lowly so that one will not admit it, then no forgiveness of his own lowliness ls possible.
It is at this point that we can begin to see the
difference between the leap of sin and the leap of faith.
Notice, grace is necessary both for sin and for faith.

' presence of God without grace; at
One could not be in the
most he could be one with God.
for one to stand before

G~

But grace makes it possible

in such a way that God can be
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offensive.

Sin is possible only before the offence and

taith is possible only before the possibility of the offence.
So by the qualitative leap one stands before the offensive
Christ.

If he succumbs to the offence he sins.

If he

believes in spite of the offence and thereby is not offended,
he is a man of fa1 th.

Both men start making the second

movement of the leap but then all of a sudden the sinner
plunges into the abyss of subjective dread.

But how does

this happen?
Kierkegaard clarifies this plunge into sin through
his notion of procrastination. 23 One receives the revelation
that he is in sin.
the leap.

That is, through grace he begins to make

In short, he hears the call of conscience and

becomes convinced that he should change his life's way,
that he should not sin.

r
I
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He knows that he can change through

God's grace.

The man of faith acts on the revelation

immediately.

But the sinner?

does not act immediately.

Well, he procrastinates.

He puts off the action and thinks

and slowly his will begins to cloud his intellect.
he sees clearly what he should and should not do.
does not want to do what is right.
his intellect.

At first
But he

Then he willfully clouds

This is sin.

At this point

~e

can begin to understand what

Kierkegaard means when he writes that "sin grows every
instant one does not get rid of it." 24 Because sin is

L

He

essentially a mind clouding procrastination whereby one
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despairs in the presence of God who offends him, he
continues to sin with every moment of procrastination.
just keeps destroying the relationship which he is.

One

But,

of course, not all of.this sinning need be subjective
sinning.
\.

One can lapse off again into objective guilt and

not be in subjective sin.
lapse.

But he is responsible for this

He may so deaden himself to revelation that he will

forget about sin until he receives another special grace in
that call of conscience.
But what happens when one receives this revelation?
Insofar as sin is concerned, he sees himself as a sinner.
Yes, every man, even Abraham, has objective guilt, and when
he sees himself as he is through revelation then he sees
that he is a sinner.

Thus, Kierkegaard speaks of sin as a

despair over one's sin or as a despair over being forgiven.
The man of faith sees himself as a sinner but does not
despair .over it.

Bather he is always repentant because he

sees himself as never completely being the full relationship
that he could be.

So he is conscious of his guilt as sin

through the leap but he posits no new sin.
by succumbing to his sinfulness.
succumbing to his sin.
So, the leap

of

He does not sin

But the sinner sins by
..

?·~
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faith is always a fall into sin.

By the leap one becomes conscious of himself as a sinner
before God.

But the leap need not be a fall into sin in

the sense that it itself becomes a new sin.
i

L

This happens
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only if one leaps in such a way as to despair over his sin
or over the forgiveness of his sin.
his dread becomes different.
subjective dread.

As one makes the leap

He moves from objective to

With this leap new possibilities of sin

open out that were not previously there.

Kierkegaard

begins to clarify these new possibilities of sin by his
consideration of Socrates• concept of sin. 25 Because
Socrates did not live within the tradition of revelation
he could not, even in an implicit way, know of genuine sin.
"Socrates defined sin as ignorance." 26 "But if sin
is ignorance, then it does not properly exist." 27 With
these two notions Kierkegaard indicates his position concerning the possibility of sin for a Socratic.

If guilt

arises because of ignorance, then one is not responsible
for it.
[;,

If one is truly ignorant, then he cannot choose

one alternative instead of another.

Ignorance removes the

~y,.

to•
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factor of will.

But Christianity makes sin possible by

.

affirming individual will and thus the possibility of
defiance.

Christianity places the blame directly upon the

individual man and thus does away with the all determining
role of fate.
distinction?

But what are the implications of this great
What are the characteristics of the man who

lives within the

tradi~ion

of the leap, and how do they

differ from the characteristics of man who lives within the
tradition of fate?

Kierkegaard singles out for considera-

tion three of these characteristics&

L

individuality,
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hi story and sexuality •.
Only within the context of the leap is it possible
for a man to exist as an individual.

When fate rules, the

intellect and the will of the individual do not have the
ability to be responsible for sin.

Individuals are

extensions of fate and thus not true individuals.
have no power of defiance.

They

But within the context of the

leap, one can, even if it is through a gift, go beyond
ignorance and see alternatives.

He can choose.

And above

.all, he can choose to make himself ignorant or not.

The

great difference between the Socratic and the Christian
context is that in the Christian context the individual can
be free to be ignorant or not.

In the Socratic context he

cannot be free to be ignorant or not.
by and is an extension of fate.

He is always ruled

There are not many free

individuals. There are only extensions of one great
individua1. 28
As a result, history has a very different meaning
within the two contexts.

Within the context of fate the

individual temporal moment has no importance of its own.
The temporal is just an extension of the eternal.

Here we

see the temporal implications of the aesthetic context.
The true ethical, that, is, the temporal and the historical,
is an impossibility.

Because there can be no free individ-

ual resolution and because there can be no decisive temporal
moment, there can be no true ethics.

There is no such thing
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as a creative event in time for individuals.

Thus, history

is only an explication of the fated flow of the eternal
succession.

But within the Chris,tian context there is the

possibility of many free individuals and ·the possibility of
decisive temporal moments.

An individual can create or

destroy within time.

Thus, history is the explication of
individual creative activity. 2 9
And fUrthermore, sexuality differs in the two

{

contexts.JO

In the mere aesthetic context sensuality is

.only psychically determined.
spiritually determined.
individual freedom.

But in Christianity it is

Spirit for Kierkegaard means

It refers to the creative power of

each individual person.

This brings us back to the

difference between eros within the Greek and Christian
contexts.

Greek sensuality was in harmony and accord.

Christian sensuality is in opposition and exclusion.

Only

when the spiritual is posited in language, that is, in
tradition, does it gain its power.31

For the Greek there

is no individual rebellion against sensuality.

For the

Christian there is.

Spirit is the synthesizing medium of
body and of psyche.3 2 Thus, it seeks to keep both in
balance and it is opposed to an over-emphasis of either.
It is from this that

t~e

new and heavy burden of Christian

dread arises.
And so, if one considers man only in his natural
state, that is, after the fall into original sin, he will
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see that no concept of sin is possible and that man ·cannot
sin.

Thus, as Kierkegaard. shows in his sketch of Agnes and

the Merman:

"An ethics which disregards sin is a perfectly
idle ethics; but if it asserts sin, it is so
ipso well beyond itself."33
Ethics is dependent on either an aesthetic or a revealed
tradition.

No true ethics is possible in the aesthetic or

Greek tradition.

But once one makes the second movement

of the leap he, through grace, can become an individual.
At that moment he sees himself as a sinner and he can
succumb to this sinfulness by despairing over his sin or
the forgiveness of his sin.

So, the Christian is a sinner

but at the same time he is a free individual with sensuality
and history.

Thus, the very.concept of man has two vastly

different meanings within these two contexts.

This is so

because reason in the Christian context belongs to free
individuals.

But in the Greek context there is at root

only one great reason and not several individual reasoning
beings.

But what are the reason structures of the leap?

How does philosophy itself, an activity of reason, differ
in the two contexts?

'
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CHAPTER V
THE REASON STRUCTURES OF THE LEAP

A~

we enter the great gallery of Fear and Trembling

there stands at the threshold, in the preface, the painting
of Descartes.

We see him with his distinction between the

natural light of reason and faith.
collision and he must doubt.
new and stronger reason.
faith.

His reason comes to

But out of his doubt grows a

However, he never doubts his

Faith is higher than reason.

Descartes is a hero

who stands alone and does not try to lead others into his
doubt.

Together with Descartes there appear in the painting

two other sets of figures.
who also were heroes.
culties of reason.

There are the Greek skeptics

They spent their life with the diffi-

They doubted and remained in that doubt

and never went beyond it.

They did not have faith to aid

them but nevertheless they were not disloyal to reason.
Also within the painting there are the Hegelians of
Kierkegaard's own day.

They have doubted all, both reason

and faith, and they have quickly gone beyond them to the
system.

Kierkegaard ridicules them in their hasty and

careless arrogance.
paradox of reason?

Are they real thinkers who feel the
Do they understand doubt or faith?

These who claim to know all, appear as superficial in
\

l
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comparison with the Greek skeptics and Descartes.
the meaning of the painting?

What is

What is the relation between

reason and doubt and faith in the philosophy of Kierkegaard?
It is in the Philosophical Fragments 1 that we find
a full explication of this painting of Descartes with all
of its philosophical overtones.

Here Kierkegaard clarifies

three different levels of the collision between reason and
the paradox.

Even the Hegelians can get a glimpse of the·

first collision.

This epistemological collision has to do

with the Socratic knowledge paradox.

It becomes manifest

before one makes the first movement of the leap and calls
forth that leap.

The second collision is that which the

Greek skeptics were able to experience.

It is the meta-

physical collision whereby reason becomes embroiled in its
great proofs, especially the proofs for the existence of
God.

This collision is possible only after one makes the

first movement of the leap and it is such that it is incomplete without the second movement.

Finally, there is the

~:

paradox with which Descartes is capable of colliding.

r

collision is possible only after one makes the second move-

~·

ment of the leap and it has to do

~1th

This

the theological

paradox concerning our knowledge of the God-man.

Hence,

the pattern of the double movement leap can once again be

'

seen as the foundation of this Descartes painting and the
philosophical text which explicates it.

Just as the three

levels of collision formed the foundation for the three
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levels of guilt, so now they can be seen as the foundation
tor the three levels of .the paradox.
Kierkegaard begins to reason about reason with a
consideration of the Socratic knowledge paradox. 2 This
paradox has to do with seeking after knowledge.
one seek the truth?

How can

He cannot seek something that he does

not know. ·If he already knows it, how can he seek it?

If

one sought to understand a triangle, he would have to
alread7 know to some degree what a triangle was or he
. cou1d not even begin to consider it.

But if he did really

know it. then seeking to know it would not be possible.
How could the teacher impart knowledge if there were not
already some foundation for that knowledge within the
learner?

Learning to Socrates seemed to be a quantitative

development of that foundation of knowledge.

Thus it was

natural for Socrates to solve the knowledge paradox with
his theory of recollection.

He thought that each person

already had the foundation of knowledge within him and that
learning was just a development of this foundation.

Thus

he saw the role of the teacher as that of the midwife.
The teacher could never impart new knowledge, he could only
bring to birth that which was already within the learner.
To seek knowledge is possible because one already possesses

"

in a fundamental sense that which he seemingly seeks.

Yes,

only seemingly seeks, for in reality he already has it.
But what are the implications of this answer to the
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paradox?

What does 1t mean to hold this recollection

theory?

First, it is evident that the recollection theory

does solve the paradox.

It does away with the paradox by

doing away with the seeking.3
one already possesses.

It is within him and, therefore, he

need not seek it without.
get beyond the paradox.

The truth is something that

But it is no great thing just to
For, "the thinker without a paradox

is like a lover without feelings

a paltry mediocrity." 4

However, that ls exactly what the Hegelians in our painting
do.

They doubt everything - reason and faith.

quickly go beyond this doubt to the system.

But they

Once they reach

the system they have swallowed up doubt forever.

They have

explained all paradox by explaining contradiction.
they become thinkers without passion.

Hence,

In the hands of

Socrates the recollection theory overcame the knowledge
paradox but at the same time discovered even a greater paradox.

That was the paradox of all Greek skepticism.

But the

Hegel1ans are such great reconc1lers that they come to no
higher and lasting paradox.

But, the overcoming of the paradox is not the only
result of the recollection theory.

If one says that man has

always known the truth even from eternity, then he destroys
the significance of the temporal moment.

The temporal

moment becomes only an ' occasion wherein the truth ls
recalled.

It is not a decisive moment wherein new truth is

really acquired.
~:

L

The recollection theory is a kind of
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eterna11sm which robs the temporal of any ultimate significance.

It even makes it impossible that there be any

personal freedom.

For truth is within one from eternity

and it thereby determines him.

He cannot acquire any new

truth by himself and thus the foundation for any creative
act is denied the individual.

The moment is swallowed up

in the eternal and the many are swallowed up in the one.
These two implications of the recollection theory
indicate the?Ja3essity for the two movements of the leap.
-The first movement of the leap enables one to regain the
paradox.

Even within the context of the recollection

theory, Socrates was able to recover the paradox.

But the

mediation theory of the Hegelians does not permit a recovery
of the paradox.

They cannot be left in perpetual doubt.

But Socrates and the Greek skeptics were.

The first move-

ment of the leap enabled them to recover the passion of
thought.

However, only the philosophy which Descartes

represents is able to respond to the second implication of
the recollection theory.

Because there is room for faith

in Descarte's philosophy there can be a significant
temporal moment.

The second movement of the leap can give

the temporal moment an eternal significance.
But, just how,is the second movement of the leap an
adequate answer to the Socratic knowledge paradox?
Together with Socrates, Kierkegaard approaches the paradox
by agreeing that man does not really seek the truth,

But,
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while Socrates thinks that man has the truth in a hidden
wa7, Kterkegaard thinks that

man

is fleeing the truth.

K1erkegaard is intent upon preserving the freedom of the
individual and thus he does not maintain that man lost
tull awareness of the truth through an accident or that
God cast him from the truth.5 .He holds that man freely
forfeited the truth.

Thus, through his own will,· man is

beyond the pale of truth.

He does not seek truth.

He

fiees truth.
This means that if man is ever to receive the truth,
the relation between teacher and learner must be very
different in the Kierkegaardian context from what it was in
the Socratic context.

And so it is.

In the context of

recollection, the teacher .could give neither the truth nor
~he

condition for receiving the truth.

be only a midwife.

The teacher could

The learner had the truth within him

and the only sufficient condition for his finding the truth

was his own turning inward.

But in the context of the ieap,

the teacher must give both the truth and the condition for
receiving the truth.

If one is really beyond the pale of

truth and fleeing truth, the only way he will really get
truth is to receive it as a gift.

He will not be ·able to

acquire truth through his own efforts.

But, as strange as

it may seem, it is only in the latter context that one can
freely and as an individual arrive at the truth.

We have

seen that if the truth is in one from eternity, then the
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temporal moment will not be significant.

Also, the lndivid-

ual will not be free for as he moves inward and discovers
the truth, he will see that he is not one individual distinct from others.

He will see that he is but an extension

of the eternal knower.

He will see that he is not free as

an individual who can create something new,

Rather, he will

see that when time is but the eternal and souls are but
Soul, then creation is but illusion,

But, if one is really

apart from the truth, then the temporal moment can be s1gni. f1cant.

one can acquire the truth in time and that moment

of acquisition will be as important as truth is important,
And how can that acquisition be an act of freedom?

It is

free because man can reject the truth and the condition for
receiving the truth at the moment that they are offered to
~1m.

He ls not forced to receive the truth even though it

is given to him as a gift.
in the moment.

He is free to accept or reject

Thus, by allowing man to freely accept or

reject truth in the moment Kierkegaard's theory preserves
the significance of the temporal moment and the freedom of
the individual.

The theory of Socrates permits neither,

So, just how does this free acquisition of truth
take place?

What is the condition which the learner must

receive that he might,receive the truth?

That condition
is precisely the consciousness of oneself as a sinner. 6

As soon as one becomes aware that he is guilty before God
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of having fled the truth, then he becomes capable again of
receiving the truth.

One becomes aware of his individual

freedom at the moment that he becomes aware of his sinfulness.

The fall into sin is the leap of faith which reveals

the truth of the distinction between good.and evil and the
human freedom to choose between these alternatives.
But, who must the teacher be who can give both the
truth and the condition for receiving it?

Clearly, it can

be none other than the God.

No man could be such a teacher.

·In this Socrates was right.

But this brings us to a new

paradox.

How can we know that there is such a God?

God is truly other, how can man know Him?

If the

Is not the wholly

other, by definition, beyond the knowledge of man?

In such

a way, the theory of the leap preserves the passion of the
paradox.

But how does this paradox arise to the meta-

physical level for the Greek skeptic and for the Christian
such as Descartes?

Why does it fail to arise for the

Hegelian?
Socrates lives within the context of the recollection
theory and therein he finds a solution to the knowledge paradox.

.

'i,

He does not seek truth without but he comes to know

himself and therein finds truth.
within a new paradox arises.
the Divine as such.

But as he finds this truth

He discovers within himself

His soul is Soul.

As a man he is Man.

With his new discovery, he is like Abraham with the young
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Isaac.

He is satisfied with his new acquisition.

struggle is gone.

The old

But then the new paradox arises.

seeks and finds a new collision.

Reason

As Socrates looks within

he begins to wonder whether he is •a stranger monster than
Typhon or a creature of a gentler and simpler sort, partaking of something Divine.•?

Kierkegaard. even compares

this dialectic o'f' reason to the dialectic of love., after one
enters the bliss o'f' the first movement of the leap, his
reason too experiences that new collisions
"But now the Reason stands still, just as Socrates
did; 'f'or the paradoxical passion of the Reason is
aroused and seeks a collision; without rightly
understanding itsel'f', it is bent upon its own
down'f'all.

This is like what happens in connection

with the paradox o'f' love..

Man lives undisturbed a

self-centered li'f'e, until there awakens within him
the paradox o'f' self-love, in the 'f'orm of love for
another, the object o'f' his longing,

Self-love

lies as the ground o'f' all love or is the ground in
which all love perishes."8
Thus, reason goes through the same dialectical pattern as
did self-love.

Like erotic love, reason too is a manifesta-

tion of the aesthetic.

It collides with the ethical both

' of the leap and after the first
before the first movement
movement o'f' the leap.

Of course, the ethical at these first
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two levels is the fruit of its own production.

And what

is this ethical pre-figuration which the reason produces
and with which it collides?

It is the paradox.

Before

the first movement of the leap, it was the knowledge paradox.

After the second movement of the leap, it is the

paradox of the unknown.

Socrates becomes baffled by that

which he discovers within himself.

There not only seems

to be something within him which is less than man, there
';: ·

seems to be something that ls more than man.

This more

·than man which he has discovered is the unknown.
:-

Like the Greek skeptics, Socrates stands paralyzed
before the paradox, unable to move.

He finds himself and

he seems like the Divine, and yet unlike the Divine.
reason surmises the existence of the unlike.

But his

reason is confounded by the different, by the other.
must posit it and yet it cannot conceive it.

His

It

Socrates and

the skeptics can only waver here before the other in silence.
But within the Christian context reason's collision
with the second paradox differs from the second collision
within the Greek context.

Just as the epistemological

collision differed, so does the metaphysical.

Within the

context of recollection it seems that reason produces the
idea of the unknown.

'But, within the context of the double

movement leap, Kierkegaard argues that this idea of the
unlmown will have to be given to reason by the unknown.9
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This is the whole point of the second chapter wherein he
paints the picture of the king who marries the humble girl.
i

The ways of the king are unknown to the girl.

She will be

unhappy if she is married but cannot share his life with
hill.

.The king knows this and wonders how they might come

to an understanding.

He knows if she is raised to his level

she will be changed.

He will not be able to love her as he

now does for he loves her in her simplicity.
know him and yet be herself?

How can she

That is, how can her

·individuality and freedom be preserved when she knows the
king?

The king thinks that in order to bring this about,

he will have to descend to her level.
no longer be able to love him as king.
the king and yet communicate.
,.

her servant.

.

uality.

·;

But then she would
So he has to remain

He can do this if he becomes

As her servant,· he can preserve her individ-

And yet, if she believes him, she will still know

him as king.

He will be to her servant and king.

with God and man in the Christian context.

So it is

Man does not

get the idea of the unknown through recollection and reason.
But his reason receives the idea through a gift. 10
At this point a serious question arises.

When

treating the previous structures of the leap, we saw that
man could make the firEt movement of the leap by his own
power.

The young swain and Kierkegaard could reach the

teleological suspension of the ethical through their own

.....___
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willing.

Abraham and the Knight of Infinite Resignation

could reach infinite resignation through the strength of
their own will.

Is Kierkegaard now contradicting his own

dialectic by saying that one can reach the second paradox
only through a gift of the unknown?

No, he is not.

Only

through the gift he argues, can the freedom of the individual be preserved.

Within the Greek context there can be no

individual will which reaches infinite resignation.

The

first movement of the leap is made when one abandons
·individuality and becomes resigned to fate.

So Kierkegaard

now reveals a new subtlety within his dialectic.

If one

is really to freely do something, grace is necessary.·
And, just how is this grace given?

At this meta-

physical level one also sees through the paradox by the
gift wherein he recognizes himself as a sinner.

How does

the Christian come to realize that God is absolutely unlike
him? He sees this when he sees that he is a sinner. 11 For
the sinner is absolutely unlike the God.

But, even more

than this, he comes to realize that it was his sin that
brought about
himself.

this complete unlikeness between God and

We saw when treating reason's first paradox that

it was by man's sin that he fled the truth.

So now we see

that it is by man's s1cn that he separates himself from God.
Both of these separations he brought about freely and thereby
laid the foundation for the two paradoxes.

If he freely
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accepts himself as a sinner, he sees through the paradoxes.
He sees the truth even though he did not seek it and he
comes to_know the unknown just as he freely created the
un}mown aspect of the God.

He becomes united with them

rather than separated from them.
In such ways then do Socrates and the Christian

come to know of the existence of the unknown.

When Socrates

thinks that reason produces the paradox, he forfeits
individual freedom and again the significance of the temporal
~oment.

For the difference has been there from eternity and

the individual has nothing to do with it.

But Kierkegaard

preserves individual freedom and the temporal moment.

He

thinks that the individual man brings about the difference
by sin in time and he thinks that man freely comes to
realize this in time when he accepts the insight that he is
responsible for the difference.

But both Socrates and

Kierkegaard while knowing the unknown do not claim to know
it by a proof of reason.

In this they differ from the

Hegelians.
Thus, in his detailed analysis of the proofs for
the existence of God, Kierkegaard continues to distinguish
between these three positions which we find in the Descartes
painting. 12 It is true that for Socrates the paradox of

'

knowing the unknown is produced by reason.

.

But, Kierkegaard

is very clear in stating that reason does not produce the

L
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unimown t"or Socrates through proof.

Even though Socrates

1s credited with the physico-teleological proof Kierkegaard
thinks that Socrates
•always presupposes the God's existence, and under
this presupposition seeks to interpenetrate·nature
with the idea of purpose.•1 3
'thus, reason has a role in bringing Socrates to the notion

ot the unknown but he did not understand how.

He was truly

hung up in the metaphysical dimension of the paradox.

Like

.the skeptics in our picture and especially like the
Corneades. "he could not get it into his head when the new
quality actually emerged."14 Socrates did not know how he
came to know of the unknown.
But, the Hegelians in our.painting do not reason to

~

\..:·
·'
'

the limit of reason as do the Greek skeptics.
that they can prove the existence of God.

They think

However, they

'

ii'-;"

~~·
?:
~'

I,•,

;:.-_

express themselves unfortunately for they blur the important
distinction between the ideal and the factual.

The onto-

logical aspect of their proof fails:
"For the difficulty is to lay hold of God's factual
being and to introduce God's ideal essence
dialectically into the sphere of factual being."1 5
And so the causal aspert of their argwnent too must fall for
one always reasons from existence, not toward existence.

I

do not first discover the existence of Napoleon by observing
..,-.
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his deeds.

No, as an historian I must first assume his

existence and then I can say that such and such deeds
belong to him.
Thus, Kierkegaard thinks that the Hegelians are
wrong in their exaggerated use of reason and he thinks that
Socrates respects the limits of reason but is baffled before
1 t.

But, what does

Kierke~rd

reason in knowing God?

think about the role of

How does he approach the proofs for

the existence of God? He ls not just a mere fedeist.

Just

· as the double movement leap always includes the aesthetic
but dethrones it, so too does his faith always use reason.
Reason uses the proofs but of themselves they must fail.
Beason cannot by itself know the unknown.

So when I use

the proofs and then drop them because of their inadequacy,
.I demonstrate that I know of ·the unknown.

have an important demonstrative power.

Thus, the proofs

Kierkegaard writes:

"When I let the proof go, the existence is there.
But this act of letting go is surely also something;
it is indeed a contribution of mine.

Must not this

also be taken into the account, this little moment,
brief as it may be - it need not be long, for it is
a leap. n 16
Thus, the
Socrates.

lea~

enables Kierkegaard to go beyond

Kierkegaard sees the importance of the moment

and of his own contribution in overcoming the metaphysical

paradox.

He can abandon the proof beca.use of the gi.ft

whereby he clearly sees himself and the unknown.
never gets this clarity.

Socrates

But does this mean that

Kierkegaard loses the passion of thought after all?

Does

he become like the Hegel1ans who are beyond the paradox?
No, for once Kierkegaard sees through the metaphysical dimensions of the paradox there arises for him
the theological dimension.

Fa.1th has come to the aid of

reason for Kterkegaard but now faith presents its own
paradox.

What is this new paradox?

How does it arise?

How does reason relate to it?
In abandoning the recollection theory, Kierkegaard

argued that the learner had to receive both the truth and
the condition for the truth from the teacher.

In this way

he sought to preserve the eternal importance of the moment
and the freedom of the individual.

But the truth which the

?

learner receives is a new paradox.

The condition for

receiving the truth which the learner likewise receives is
also a new paradox.

That is this new paradoxical truth and

what is this new paradoxical condition?
Within the context of the eternally important
moment the dialectic of the paradox proceeds as follows.
First, the epistemological paradox of learning what one
does not know presents" itself.

It is assumed that one

freely comes to know a new truth.

l

That is, it is a new
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truth o'f the moment which was not his from eternity.

But,

this assumption implies that both the truth and the condi t1on for learning the truth have to be presented to the
learner by the teacher.

A learner without the truth could

not find it simply by himself.
to a seco!li paradox.

But, this gift gives rise

For the one who gives the truth and

the condition for the truth must be other than man.

This

other must have the truth and the condition for the truth.
But, how can this being who is wholly other communicate this
.gift to man? How can man know this wholly other even enough
to receive from Him a gift?

But, one does know of Him and

he shows this by letting go of the proofs for the existence
of the other.

But, if one does know the wholly other and

has· not always known Him a new paradox arises.

The wholly··

other cannot be wholly other •. He must in some way be like
man if he is understood by man.
likeness of the unlike.

The new paradox is the

It is that the eternal God is also

temporal.
But, now we see that the paradox is the teacher
himself.

As one looks at the Socratic knowledge paradox,

he discovers the paradox of knowing the wholly other.
Socrates saw both of these paradoxes.

But, if one is to

solve them sp as to permit individual freedom, then the

"

wholly other must at the-same time be the same as man.
teacher who truly teaches must be eternal and yet also

The
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temporal in order that the lea.rner might truly learn.

The

new paradox is the eternal God who is also a temporal man.
The teacher is at the same time the teaching.

The paradox

gives the condition by which the paradox can be understood.
Only with such a theory can the eternal importance of the
temporal moment be preserved.
So, to be free the individual learner must receive
not only the truth but also the condition for receiving the
truth.

The condition which enables the learner to know the

truth must·be a knowledge which is not a knowledge.

If the

condition for receiving the truth were simply knowledge,
then it would not be a condition, it would be truth itself.
Again, man would not be free to bring about truth in the
moment he would simply receive it.
were not at the same time a
man in knowing.

knowing~

But, if the condition
then it would not aid

This condition is faith.

Faith is the

paradoxical knowing-not knowing that conditions man's knowing the known-unknownable.

When man freely accepts the

condition and the truth, he stands in a paradoxical
relationship to the paradoxical.
But, just how does the God-man give this double
gift?

Just how does man receive it?

The God-man gives

the gift of faith by becoming the God-man.

'

When God walks

as a man among men, he makes it possible for them to believe.
But, God walked among men only once.
God became truly temporal.

In becoming temporal

That is, he lived and died in a
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certain time as do all men.

So there are two problems.

How did the contemporaries of the God-man come to believe
in Him and how do discipies at second hand come to believe
in Him?
Of course, the contemporary of the God-man could not
simply know the God-man.
man.

He too had to believe in the God-

The contemporary might see the historical man and he

,.
,«·,

,·.

might reason to the eternal God.

But, he could not simply

know the absurdity that the eternal God was the historical
·man.

Many who saw the God-man did not believe Him to be

the God-man.

How did those who did believe in Him come to

believe in Him?

In The Fragments Kierkegaard gives two

aspects of his answer to this question.

In order that the

contemporary might believe, it was necessary that he see a
sign and that he look inward even to the extent that he
might discover himself as a sinner.
As the God-man went among men, the very loftiness

of his mission would attract the crowds.
cannot believe.

But, the masses

Even if one became extremely interested in

him and watched him day and night, that would not mean that
he believed.

In order that one believe, it is necessary

that he pay attention but the mere attention which the sign
might call forth is

n~t

yet belief.

he must also look inward.

If one is to believe,

As he looks both at the God-man

and himself, he must come to see that he is a sinner.

L

If
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he comes to see that the God-man is also his judge even to
the extent that be can be scandalized by the God-man, then
he ls on the threshold of belief.

If he then accepts him-

self as a sinner and accepts the God-man as his saviour,
then he is a believer.

To believe is to repent.

The way in which the di.sciple at second hand
.

-

receives the gift of faith is exactly the same.

·For in

reality. there is no such person as a disciple at second
hand.

The God-man ls not merely eternal and He is not

. merely historical.

He is an absolute fact and thus can be
co~temporary to every generation. 1 7 He has the power to
force a decision for anyone who will believe in Him in any

age •. The God-man must always supply the condition for
truth to each individual directly.

Only if one pays atten-

tion to the-sign and then steps out of the crowd as an
individual.sinner is he a believer.

One can look at the

sign and be.aroused to repentance equally well in any generation.

There is only a quantitative difference between the

strict historical contemporary of the God-man and the
believer of a later generation.

What a man of one generation

can do for a man of another generation is to pass on the
testimony of his belier. 18 In this way, the testimony of
one believer can
believer.

arou~e

the attention of another potential

But, this arousal of the attention through the

tradition of believers is not a sufficient condition for

L
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faith.

It is only a quantitative occasion that cannot in

itself bring about the new quality of belief.
So it is that one receives the gift of faith whereby

'

he stands in a paradoxical relationship to the paradoxical.
In the God-man he sees the judge and by looking inward he
sees himself as a sinner.
he believes.

If he accepts himself as a sinner,

But this is possible only through the gift of

the witness who arouses his attention.

In order to believe,

a man has to receive the gift of the absplute witness.
·then only some believe.

But

That is, only some will exercise

their freedom as an individual.

The accepting of oneself

as a sinner is the free act of the individual.

But, what

is the role of reason in this act of accepting the gift of
faith?

What happens to reason as one places himself within

the paradoxical relation to the paradoxical?
First of all, as we have seen when treating the
proofs for the existence of God, 1 9 the paradox bestows
itself when reason sets itself aside.

But, the act of

setting itself aside is an act of reason.

So reason must

first reason to its limit and in so doing realize that the
limit exists.

Faith is thus occasioned by reason.

But,

faith is the third entity which permits reason and the
paradox to encounter one another happily in the moment. 20
Thus, reason not only has the role of setting itself aside
but it can be preserved within the context of faith.

Just
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as religiousness B dethroned the aesthetic but still
preserved it and just as love of neighbour dethroned the
erotic love but still permitted it, so does faith dethrone
reason but still preserve it.
If one is to be a philosopher within the context of
faith, then his reason is necessary for his faith.

Just as

religiousness A was absolutely necessari for religiousness B,
so is reason absolutely necessary for the philosopher if he
is to have faith.

And reason can still exist even within

·faith, just as the aesthetic could exist even though
dethroned.

Reason is dethroned when it recognizes that it

cannot produce the awareness of sin and when it admits
nevertheless that sin exists.
Thus, we have seen the new paradox of faith, its
genesis and reason's relation to it.

But before leaving

this painting of Descartes with his firm distinction between
reason and faith, we should clearly summarize the relation
of the dialectics of reason to the double movement leap.
Kierkegaard presents three paradoxes that stand in a
temporal relation to one another.
the paradox of knowledge.

First, one encounters

As he works his way through this

there arises the paradox of the unlimited God being known.
Then he sees that if he is to know the God, the God must
also be human.
dox.

The humanity of God is thus the third para-

The first collision of reason and the paradox has
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. therefore to do with knowing something external.

This is the

problem of the mere aesthete before he makes the first movement of the leap.

He solves this paradox by moving inward

and discovering his unity with the Divine,

This solution to

the second paradox ls the first movement of the leap.
then·he
discovers that he 1.s not only God.
......
.
'•

tfuit he is also a sinner.

But

He discovers

This discovery is revealed to him

when the God-man reveals himself.

This takes place in the

second» movement of the leap.
Thus, if a man ls a Christian philosopher he will
proceed according to the same basic pattern as the Christian
lover.

He will move from the first collision to the first

movement of the leap·and from there to the second collision.
From the second collision of the aesthetic and ethical he
will then move on.to the second movement of the leap.

In

such a way does Descartes differ both from the Greek philosophers and from the philosophers of

C~ristendom.

But, this

distinction can be even further clarified if we now consider
the existential structures of the leap.
~~·.

[

For the Christian

philosopher lives his philosophy in a way :that both the

...,,.

~.

r.
t
~'

Greeks and the Hegelians do not.

The existential structures

of the leap will further clarify both the love and reason
structures of the leaJlr.

They will also prepare us to examine

the faith structures of the leap which will in turn further
clarify the sin structures.
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CHAPTER VI
THE EXISTENTIAL STRUCTURES OF THE LEAP

At the very end of Fear and Trembling, we find the
painting wherein Kierkegaard contrasts Socrates and
Abraham as they break their silence at the moment of death. 1
This issue of death and of silence plunges us at once into
what Kierkegaard means by the existential.

How do these

· two men approach death in such a way that they are both
existential?

How do they maintain silence and yet speak

that last word as existentialists?
mean by the existential?
Abra.ham are contrasted.
different ways.

What does Kierkegaard

But then again, Socrates and
They are existentialists in very

How is the existential distinguished in

its two basic kinds?
It is in The Postscript that Kierkegaard clarifies
the existential structures of the leap.

Here he shows how

the leap is always a leaping, that is, a becoming subjective.
This becoming subjective or, as he calls it, this subjective
truth, is what he means by the existential.

But,

~

Postscrint does not only clarify the leap by explicating
its existential structfures.

The Postscript is also a kind

of commentary upon all of Kierkegaard's previous aesthetic
lit~ra.ture.

L

Thus, in this book he not only introduces us
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to the existential structures of the leap but he then
relates these structures of the leap to the previous
structures which we have examined.

Hence, The Postscript

marks the great turning point in Kierkegaard's authorship.
Here he firmly distinguishes between aesthetic religion and
Christian religion even in its existential dimensions.

He

completes and summarizes all he has to say about the leap
from the aesthetic viewpoint.

He paves the way for his

purely Christian development of the leap.
In its fundamental meaning,. existence refers to the

kind of being which a particular, thinking, human entity
possesses. 2 Thus, Kierkegaard considers the being of an
idea to be non-existential.
lar.

It is abstract and not particu-

Also, he contrasts the being of a human with the being

of a potato.

The human can

potato cannot.

p~ssess

an idea in a way that the

the existential, Kierkegaard refers to

By

that particular entity which can have ideas.

Thus,

~either

an idea nor a potato ls existential ln the strictest sense.
But, Kierkegaard goes even further in defining the existential.
He declares that "God does not think, he creates; God does
not exist, He ls eternal."3

Thus, according to Kierkegaard

there are at least four levels of being:
and partlculae entitles without ideas.
..

'

.

..

'

God, idea, human,
Existence in lts

strictest ..sense Kierkegaard predicates only of the human.
But, then Kierkegaard clarifies the existential ln

L
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man even further.

For man can have both exlstentlal·and

non-existential aspect·s.

He refers to thought within

existence as a foreign medium. 4

Because of abstract thought

one can live outside the realm of existence.

He can live in

the realm of possibility instead of reality.

This poetic or

intellectual standpoint which sees only possibility and is
disinterested in the particular is the foundation for a nonexlstential way of life and for degrees of the existential
within ways of life.

Because of his thought,

·for man to escape the existential.

1~

is possible

But again, it ls .because

of his finite thought that man can be existential.

The

potato which lacks thought cannot be existential.

So man

is existential. insofar as he is a mixture of the ideal and
the particular, of the finite and the lnfinite.5

But

:through thought he can escape the existential predicament
and

li~e,only

in the ideal, that is, in the non-existential.

Hence, there ls only a certain kind of issue which
is truly existential.

If one can attain objective certainty

about some issue, then it ls not existential.
purely ideal.

It can become

Thus, one can wonder about whether or not a

scientist can bring life out of non-life.

But this is not

an existential issue, for all the scientist has to do is
produce life and the Rroblem ls solved.

However, eth1co-

rel1gious issues like the existence of God, my life after
death, my prayer life, and the issue of whether I should
marry this woman or not are .existent1a1.issues.6

'-···

They

107

cannot be solved by means of objective evidence.
onl7 be entered into by a subjective decision.
"

They can
Thus, that

question of death and how to approach it, which we encounter
1n our Socrates-Abraham painting, is an existential question.
For these two men do not convert it into an objective matter.
They preserve its subjectivity in silence and in their ironic
last word.
So, the existential has to do with human existence.
But the human can escape his existential dimension.

He can

. flee into the objective.

But why would he want to do that

and how would he do it?

The answer to this question begins

to emerge as we further clarify the meaning of the existential especially in its relationship to the leap.
In The Fragments we saw that the leap was the moment,
the instant.

But, in The Postscript, Kierkegaard. develops

another aspect of the leap.

Here he writes:

•The martyrdom of faith (crucifixion of the
understanding) is not a martyrdom of the instant
but precisely the martyrdom of endurance."?
So the leap begins with the suddenness of the instant but
it endures through a lifetime.

Death for Socrates was not

something he faced only as he departed life.
dying that philosopher's death.

'

He was always

So also the sacrifice of

Isaac did not just end for Abraham as he lay down the knife.
That event endured through his life.

But, what is the nature
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of this leaping?

Kierkegaard refers to it as becoming

subjective and as subjective truth.

In the theses attributable to Lessing8 Kierkegaard
points out how the subjective thinker "is constantly in the
process or becoming, 1.e., he is always striving~" 9

He

agrees with Lessing that "if God held all truth in His right
hand. and in His left the lifelong pursuit of it, he would
choose the left hand."lO

Man must constantly be striving

for truth and can never completely attain it because of his
·finl te and temporal nature.

He can be 1n contact with truth

because of his infinite and eternal nature but this is
limited by his other side.

Because man is existential,

because he is that mixture, he can only continue to strive
after truth and if he does not continue to strive he
~estroys

himself as existential.

A logical system wherein

one is concerned only with the abstract and ideal is
possible for man.
impossible.

But an existential system for man is

God can know of all reality in a final and

perfect way but man cannot.

11

Hence, Kierkegaard. defines truth for man as:

"an

objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation process
of the most passionate inward.ness. 1112

Man can never have

objective certitude about the existence of God, about his
own immortality, about whether he should now marry this
woman.

In ethico-religious matters, objective evidence can
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never completely convince him.

And yet, these are the most

important matters of his life.

Therefore, he can be con-

cerned about them with the greatest possible inwardness.
To be so concerned and yet always to.realize that objective

evidence will never occur ls to be 1n subjectlve·truth.
is to be constantly striving.
was with Socrates.

It is to be leaping.

So it

He always concerned himself with all of

his energy about eth1co-rel1gious matters.
of immortality.

It

He never forgot

As a philosopher, he was always concerned

·with death even so that he could say, philosophy is a dying.
So also with Abraham.
haunt him.
he was man.

leap.

The sacrifice would not cease to

Its paradox could never leave him as long as
Both of these men were making the existential

But what are the characteristics of this leap even

more specifically?
The characteristic of the existential leap which
Kierkegaard refers to most often is that 1t is the most
difficult of all tasks.

He writes:

"To strive to become what one already is--is a.very
difficult task, the most difficult of all tasks, in
fact, precisely because every human being has a
strong natural bent and passion to become something
more and differe~t." 1 3
One 1s constantly tempted to get rid of his passionate
lnlorardness and either cease caring about ethico-religious
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matters or to convert them into matters of objective·
certitude.

Not to give in to the temptation is the most

difficult of .all tasks.
tion.

Hegelian1sm gave in to the tempta-

The people of K1erkegaard•s day were constantly in

danger of givtrg in to it especially because of the increased
knowledge of the day.
Christianity was not

They could easily forget that
~matter

of mere knowledge.

Kierkegaard

saw it as his vocation to make things difficult for people.
To stem the tide of ease was his quest.
The existential leap is very deceitful in its difficulty.

It can even appear to the observer as an easy task.

But, as Kierkegaard puts it:

•tt is as if one were to recommend being put to
death by the guillotine, saying:

it is a very

easy matter, forsooth; you simply lay your head
down on a block, somebody pulls a string, the axe
falls - and the thing is done.

But suppose that

being executed was precisely what one did not wish;
and so also the leap.

When one is indisposed to

make the leap, so indisposed that this passion
makes the chasm infinitely wide, then the most
ingenious contrivance for the purpose will not
help at all ... l 4

'

The leap is difficult because it is a lifelong task.

One is

constantly tempted to be finished with life before it is
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finished. with him. 1 5

Thus, 1 t ls prec·isely illusion and

c{~celt that lay at the bottom of the difficulty.

..;;·is finished once he has made the decision.
is a leaping throughout all of one's life.

One thinks

But the leap

One must

constantly renew the decision.
"It is easier to become a Christian when I am not
a Christian than to become a Christian when I am
one. 1116
Becoming subjective is the most difficult of all tasks
because it is so easy to think that I have become subjective •
.· -

But that is precisely to become objective.
~

An immediate implication of this difficulty is the

second characteristic of the existential leap, namely, that
the leap is a suffering of inwardness.
"While aesthetic existence is essentially enjoyment,
and ethical existence is essentially struggle and
victory, religious existence is essentially suffering,
and that not as a transitional moment, but as a
persisting.

The suffering is, to recall the Frater•s

words, the seventy thousand fathoms deep on which the
religious man constantly lies.

But suffering is

precisely inwardness, and it is an inwardness which
marks itself off 'from the aesthetic and the ethical
types of existential inwardness." 1 7
The suffering of the leap is a suffering that arises from

from within because of the paradox.

As long as the

is there one is over the seventy thousand fathoms.

par~

This

suffering grows out of the collision which is manifest in
subjective truth.

There is always the tension of objective

uncertainty and passionate inwardness.

One wants certainty

more than anything else but he knows he cannot attain it.
However, he still persists in his concern.

This is the

suffering of inwardness.
A third characteristic of the existential leap which
.runs through Kierkegaard's authorship is that of scandal or
the ·offence.

We have already had occasion to treat this

characteristic when we were clarifying the sin and the
reason structures of the leap.

It will arise again when we

treat the incarnational structures of the leap.

At present

we need merely to point out that two of Kierkegaard's most
frequent adjectives by which he describes the religious are
suffering and offence.
offensive.
death.

Both Socrates and Abraham are

Socrates was so offensive that they put him to

Abraham looks like the murderer of his own child.

Both of these men appeared as offensive and both suffered
~he

offence of the paradox.

The paradox which founds

subjective truth is offensive.
Then there is,the fourth characteristic of
individuality.

The individual is one of Kierkegaard's most

fundamental concepts.

It refers to the man who is making
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the existential leap.

Socrates could only go inward.alone.

No teacher could really help him.
midwife.

And Abraham had an absolute relation to the

absolute.
, ~:::~;'.

Even he· could only be a

His relationship to God was not mediated by any

relative means.

He alone could face the full meaning of

Isaac's death.

Both Socrates and Abraham stood alone as

·f··

individuals before death.
with them.

No man could share their secret

Both stood as lonely rebels against the

established order.
so different.

They were offensive because they were

They suffered the most difficult of all

sufferings because they were alone over the seventy thousand
fathoms.
But what did all this mean?
locked in utter silence.
if they were to speak.

It meant that they were

No one could understand them even
They were beyond the limits of

language in their existential leap.

Kierkegaard puts it

nicely when he writes .that Jacobi:
"is not dialectically clear about the leap, so as
to understand that it cannot be taught or communicated directly, precisely because it is an act of
isolation, which leaves it to the individual to
decide. 018
By the existential leap one enters the realm of the paradox
beyond und.erstand1ng and beyond language,

Thus, Socrates

and Abraham are silent about their death except for that
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last ironical word whereby they both point to the necessity

of

silence.

The leap can only be commun:tca ted indirectly.

Such are the characteristics of the existential
leap.

Socrates and Abraham both made that leap.

both existentialists.
of contrast.

They were

But Kierkegaard's main point is one

They participated in the characteristics of

the existential leap in very different ways.

What is the

distinction between the two levels of the existential which
Kierkegaard. is so intent upon showing?
The difference between the existential leap of
Socrates and that of Abraham is precisely the difference
between religiousness A and religiousness B.

Socrates only

makes the first movement of the leap which takes him as far
as natural or aesthetic religion.

Abraham makes both move.ments of the leap which take him to the religion of faith. 1 9
Kierkegaard contrasts the two as follows:
"If the individual is inwardly defined by selfannihilation before God, then we have religiousness A.

If the individual is paradoxically

dialectic, every vestige of original immanence
\being annihilated and all connection cut off, the
individual being brought to the utmost verge of
existence, then we have the paradoxical religious.

ness.

This paradoxical inwardness is the greatest
20
possible •••• "
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Only Abraham lives at the utmost verge of existe.nce.
has a paradoxical relation to the paradoxical.

He

Socrates

relates only straightforwardly to the paradoxical.
Both men experience becoming subjective.
in subjective truth.
objectivity.

Both live

Both of them avoid the flight into

Thus, Kierkegaard contrasts the Greek or

existential dialectic with the Hegelian dialectic:
"The Greek philosopher was an existing individual
and did not permit himself to forget that fact.
In order that he might devote himself wholly to
.. ·thought, he therefore sought refuse in suicide, or
in a pythagorean dying from the world, or in a
Socratic form of philosopher's death ••••
involved him in a process of becoming.

Existence
In order to

think in very truth he took his own life.

Modern

philosophy from its lofty heights smiles at such
childishness. 1121
Socrates just as well as Abraham is involved in an existential dialectic.

But there is a difference in kind between

the two forms of the dialectic.

As we have seen when treat-

ing the reason structures of the leap, Socrates does not
abandon the paradox.

He finds within himself something of

Typhon and something of the Divine.

However, through the

infinite resignation of his recollection theory, he does not
have what Kierkegaard calls a paradoxical relationship to
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the paradoxical.

His existential dialectic lacks this

dimension which ls possible only by virtue-of the absurd.
-~:~--

-

Within his context of resignation, the last word of

Socrates about death is a jest.

His point is to show that

through his philosopher's life he has already passed into
the eternal and as a result he can approach physical death
without fear and trembling.
reason.

He relates to the paradox with

Abraham, on the other hand, approaches death very

differently.

He too has reached resignation and, therefore,

.shares in the paradox of Socrates.

But, by virtue of the

absurd, he continues to believe in the temporal fulfillment
of the promise and thus he relates paradoxically to the
paradox.

For Socrates life would come after death.

That

is not absurd.
Because of this basic difference between the two
leaps, there is also a difference in kind 1n the characteristics of the existential leap for the two men.

Socrates

can approach death in jest but Abraham only in fear and·
trembling.

To make both leaps is difficult but, strictly

speaking, only the double movement leap is the most difficult of all tasks.
difficult.

The first movement is only analogously

The leap of Socrates whereby he abandoned

physical science and spught knowledge within was an existential task which took great effort.
leap he was beyond real difficulty,

But, once he made the
His immanent.relation

117

to the divine, that is, his non-paradoxical relationship to
the paradoxical grounded his jest.

But, the absurdity of

Aoraham's position could ground only fear and trembling.

:1.

Abraham believed in the fulfillment of the promise with an
aesthetic immediacy not unlike that of Socrates.

But the

promise was to be fulfilled in time, not in eternity.

And

the means whereby it was to be fulfilled was temp·oral.
Abraham's difficulty was to destroy the means and yet still
be convinced of the end.
So also Socrates had a great inwardness.
he.went inward he discovered that he was divine.

But when
Even if

there were strong traces of Typhon within him, he still knew
the bliss of the one and with reason held to that as the
only reality.

Abraham lived only for the fulfillment of

the promise in time.

With the conviction of Socrates he

knew it would be fulfilled.
first movement of the leap.

That conviction he had with the
But then in his inward dread he

saw himself destroying the only means to the fulfillment of
the_ promise.

The means was infinitely important to Abraham

whereas it was not to Socrates.
Socrates.

The moment was lost for

But because it was there for Abraham, his inward

suffering was even of a different kind from that of Socrates.
This differencr of kind is clear in the characteristic of scandal.

Kierkegaard writes:
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"Christianity is the only power which is able
truly to arouse offense; for hysterical and
sentimental fits of offense at this or that can
be simply dismissed and explained as lack of
ethical seriousness which is coquettishly busy
about complaining of the whole world instead of
itself." 22
Socrates was only capable of experiencing accidental scandal
but Abraham was capable of facing the essential scanda1. 2 3
So also as individuals, Socrates and Abraham were
essentially different.

Socrates relates to himself only

within an improper ethical context.

He never leaves the

realm of the aesthetic even though he is a most ethical and
religious man.
himself fuilty.
creativity.

Thus, he cannot sin.

He cannot freely make

But Abraham is capable of individual

He is capable of creating or destroying some-

thing of supreme importance within time.

He discovers the

infinitely important as did Socrates with absolute mystical
conviction.

But through constant faith he is not swallowed

up ln the infinite.

Through faith he is so able to empha-

size the '!"yphon aspect within himself that it always remains.
Finally, as we have noticed, Socrates in his last
word can jest about death.

'

When he hears his death sentence

he can reveal his infinite resignation by "expressing
surprise that he has been condemned by a majority of three
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votes." 24

But, the communication of Abraham's paradoxical

relationship to the paradoxical calls for even more than
Socratic irony.

He cannot just utter a word that shows

that Isaac is immortal.

The promise cannot be fulfilled

through a dead but immortal Isaac.

It can be fulfilled

only through an Isaac who lives in time.
is to die, what can Abraham say.

And now that Isaac

There is his word:

"God

will provide Himself the lamb for the burnt offering, my

son." 2 5

In this communication, the double movement leap

is manifest.
Isaac."

He does not say:

He does not say:

"you are to be sacrificed,

"I know nothing."

that Isaac must be sacrificed.

He does know

But, to say that would be

an untruth for by faith he knows that it is not to be Isaac.
So through his enigmatic last word, he manifests the double
movement leap.
Hence, Socrates and Abraham both qualify as existentialists.

Both retain passionate inwardness by refusing to

abandon the paradox.

But, between their existential leaps

there is an essential difference.

Socrates relates

immediately to the paradox and does not contradict reason.
Abraham relates paradoxically to the paradox through the
absurd.
leap.

So it is with the existential structures of the
At this point

~

can further clarify the structures

-

of the leap we have so far studied by interpreting them in
terms of subjective truth.

Just as Kierkegaard finds it
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fitting to make a summary of his aesthetic literature in
~e

Postscrlnt, so it would be helpful if we would do

1JJtew1se before moving on to the faith structures of the
leap •
. So far we have seen that within Kierkegaard's
dialectic there are three collisions of the aesthetic and
ethical.

The first takes place before the first movement

of the leap; the second after the first movement of the
leap; and the third after the second movement of the leap •
.Kierkegaard refers to the three contexts within which these
col11s1ons take place as the aesthetic, the ethical, and the
religious, even though all three spheres penetrate each other
at each moment.

In our next chapter, it will be necessary

to study this interpretation of the spheres.

But for the

moment we need to show that it is by the criterion of
existence that Kierkegaard establishes his dialectical
hierarchy of values.
existence.

The aesthetic is most devoid of

The ethical has more.

existential ls the religious.

But the peak of the

In fact, it is even accurate

to say that the existential and the religious are equivalent.
The hierarchy of the stages is determined by the
criterion of existence, which refers to the synthesis of
the aesthetic and the ethical.
three moments:

"

The immediate aesthetic has

yearning as dream, yearning as seeking and

yearning as desire.

When Abraham first received the promise
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his existence was at the level of a plant.

In the enthus-

iasm of his first 1mmed1acy, he salf no diffi.culties.

The

question of truth or certainty had not arisen for him.
did not reflect.
the promise.

He

But then he had to endure the threats to

In his experience of the first collision he

began to reflect.

The ethical and the question of truth

began to emerge for him.

He experienced the imperfections

of temporality and he became uncertain.

But at least he

attained the existential status of the butterfly.

As he

.experienced the either/or of this first collision, he did
no~

go the way of mere objective truth.

He chose the exist-

ential level of a Socrates rather than that of a Hegel.

He

made the first movement of the leap and received Isaac.

In

his second immediacy he was at rest, but only for a moment,
for a new collision announced itself.
the threat to Isaac.

Now he had to endure

Through his faith he made the second

movement of the leap and thus attained the highest level of
existential truth.

In this dialectic of Abraham we see the

existential hierarchy of the plant, the butterfly, a Hegel,
a Socrates and finally that of the mature Abraham.

Ea.ch of

these levels is characterized by a higher synthesis of the
aesthetic and ethical.
The hierarchy ,of love also reveals the existential
criterton.

The erotic dreaming of the page is a perfect

blend of the masculine and the feminine.

There is no
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reflection by which the page distinguishes himself from the
object of his longing.

But then with Papageno the distinct-

16n-between himself and the other is made.

His longing is

a seeking even if it is for the feminine in general.

A~ain

this first collision presents its various posslbilltles.
But the young man does not go the way of Constantine or the
ladies' tailor or the seducer.

He does not choose the

definite even to the forgetfulness of the mysterious.

No,

he follows the way of Victor Eremita and makes the leap of
-erotic inspiration into the new immediacy.
sy~thesis

of the aesthetic and ethical in such a way that

they are held together reflectively.
ls subordinated to the aesthetic.
arises.

He makes a

However, the ethical

But then a new collision

Sympathy rebels against the negative resolution

and calls for equal status for the ethical in a positive
resolution.

Through this new collision, there is revealed

the higher existential possibility of neighbourly love.
This permits a balanced synthesis of aesthetic and ethical
love.

With its eternal demand for temporal love, it permits

both erotic and married love.

Thus, in the dialectic of

love there is the existential hierarchy of the page,
Papageno, the seducer, Victor Eremita, and neighbourly love.
Even in

Kierke~aard's

this existential development.

own life there ls evidence of
As a child, he experienced

the first immediacy of parental love.

The aesthetic and
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ethical were not distinguished for him.

He

duties with the total energy of immediacy.

performe~

his

But then with

his friends, he began to seek other values than those he
had found with his father.

He experienced the new exist-

ential level of the distinction between the aesthetic and
the ethical.
seduction.
violent.

He flirted with Hegelianism.

He flirted with

The first great collision became more and more
The trumpet blast of

and he even thought of suicide.

PaulM~ller

called to him

He abandoned intellect-

ually his search for the aesthetic particular.
abandon it he could not.

But morally

Then he was caught by the fishing

fly of Regina, and in 1838 he made the first movement of the
leap.

He returned to his father and to God with a new

immediacy.

The values of the aesthetic and ethical were

now explicit in their new found harmony.

But the ethical

was subordinate to the aesthetic in this harmony.
a new collision arose.

Should he marry Regina?

that he could if he only had faith.
lifting of the divine counter order.
the earth.

However,
He knew

He waited for the
He waited to return to

He saw in the instant that he could marry.

He

began to make the second movement of the leap but· it was
always only a beginning.

His martyrdom was not that of the

moment but that of endurance.

He endured through the Corsair

'
Affair and the great experience
of 1848 and even the years
of the attack.

He lived on in the absurdity of faith always
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becoming subjective.

Kierkegaard lived through those levels

wherein the aesthetic and ethical at first-were not distinguished, then collided in friction, then were harmonized in
the second immediacy, then were torn apart by sympathy and
were finally separated but united·in the absurdity of faith.
The sin structures of the leap also reveal the
existential gradations.

The aesthetic and ethical are so

united for the child that there is no question of sin.
is just learning the meaning of the terms.

He is in the

·process of sorting out the aesthetic and the ethical.
th~

He

Once

distinction is made the Hegelian possibility can arise.

Kierkegaard labels this as proper ethics of the first order.
The Hegelians know of sin but in accounting for it by
reason they rationalize it away.

They have no existential

possibility of sin because they have abandoned all existential possibility.

However, at this point there is the

possibility of improper ethics.
ignorance.
aesthetics.

Socrates roots sin in

But that is to put ethics on the background of
It is to destroy the significance of the

temporal moment wherein one can sin.

Socrates preserves

subjective evil in his improper ethics, whereas Hegel and
Christendom fail to do so.

But for Socrates there are no

individual subjects, pence no personal sin.

Finally, there

is the ·possibility of sin within the context of proper
ethics of the second order.

Here, individual guilt is
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possible because there are free individuals.

At this· level

the ethical ls not swallowed up in the. aesthetic as it was
fo·r Socrates.

gory

or

The ethical is not subsummed under the cate-

ideal rationality as it was for Hegel.
Finally, we can see how the existential is the

criterion which distinguishes the reason structures of the
'

leap.

Reason arises with the paradox of kn?wledge which is

its first collision.

Reason can emerge out of the first

collision in either the.Hegelian or the Socratic way.

If

it becomes Hegelian, then it will reduce all matters to
objective certainty and thereby move into metaphysical
disinterestedness and lack of passion.

If reason makes the

first movement of the leap by moving inward in ethical
passion, then it will discover a new dimension of the paradoxical.
its limit.

Reason will collide with the other.

It will meet

It can Socratically remain here or it can move

on to even a higher existential possibility.

By reason of

faith, it can move from immanence to transcendence.
even collide with the limit-become-limited.

It· can

This is the

new paradox of the absurd wherein the ethical is no longer
lost in the aesthetic.

At this existential level, the

aesthetic and ethical are related with equal importance.
The ethical moment is 8'1-ven an eternal importance.
-So, Socrates and Abraham are both existentialists.
Hegel abandons the existential.

Kierkegaard primarily
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affirms the existential of the two movements of the leap
and any dialectical stage besides that is :non-exis.tential.
Btit; by the first movement of the

one enters religious-

l~ap

ness A and by the second movement of the leap he enters
religiousness B.
religious

a~~

Therefore, the existential and the

equivalent.

Any other stage is non-existential.

.

The immediate aesthetic is non-existential.

The collision

of the aesthetic and.the ethical before the first movement
of the leap. is non-existential.

The flight into objectivity

·out of the first collision is more existential.

If one wants

to.say that the ethical is existential, then he has to mean
the ethico-religious.

He has to mean the ethical as it is

subordinated to the aesthetic immediacy of natural religion,
or he has to mean the ethical as it has equal rights with
.the aesthetic within Christianity.

There is no such state

as an existential ethical state without religion.
But, this brings us to a new problem.

If the

existential is a synthesis of the aesthetic and ethical,
then was it not there even in the pre-leap moments?

There

is some kind of synthesis even in the child and in the first
collision.

Does not one have to say that even the child and

even the Hegelian can be religious?
in some way even in

t~e

Is not faith present

aesthete just as the aesthetic is

present in the man of faith?

Here we have the problem of

the interpenetration of the spheres.

This question brings

us to the faith structures of the leap.
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CHAPTER VII
THE FAITH STRUCTURES OF 'l'HE LEAP

In Fear and Trembling it is perhaps Kierkegaard's
beautiful little portrait of "that blessed woman, the mother
of God, the Virgin Mary," which whispers to us most fruitfUlly of the faith structures of the leap. 1 She was highly
favored and yet what distress, what dread, what paradox were
hersl

She was God's mother and yet it was still her privil-

ege and her agony to believe in Him.
double movement leap?

How did Mary make the

What were the elements of her faith?

How were these elements related so as to be dynamic?

What

were the negative and positive aspects of her faith?
All along, we have been saying that the double movement leap is a synthesis of the aesthetic and the ethical.
We have seen that existence is a synthesis of the temporal
and the eternal.

But what sort of synthesis is this?

Did

not Kierkegaard above all else teach the doctrine of the
Either/Or?

Did he not argue that one had to be either

aesthetic or ethical and that one could not be both?

In

Works of Love, for example, he writes that erotic love
always claims an Eithe~/Or~
a compromise thenr

If Christian love should strive
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"Both poetic and Christian love have become confused,

.

.

and the replacement is neither the

po~tlc

nor the

Chrlstian."3
One must pay great attention to the either/or for in
attempting a both-and it is easy to come up with a neithernor.
But, on the other hand, there must be a valid form
of the both-and,

For at the very heart of Kierkegaard's

philosophy lies the idea that:
"The subjective thinker is not a man of science,
but an artist.

Existing is an art.

The subjective

thinker is aesthetic enough to give his life
aesthetic content, ethical enough to regulate it
and dialectical enough to interpenetrate it with
thought," 4
The highest form of the existential ls precisely a combination of the temporal and the eternal or the ethical and the
aesthetic.

Thus, we have to make a distinction between two

kinds of both-and, one which is illegitimate and one which
is absolutely necessary for the Kierkegaardian philosophy,
Mary, in her faith, lived out precisely such a
synthesis of aesthetic and ethical love.

For her the

eternal and the temporal were united in her child but like

'
human she could
only see the temporal.

However,

through faith, she knew of His eternal divinity.

How were

any

oth~r

these elements of the eternal and temporal balanced .in her
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faith?

How did she accoDJ,plish the

bo,th~and.

avoid the both-and of Christendom?
i

By a

of faith, and

c~ose

analysis of

the forms of despair in Sickness unto Death, we shall be
able to understand the elements of her faith and of all
faith.

Despair is the opposite of faith.

Thus, in des-

cribing despair, Kierkegaard. gives us a negative description
of faith.

By showing us what faith is not he at the same

time shows us what it is.

By an analysis of faith's

balance in Sickness unto Death we shall see both the proper
and the improper senses of the both-and.
As we have seen,5 Kierkegaard defines man in
Sickness unto Death as a relationship, related to himself
and to God.

This means that man is aesthetic (he is

related to the other) and ethical (he is related to himself)
and religious (he is related to God').

Any break in the

balance of this threefold relation constitutes despair.
If a man should relate only to the other he would be in
aesthetic despair.

If he should relate only to himself he

would be in ethical despair.

If he should relate only to

God he would be in the despair of infinite resignation.
Thus, there are three basic kinds of despair or three ways
in which a man can remain outside the both-and of faith.
By aesthetic despair, we refer to a plunge into

' possibility.
infinity, eternity, and

One becomes an

aesthete by projecting an eternal value upon a temporal
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object.

This is a kind of worldliness whereby one attri6
Qutes "infinite value to the indifferent.". Aesthetic
"'
dftspair
is always a swallowing up of the self in the object.

It ignores the limits of finitude and actuality.
"Possibility then appears to the self even greater
and greater, more and more things become possible,
because nothing becomes actual.

At last it .is as

if everything were possible - but this is precisely

when the abyss has swallowed up the self."7
Thus, it is evident that in aesthetic despair, we
have an illegitimate kind of the both-and.
are found here.
possibility.
actuality.

Both elements

There is aesthetic infinity, eternity and

There is ethical finitude, temporality and
But, the both-and is accomplished by a pre-

reflective transformation of .the finite into the infinite,
the temporal into the eternal and the actual into the
possible.

The aesthete is in despair because he does not

recognize the ethical aspect of reality.

Through yearning

or melancholy, he makes a dishonest projection of what he
wants upon what is.
Kierkegaard describes two types of this aesthetic
despair.

There is that of the young girl who eternalizes

the present moment.

This is pure non-reflective despair.

'

Then there is the despair of the old man who dreams dreams
and the young man who sees visions.

The old man eternalizes
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the past and the young man the future.
~~lationship

Neither has a full

to himself as he is in the present.

In the

io.ung girl, the young man and the old man, we see the three
stages of the immediate aesthetic.

The young girl is like

the page who has the longing of the dream.

The young man

is like Papageno whose longing is an indefinite seeking.
The old man is like Don Giovanni whose longing is a definite
desire.
Just as aesthetic despair converts all into the
eternal, infinite, and possible so ethical despair converts
all into the temporal, finite, and actual,
takes two forms:

This despair too

that of weakness and that of defiance.

In the despair of weakness:
"A man finds it too venturesome a thing to be
himself, far easier and.far safer to be like the
others, to become an imitation, a number, a cipher
in the crowd ••••

The despair which not only

occasions no embarrassment but makes one's life
easy and comfortable is naturally not regarded as
despair." 8
lt is precisely this despair of weakness which
seems to compromise the both-and and receives instead a
neither-nor.

This is the despair of Christendom which

abandons both the passion of poetic love and the passion of
Christian love,

It seeks to be purely ethical, that is, to
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be at home in the temporal without any passion for the
~ternal.

m~.st

But the ethical can never stand l?Y itself.

It

be rooted either in the background of the aesthetic

or the background of Christianity.

This despair of weakness

is made possible by Christianity which emphasizes the
importance of the temporal.

But, this form of despair will

not admit the passion of the aesthetic which Christianity
also demands and thus it falls into the weakness of comfort
and security.

It wants both the aesthetic lack of dread

and the Christian earthly emphasis.
aestbetic nor Christian passion.

But it receives neither

The philosophical express-

ion for this form of despair is Hegelianism.

The second form of ethical despair is that of
defiance wherein one chooses to remain in infinite resignation.

This can be referred

~o

as ethical despair even

though it is still improperly ethical, that is, it is set
in the context of the aesthetic.

For it is an attitude of

self reflection and even decision.
wherein one wills not to be himself.
free to make decisions.

But it is a decision
He wills not to be

However, in this ethical despair

one does not flee into the protective crowd as did the weak
one.

He does not seek relief by becoming anonymous.

Rather, in his introversion he stands alone in proud

'
defianee against all others
and against God.
puts it:

As Kierkegaard
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•The dialectic of resignation is commonly this:

·····

to will to be one's eternal self, and the:n with .
.•

.t:t ... respect

to something positive wherein the self

suffers, not to will to be oneself, contenting
oneself with the thought that after all this·w111
disappear in eternity, thinking itself therefore
justified in not accepting it in time, so that,
although suffering under it, the self will not
make to it the concession that it properly belongs
to the self, that is, it will not humble itself
under it in faith ... 9
So, this despair of defiance is also made possible by the
Christian context.

One sees his weakness; but then flees

from it in resignation.

The Greek and especially the Stoic

could flee resignation; but he did not see the weakness to
be his own personal possession so clearly as does this
defiant man.

He has caught a glimpse of the possibility of

the second movement of the leap.

His individual sin has

suggested itself to him but he chooses to be ignorant of
it.

In this way, he cancels out the finite and concentrates

only on the infinite.

Thus, here too is an unbalanced both-

and.
In so describing aesthetic and ethical despair,

'

Kierkegaard. shows five instants where the both-and is not
a satisfactory synthesis.

The young girl has her nose

134
pressed so closely against the windm·:r of the world tt:ia t
she cannot even see her own reflection.
a· . dream world.

She longs within

She feels that she can have, and do, and

be, all that she wants.

All these things are within her.

Both the finite and the infinite ar·e united for her because
she does not see the difference.

This synthesis of naivete

has not made the distinction between past, present and
fUture; between possibility and actuality; between the
finite and the infinite.

The synthesis of the young man

is a little more advanced in despair.

He feels some kind

of distinction between himself and the other and therefore
he can seek his vision.

The future singles itself out for

him as distinct from the present, but it is not yet a
fUture with definite finite objects.

He still lives in the

pre-reflective ignorance wherein he does not yet distinguish
the particular finite thing from his vision of the infinite.
The old man dreams dreams about definite events of his past
life.

He not only has made the distinction between the

dimensions of time but he has made the distinction between
many finite things.

But, still he chases after each separ-

ate, finite individual as if it were the infinite.

His

synthesis of the finite and the infinite is still one wherein
he fails to distinguish the two.

The man of weakness finally

"
reaches the level of reflection
wherein he can distinguish
himself from the other finite thing and himself from the
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infinite.

He sees himself as a finite being needing· the

1·nfini te.

But in his weakness he despairs: of ever attain-

ing this infinite; so he forgets it and becomes lost in the

comfortable world of finite individuals.

His synthesis is

not one of the both-ancL but rather one of the neither-nor.
Finally, we have the man who has made the first movement of
the leap.

The man of weakness represents Don Giovanni or

the ladies' tailor at the every day level and Hegel at the
philosophical level.

The man of defiance represents a man

.who has gone as far as Victor Erem1ta or Socrates, but then
wh~n

given the gift of faith refuses to accept it.

He ls

one who has gone as far as the movement of faith but is so
scandalized by evil that he refuses to face it.

His

synthesis is so existential that he faces the paradox of
the infinite as finite but he will not face it paradoxically.
He faces it immanently and then succumbs to it in objective
dread.

He chooses to forget the finite.
Such then, are the contradictory and the inadequate

synthesis of the both-and.
either/or must reign.

At the aesthetic level the

But, at the Christian level the

either/or of the aesthetic is overcome in a both-and which
permits both the aesthetic and the ethical to dwell side by
side as distinct and

~et

as harmonized.

Just how does this

second movement of the leap take place wherein one fully
recovers the ethical while retaining the eternal?

What ·is
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the dynamic force by which one moves back to the finl te?
'- ..

-

In his painting of Mary, Kierkegaard. tells us that

:.;.

sh_e ,became great by saying, "behold, the handmaid of the
Lord."

Through her acceptance of God's gift she made the

leap of faith.

By this faith she entered the realm of

distress, dread, and. paradox.
as Mary?"lO

"What woman was so mortified

So it is with all men who believe.

In accept-

ing the gift of faith they become mortified even to the
point of distress, dread and paradox. It is in his book
Purity of Heart ls to Will one Th1ng11 that Kierkegaard
clarifies the relation between this mortification and the
movement of faith.

One reaches that perfect synthesis of

the both-and wherein he wills only one thing through the
mortification of repentance.

By this act he accepts himself

as an individual who has sinned.
The voice of conscience which calls a man from double
mindedness to purity of heart is a two-fold voice.

It is

a voice which calls to him both from behind and from in
front.

out of the past it reminds him of his guilt, that

ls, of the divided ways upon which he has dissipated his
energy.

From the future it puts before him the ideal of

the one way wherein he wills only the good.

If one is

silent and listens to this voice of eternity which speaks

"

through-the past and the future, he will repent and become
collected in the present with purity of heart. 12
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The voice of conscience reveals all those barriers
to willing one thing which were described in Sickness unto
neath as the forms of d·espair.

These forms of double

mindedness, wherein the false both-and of the aesthetic
ways reign, are revealed in their falsity.

The young girl

might dream of variety and great moments. But this is not
to will one thing. 1 3 Her mind mirrors its objects and it
becomes split and is at odds with itself when it seeks many
objects.

Only when one wills one thing, which is the good,

.does he have purl ty of heart.
The young man too, who seeks his vision which
beckons to him for the future, is also double minded. 14
For even if he wills only the good and the reward that might
come from willing it, he has not purity of heart.

Ir he but

listens to conscience he will· see that the reward is also
something and that in willing it he is double minded.
Repentance should not be motivated by the desire for reward
for that, too, is but another form of despair.

True faith

does not seek the reward of heaven which lies off in the
future like the young man's vision.

No, the true synthesis

of both heaven and earth, of both the eternal and the
temporal, does not see heaven as a future reward.
heaven and earth as

It sees·

on~.

-The old man might not dream of variety and he might
not seek after future reward, but he can still be double
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minded.

If he looks into the past at his sins and then

desires the good out of fear of punishment,- he is still
di'.ksipated in the manifold of the false both-and. 1 5 Man
should not fear punishment; he should fear to do the wrong.
If one concentrates both upon punishment and upori the good,
then he does not

~nly

will the good.

Even if one preserves

a certain slavish blamelessness out of fear of punishment,
he would still be double minded.
Even if one becomes ethical and in his self
reflection does not dream of the manifold or seek reward
or-~ear

punishment, he can still be double minded.

It is

possible that he might live in an egocentric service of
the good. 16 He might not seek only the good but the victory
of the good.

Thus, Victor Eremita, in his impatience for

the victory of the good, might be scandalized by the slowness of time which clothes the good.

This man of defiant

despair might, like Judas, treacherously wish to hasten the
victory of the good.

He does not perfectly harmonize time

and eternity, for in his quest for victory he is impatient
with time.

Thus, even though he appears as ethical, he

shows in reality that he is improperly ethical.

He really

misuses the temporal in his eternal quest.
Finally, there, is the double mindedness of weakness.
This other ethical attitude is a barrier to willing one
thing because it will only become committed to a certain
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degree • 1 7

This man does not forsake the temporal bu·t he

..

dwells in the

tempo~al

with

busynes~.

In his busyness,

he.-lets time cut him off from contemplation and the eternal
of contemplation - this man misuses the eternal in his
temporal quest.

With his ability and indefatigable industry,

he might become well-to-do and respected, but he is busy
with trivialities.
clear course.

He does not chart out a straight and

He might even be busy only for the good but

his very busyness is another goal.

He does not live for

_the victory of the good but he lives for busyness in service
of:the good.

This too is not purity of heart.

It is a way

of life that is without the passion of the eternal.

It is

neither Christian nor aesthetic.
Despair then is double mindedness and faith ls the
purity of heart which wills one thing.

This double minded-

ness is always an unbalanced joining of both the aesthetic
and the ethical.

It is such a perfect balance that they

become one thing, not one thing through a pre-reflective
indistinctness, but one thing even in their clear distinctness.

How is it that one moves along the stages of life's

way wherein he despairs to that stage of willing one thing?
What is the dynamic force by which one moves from the
collision of both the aesthetic and the ethical to their

"

harmony· in the double movement leap?
It was in The Concept of Dread that Kierkegaard
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began to spell out the dynamics of the double movement leap.
There he showed how dread is that psychological phenomenon
->

whereby one can plunge down into himself and rise up a new
man.

Dread had very much to do with·the attractive yet

repelling powers of eros.

We have seen how sympathy is one

of the aspects of that dynamic force whereby one moves
toward the second movement of the leap. 18 In Purity of
Heart, Kierkegaard again briefly refers to the dynamic
power of eros and speaks _of how it can educate one toward
the good. 1 9 But, then he goes on to write that shame will
help_ one "better than all human sympathy which easily leads
to double mindedness." 20 What is Kierkegaard's concept of
shame?

We have seen that shame played a great role in
Kierkegaard's development. 21 How is shame related to
repentance and to dread?

How does it bring a man from

double mindedness and despair to purity of heart and faith?
Kierkegaard points out that one might be more
serious ln his task when another is watching him than when
he is alone.

This shame before another which motivates one

to efficiency is, however, the shame of the child.

There is

a higher sense of shame wherein one is most of all ashamed
even before himself.
one to will one thing.

This is the shame which strengthens
This self-shame can be developed

by the sense of shame which one has before a revered
person and before a transfigured person who is dead.

A man
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cannot get around the

tran~·figured

one.

'Fh1s ·transfigured

one exists only in the sacredly still silence of shame.
In this silence one is beyond the double mindedness of
despair.

Finally, there is the shame of the elder before

the child even as there is shame of the child before the
elder.

This shame of the elder as he admonishes the child
toward good also admonishes the elder toward good. 22
Thus, Kierkegaard touches upon five levels of shame
that might motivate one through the stages _on life's way.

The child can begin to will one thing as he has shame
before his elders.

The youth can discover his double

mindedness even more as he has shame before his revered
hero.

The older man can have even a deeper shame before,

perhaps, his father who has died and thereby become transfigured.

Then he can will the good even more purely as he

is ashamed in admonishing his child toward the good.
Through all of these stages of shame, there develops the·
shame before oneself.

As one becomes more and more an

individual, he becomes more capable of being ashamed before
the all seeing eye of the eternal which is within him.

As

he becomes more balanced and harmonized, his sense of shame
becomes deeper.

He can even make the qualitative leap to

the shame of faith when he becomes so individualized that

'

he repentantly sees himself as a sinner.
In The Concept of Dread, Kierkegaard

poi~ts

out how
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shame is a manifestation of dread. 23

And, thus, just as

dread moves one along toward the first and .toward the
(.

s~~o~d

movements of the leap, so shame is an aspect of this

motivating force.
repentance.
sinner.

Shame can even bring one to the point of

Through shame, one comes to feel himself as a

It is this shame of repentance that moves one from

double mindedness to purity of heart.

When one feels shame

deeply enough to repent, then he is a man of faith.

It is

in repentance that one sees the detail of the perfectly
balanced
In

syn~hesis

r~pentance,

of both the aesthetic and the ethical.

these two stages are distinguished yet one.

In repentance, man can will only one thing.

But, that one

thing is both aesthetic and ethical.
It is in The Gospel of our Sufferings 24 that
Kierkegaard spells out the detail of this synthesis of
repentance.

When treating the problem of suffering,

Kierkegaard shows how the greatest suffering can be for the
man of faith at the same time the greatest joy.
(

He describes

several bonds which bring about this paradoxical unity of
suffering and joy.

But, the bond which is most pertinent
to repentance appears in chapter two. 2 5 Here he shows how
the burden of suffering, even though it is very heavy, can

at the same time be light •
.'.l'hrough an eternal perspective which faith.provides,
a thought can arise which transforms suffering into joy.
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If one believes his suffering to be a good, then he 0an
bear it joyfully.

·-

hfu:n~n

He will not see how it 1s good through

understanding, but he can believe through faith that

it is good.

Thus, faith takes one beyond the temporal

insights of reason.

It takes one beyond the ethical.

has an aesthetic aspect.

And yet, at the same time, it

gives one joy in his suffering right now.
bel1e~er

It

The true

does not· think that his joy will come in a future

and distant heaven.

No, upon earth and in the ethical

moment he can be joyful because of the thought that suffering 1s a good.

When one suffers, he might suffer with

courage, with generosity, with patience.

But, none of these

indicate that he suffers as a Christian,

At most they show

that he has made the first movement of the leap,
infinite resignation.

They show

But, the true Christian suffers with

meekness and in such a way that he inherits the earth.
Meekness alone bears lightly the heavy burdens of time
because it firmly and humbly believes that they are good.
This meekness, as seen by Kierkegaard, is not at all what
Nietzsche thinks Christian meekness to be.
he inherits the earth.

When one is meek

He does not live for the world

beyond.
"Therefore is the faith that heavy suffering is
for our good more" perfect far than the expectation
of a happy ending.

For the happy ending may not

144
come about, .but a believer believes the suffering
is for the good, hence good cannot fail to come
about since it already ist" 26
When one turns the other cheek in meekness, he need not
shame the other; but rather meekness alone can make the
wrong less. 27 For meekness can see it as a good.
But, what is the heaviest burden of all?
burden of guilt.

It is the

As Ni.etzsche. further pointed out, this is

the basic burden which the Christian alone bears.

But, the

Christian bears it with joy; not with resentment as
Nietzsche thought.

The true Christian does not brood in his

sin and wallow in his impotence.

He does not become a man

of revenge and create false values.

No, with the idea that

faith provides, he· can just as easily see that sin is forgiven as he can see that he is a sinner.

When one is meek,

he can bear lightly even the burden of sin.

Jesus took

upon Himself all the sins of the world and yet he was meek
and humble of heart.

And so also Mary, in showing her faith

through those words:

"Behold the handmaid of the Lord,"

took upon her shoulders the heavy burden.
paradox and distress and dread.

She suffered the

And yet because of her

meekness, she was blessed among women.
So it is that faith is a perfect synthesis of the

'
eternal_ and the temporal.

Because one has an insight that

is not arrived at in time and that cannot be fully under-
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stood in time, he can live in time joyfl.llly.
~aith

The man of

believes his temporal life to be a g9od even in its

~qf~ering.

In such a way is he different from the man of

religiousness A.
punishment.

Hence, he need not live in fear of

He need not live for some future reward.

These are escapes into the past and the future.

If he wills

only the one thing, which is the good, then he inherits the
earth in the present.

He has all the values of the ethical

and temporal earth in full.

If one merely has that idea,

which cannot be arrived at through time, that suffering is
good., then the temporal can be accepted with joy.

So it

is that one leaps back to the earth.
And yet, this leap can be made only through the gift
of faith.

If Jesus would not have revealed the way, then

no man would have found it.

So now it is time that we turn

to the incarnational structures of the leap and see how it
was that God Himself made the leap that man might make it.

'
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C:'1AP1'ER VIII

'- ~ -·

THE.IlJCARNATIONAL STRUCTURES OF THE LEAP
It is in the painting of the Duke of Glo~cester 1
that we are best introduced to what we might call the
incarnatlonal structures of the leap.

Here Kierkegaard

puts before us Shakespeare's portrait of the wretched
noble, Richard III.

Feel the pathos of that mans

"I. that am rudely stamped, and want love's majesty
To strut before a wanton ambling nymph;
I, that am curtailed of this fair proportion,
Cheated of feature by dissembling nature,
Deformed, unfinished, sent before my time
Into this breathing world, scarce half made up,
And that so lamely and unfashionable
That dogs bark at me as I halt by them," 2

And what is the ground of all this suffering?
human body.

It is the

Richard III becomes a demon because he cannot

bear the pity he had been subjected to since childhood.
For many the body is a source of offence.
had just such a body,

But, Jesus Christ

However, He did not bear the suffer-

ings of His body so as to become a demon.

No, instead,

through His body, He made the second movement of the leap.
How.did Jesus make the leap?
possible the leap of

~11

How does His leap make

who believe?

It was through His

incarnation that God gave man the gift of faith.

How does

the double movement leap have its very source in the
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incarnation of Jesus?

...

J:C1erkega.ard • s primary medi ta ti on upon the incarna-

t_i-onal structures of the leap is in his book TraininP.; in
Christianity. 3

Here he spells out the meaning of the

incarnation in such a way that we can see it as the primary
instance of the double movement leap.

Here he shows in

precisely what way the incarnation was a suffering that
nevertheless was borne with joy.

Here Kierkegaard enables

us to see how the incarnation is the efficacious example
that makes the leap of faith possible for all Christians.
Of course, Jesus did not make the double movement
leap in just the way that mere humans do.

He did not begin

in the collision of the aesthetic and the ethical and move
from there to infinite resignation through the first movement of the leap.

No, as God. He be.gan in the infinite.

He did not have to leap into that.

But, He did make the

second movement of the leap while at the same time preserving His infinity and eternity.

He did come to the temporal

earth even though it was not by way of return.

Thus,

through His incarnation, He became a perfect synthesis of
the eternal and the temporal; of the infinite and the
finite.

Hence, in Him we see the perfect model of that

balanced both-and which men strive for in faith.

'

The

incarnation is the first and most perfect instance of the
double movement leap.
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Kterke~aard

begins to show how the paradoxical

nature of Jesus is manifest by an examination of qis words:
".Come hither, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, I
will give you rest."

It seems that such a consoling

invitation would attract many.

But that is not the case.

Instead, most people look at the one offering the invitation and flee.

He offers such a lofty gift but He appears

to be such a lowly man.

That is the paradox.

if He were God and yet He is a man.

He speaks as

Even His miracles and

His resurrection and His ascension do not take the beholder
beyond the paradox.
divine.

His miracles are not a proof that He is

Rather they are signs by whi.ch He attracts atten-

tion to Himself just as He does by His words.
to explain away the miracles.

Many did it and do it.

the paradox He can only be known by_faith.
His words and His actions are temporal,
also divine.

It is easy
As

His body and

And yet, He is

But He is divine only for those who believe,

So, Jesus Christ is the God-man and one can know
Him only through faith.
double movement leap.

And what is faith?

It is the

Thus, Jesus, as the paradox, can only

be known through the paradox.

A~

we have seen, Christianity

is a paradoxical relationship to the paradoxical.

So what

kind of God must this Jesus be to whom one relates in the
double movement leap?

"What

are the implications of

Kierkegaard• s theory concerning the nature of God?
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It is evident that the God of Christianity, for
Kierkegaard, is not merely the Divine of the Greeks or
the
. God of the Hebrews,

Kierkegaard would agree that Jesus

Christ was a folly to the Greeks and a scandal to the Jews.
The Greeks did not conceive of a monotheistic God separate
from men and nature,
as a human person.

The Hebrews did not conceive of God
The Greeks came to know of the divine

in a natural way through their mystic experience,

The

Hebrews came to know of. their God as He revealed Himself
in their hlstory,

The God of the Greeks was an aesthetic

God whom one experienced immediately,

If there were

ethical manifestations of the divine for the Greeks, it was
always in an improper sense.

The God of the Hebrews was an

ethical God whom one knew in the reflection of covenant
faith,

But, what is the God of the Christians?

He is a

synthesis of the God of the Greeks and. of the God of the
Hebrews.
ment leap,

·Therefore, one must know Him in the double moveThrough the first movement of the leap one

comes to know the aesthetic and Greek aspect of God,
Through the second movement of the leap one comes to know
the ethical and Hebrew aspect of God,

Jesus Christ as God

could be understood neither by the Greeks nor by the Jews.
He was different from both of their Gods.

He was different

If

because He was a synthesis of both the pantheistic and the
monotheistic God,
Christian God.

That is the fundamental paradox of the
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Such must be the im'!)lications of

~{1srkeo;aard'

s

thought even though he never spells it out-so clearly.
'I'ne-first movement of the leap is always absolutely necessary
if one ls to be a Christian.

This means that one must first

discover the divine majesty even as the saints of natural
religion found it.

Religiousness A is necessary before

religiousness B becomes possible.

If one is not ·first a

pantheistic mystic according to Kierkegaard, he can never
become a Christian.
.for Christianity.

But, of course, that is not sufficient
He must then go on and make the second

movement of the leap and discover the divine as the personal
God of history.
Because this God of Christianity is the paradox,
one can know Him only through the paradox of faith.

But,

that very faith is a gift that the paradoxical God gave to
man in "Sis incarnation.

By making the leap to the earth,

Jesus makes it possible for man to leap after Him and in
their leaping to believe in Him.

How is it that Jesus gives

the gift of faith through His incarnation?
Just as the Duke of Gloucester suffered because of
his body, so Jesus suffered because of His.
bore the burden of all mankind's sin.

In His body He

In taking upon Himself

this guilt and dying because of it, He suffered.

'

mocked -and scourged and spat upon.
among men.

He was

He too was an outcast

But, the greatest suffering of Jesus came from

the paradox of Divine Body.

Just as the Duke of Gloucester
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suffered because of friction between his desires and .the
l.lmitations of his body, so Jesus suffered_because He was
a-'.-scandal
to men.
·,.

to Him and be

He wanted all, literally all, to come

refre~hed

but when they saw Him in His human

body they were offended by His divine invitation.

It was

through his incarnation and the suffering implied by it
that Jesus gave to man the gift of faith.

We are enabled

to make the leap of faith because of his example.

But,

how do we come into contact with His example in such a way
that it can be efficacious for us in making the double
movement leap?
Kierkegaard's answer to this question is hinted at
in his words:
"The relationship to Christ is not: either to doubt
or to believe; but either to be offended or to
believe. ,,4
Being offended or scandalized is the opposite of faith and
yet faith is not possible for a person unless he overcomes
the possibility of being offended.

In order to see how

Jesus gives the gift of faith through that incarnation
according to Kierkegaard it is necessary to examine his
concept of scandal.
According to Kierkegaard, Jesus is capable of
scandalizing others in three ways.

The first of these ways

is the accidental scandal that arises from his collision
with the established order.

He refers· to the other two

ways as the essential scandal of loftiness and lowliness
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which arise from the collision of His 1.ncarna.tion.
~ccidental

scandal is possible when the subjective individ-

Va.,1 _collides with the objective universal order.
Kierkegaard shows how others besides Jesus, Socrates for
example, are capable of offending i.n this way.5 . Socrates
offended the Athenian establishment and Jesus offended the
Pharisees.

In each case it was the simply human kind of

offense that any rebel can provoke.

However, the essential

scandal of Jesus was not possible for Socrates.

Because He

claimed to be the God-man Jesus could offend people in two
unique
ways.
....

He could offend people by the loftiness of
His claim that He was God. 6 People would look at Him and
think:

"an individual like us pretends to be God."

However, if they did believe in Him as God and then saw Him
acting as a mere man they could be offended by His lowliness. 7

Thus it is that when Kierkegaard. thinks of. the

incarnation he is first struck by the scandal of Jesus.
"He would save all, but literally a11 -and all
were offended in Him, literally all." 8
However, it is possible to look at Jesus and not
even notice that He could be offensive.

But, Kierkegaard

thinks that this is to construe Him in a fantastic sense.
If one would see Jesus as He is, the God-man would always
appear as a possible

~tumbling

stone.

In opposition to

seeing Christ in a fantastic sense Kierkegaard describes
what he means by having a contemporary sense of Christ.9

153
The one who is contemporary with Christ is always capable
of being scandalized in the strict essential sense.

The

meaning of this contemporaneity will be examined in the
next chapter on the temporal structures of that leap.

The

way in which the christian witness can bring another to a
sense of contemporaneity will be referred to in the last
chapter on the style structures of the leap.
When one beholds Jesus contemporaneously he sees
Him as offensive.

This is the decisive moment.

The man

.will either be offended by Jesus or he will believe in Jesus.
If_,_he believes he will imitate Jesus in the suffering of
His incarnation.

A~

Kierkegaard writes:

"Christ's life here upon earth is the paradigm; it
is in likeness to it that I along with every
Christian must strive to construct my life."10
It is by imitating Jesus in His suffering that a man makes
the double movement leap.

The suffering of Jesus is the

source of the gift of faith whereby

a man

makes the leap.

This can be understood when we see that the primary suffering of Jesus is rooted in His incarnation.

Christ suffered

because by His incarnation He was a sign of contradiction.
He was to be the saviour of the world and yet, men were
scandalized and therefore condemned Him.

Kierkegaard writes

of christian suffering that:

"

"It ·is a whole muttcal tone deeper than common
human suffering."
Christian suffering is as different from common suffering
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as the essential scandal ls from the ac:cidental.

This

sµffering is rooted in the paradox whereby-the eternal and
the-temporal are one.

When a man beholds Jesus, the

temporal embodiment of the eternal, and believes, it means
that he too suffers the christian paradox, he sacrifices
his understanding for madness.
reveals to man

The madness of Jesus first

the possibility of such a madness.

And

then that madness is so efficacious that it even makes it
possible for the willing man to imitate it.
We know that according to Kierkegaard the leap of
faith is a gift and yet man makes it freely.
the gift through the incarnation.

Man receives

There Jesus shows him

the possibility of the double movement leap.

But there

must be more to the gift than the showing of the possibility.
What that other characteristi-c of the gift is, and how it is
rooted in the incarnation, is part of our problem.

The other

part is to reconcile such a gift with man's effort and freedom.

So far we know that man makes the first movement of

the leap by his own efforts.
work.

Here we see his freedom at

But, how is this first free movement of the leap

related to the incarnation?
Kierkegaard explains this by saying that:
"The decisive mark of christian suffering is the
fact that it is voluntary and that it is the
possibility of offence for the sufferer. We
read of the apostles that they forsook all to
follow Christ. So it was voluntary. 11 12
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'J:his forsaking all refers to the asQeticism which makes the
first movement of the leap possible.
one enters the stage of infinite
this he freely imitates Jesus.

With his own efforts
By doing

resi~nation.

In this movement of the leap

he imitates Jesus in His infinity and eternity.

By ascet-

icism he unites himself with the God of the incarnate Jesus •

.

But, now he is not united with the man of the incarnate God.
For this movement back to the earth grace is necessary.
So far we have seen one aspect of man's freedom.
He freely makes the first movement of the leap by imitating
Jesus and any other Holy man who has made that movement.
But, now we must see another aspect of his freedom.

For,

in this state of infinite resignation he can receive the
grace to return to the earth and reject it.

He is free to

make the second movement of the.leap or not.

He can see

Jesus becoming incarnate and. be offended or he can see 1 t
and believe.

In this moment of belief, in this second

movement of. the leap, there is a special grace and there is
a special freedom.

What are they and how are they related

to the incarnation?
That special grace is not only the example of Jesus
in the incarnation whereby he shows us the possibility of
makin~

the second movement of the leap.

" that helps_ us
also include some power
possibility.
What is it?

That power

i~

to

That grace must
actualize that

derived from the i_ncarnation.
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Kierkegaard clarifies the e.fficacious power of that
grace by relat1n?; it to humility and indirect commu.nication.
'.Cne-incarnation is an act of humility.

Jesus actualized the

possibility of the double movement leap.
"That reality is even more terrible than possibility •••
It is a strange sort of dialectic: That He who
almightily ••• binds Himself, and does it so almightily
that He actually feels Himself bound ... 13
Jesus even had to die.

Such was His humility.

But at the

same time this mystery of the bound God indirectly communicates something to man.

It communicates to man whatever

man freely chooses to see in it.

Because God presented

Himself as a riddle man is free to believe.

The incarnation

is an invitation to man beckoning him to make the double
movement leap.
v

,

The invitational power of its riddle is the

efficacious aspect of the grace that comes from the
·incarnation.
Because this grace is invitational, it not only
allows the individual to be free in his second movement
of the leap, it even calls forth that freedom.

Man becomes

free as an individual the moment he responds to the invitat1on.
Thus it is that the incarnation is the first instance
of the double movement leap and it is the source of grace
that makes that leap possible
for all indii.riduals.
'

Jesus

felt the limitations of His body as did the Duke of
Gloucester.

So does every christian who follows Him.

But
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these linitations are accepted in faith for that

~s

the

very meaning of the return to earth in the second movement
of the leap.
body.

One even finds joy in the earth and in his

He feels the contradiction as did the Duke.

But

instead of being scandalized by it he experiences the
resurrection of the body,

He dies to his body in the first

movement but then recovers it as glorified but still temporal
in the second movement.

'
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CHAPTER IX
{

-·-

..

THE

T~!PORAL

STRUC1.1UH3:S OF THE LEAP

The painting which might most adequately plunge us
into a fruitful meditation upon the temporal structures of
the leap is that of the four fathers who are killing their
ohildren. 1 In this painting, Kierkegaard seeks to clarify
the special nature of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac.

In

.order to do this, he contrasts the Abraham-Isaac case with
the cases of Agamemnon and Iphigenia, Jephtha and his
daughter, and Brutus and his son.

Kierkegaard wants to

show that by his act Abraham suspended the ethical, but by
their acts the other fathers acted in accordance with
ethical demands.

Thus, the other three would be understood

and praised by others, whereas Abraham could not be understood and, hence, could only be blamed.
are tragic heroes.

The other three

But Abraham is something else.

The special value of this painting for our consideration of time lies in its complexity.

Here we see in

contrast a Greek, a Hebrew, a Roman and then Kierkegaard's
peculiar Hebrew model whom he uses as a paradigm case of
Christian faith,

Abrah~.

It is valuable to take the most

complex -of Kierkegaard• s paintin&; when considering time for
it is primarily in terms of time that Kierkegaard makes all
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of his key distinctlcns.
meditations upon time.

Kant and Hegel had prolonged
In our day, Heidegger, Husserl,

Bergson, and Sartre, not to mention almost all other
serious philosophers, have continued to grapple with time
just as did Aristotle and Augustine.

In short, time is

one of the central philosophical issues and I would not be
surprised· if, of all philosophers, Kierkegaard has not
dealt with this issue most constantly, most comprehensively,
and most deeply.

What is his notion of time insofar as it

.has a bearing upon the structures of the leap?
.-

In order to answer this question \<1e shall consider

four of Kierkegaard's ideas:

the relation of the temporal

dimensions to the eternal, repetition, the moment, and
contemporaneity.

ThiR will give us an opportunity, first

of all, to see how Kierkegaard distinguishes all of the
various stages in terms of time.

Then, once these distinct-

ions are clarified, we shall be able to consider the temporal
flow or dynamics of the leap.

In other words, we shall

examine the elements of the leap and the dynamics of the
leap in terms of time.

We shall consider Kierkegaard's

notion of time in its dimensions, duration, and succession
and thereby discover the ground in terms of which he makes
his basic distinctions,.
- The primary distinction which Kierkegaard makes
throughout all of his authorship ls that between the Greek
world view, the world view of Christendom, and the world
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view of Christianity •. Thus, he is continually contr.asting
the recollection theory of' Socrates, the mediation theory
,.

Qf Hegel, and his own theory of
-i.-

-~

-.

repetition~

But, in this

,,

painting of' the four fathers and their children, Kierkegaard
even hints at two other world views, namely, the Roman and
the Jewish.

Let us begin to unravel the complexities of

his theory of time by considering how he makes these
distinctions.
It is in The Concept of Dread that Kierkegaard concerns himself the most with the distinction and relation
between these world views.
fotir world views:

Here he firmly dlst1ngu1shes

paganism, Judaism, Christianity, and

paganism within Christianity.

The Greeks, the Romans, and,
as he mentions, the Oriental theories of fate 2 all belong
to paganism.

Perhaps we can best get into the temporal

distinctions between these world views by considering a
statement Kierkegaard. makes about paganism within
Christianity.

He writes:

"The life of Christian paganism is neither guilty
nor not guilty.

Strictly speaking, it makes no

distinction between present, past, future, eternal,
Its life and history go on like the writing in
those old days when people used no marks of punctuation but crabbedly" traced on the paper one word,
one sentence, after another."3

In this synthesis of the both-and which turns out to· be a
neither-nor, one loses both the significance of the temporal dimensions and the eternal duration.

All he has is

a meaningless succession which Kierkegaard. calls spiritlessness,

From this it is evident that the nature of a

people is ·related to their view of time.
Paganism proper, that is., all the world views which
are not influenced by the Semitic world view, as Kierkegaard.
so often and in so many ways shows, is an eternalism.

The

·dimensions of time have no ultimate importance of their own.
They are only manifestations of the eternal.

From this it

follows that there are, in reality, no individuals.
too, are only instances of the world soul.

They,

History in such

a context does not emphasize the creative genius of
.individuals but demonstrates· rather the great pattern of
the rise and fall of the eternal circle.

Ethics, as

Kierkegaard argues, is, in such a context, an improper
ethics,

Strictly speaking, there is no sin or individual

guilt because there is no individual freedom,

There is

only an aesthetic criterion by which one can judge human
action.

Hence, between Agamemnon and Brutus there is no

essential difference.

They both kill their children within

the context of eternalism.

Both of them are aesthetes and

are beyond the pale of guilt.

Kierkegaard. says that they

are both ethical by which he means that their actions are
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reasonable and do not conflict with the universal order.
Their
actions have a telos that fits in with the aesthetic
<.
~riteria

of their world view.

They are ethical but in an

imp_roper sense as Kierkegaard would argue in The Concept
4
of Dread,
If one wants to make a distinction.between
Aisamemnon and Brutus, he might do it in terms of the past
and the future.
future hope.

A~ame~non

killed Iphigenia

beca~se

of a

If he would kill her, then favourable winds

would come and he could sail against the enemy.

Brutus

killed his son because his son had broken the law and
Bru~us w~s

an execut-Or of the law.

Thus, with the vision

of youth, Agamemnon looked to the future and with the
apollonian dream of old age, Brutus looked to the past.
Even though these men both operated within the context of
aesthetic eternalism, they were still improperly ethical
and thus had some relation to the dimensions of time.
Judaism is the complete opposite of pagan eternalism.
It is a pure temporalism.

Hence, while Hellenism uses the

lighter expressions of:

fate, luck, misfortune; Judaism

always refers to guilt.

Judaism has the monotheistic God

of Proviuence but not the pantheistic gods of fate.
Judaism, God, man, and nature are distinct.
are completely temporal.
of an

~fter

life.

For

Nature and man

Classical Judaism has no thought

It' lives only for the earth.

Immortal-

ity has no individual reference in the context of Judaism.

It means, rather, that the race will last forever and even

·-that

the promise will be fulfilled.

~cial

Escha~ology

has a

reference but not an individual reference in Judaism.

As long as Israel, as the race, through her king, is loyal
to the covenant, God is pleased.

But, if the race should

forsake the covenant, and the covenant was always a racial
phenomenon, then God would be angry.

If the people

remembered what God had done for them in the past and if
they remembered what He would do for them in the future,
that is, fulfill the promise, then they would please God
in

~he

present.

The present was meaningful in their context

when weighted with the temporal past and future.

For the

Jews, the present could have meaning without the eternal
of the pagans.

The present would lose meaning only when

separated from its historical context of the covenant.
Thus, Jephtha would kill his daughter within an ethical
context.

He would kill her in the context of the covenant

because God demanded her in sacrifice that the race might
live.

Through her death, the fulfillment of the promise

could be promoted.
Christianity is a synthesis of both paganism and
Judaism.

It paradoxically combines both an eternalism and

a temporalism.

The present moment has meaning for the

'
Christian because of both
an eternal and an historical
context.

He does not make one subservient to the other.

164
Unlike the Greek he protects the absolute significance of.
~he

temporal moment.

n·ecessity.

He does not sacrifice it to fate and

Unlike the Jew, he thinks that the promise has

to do with eternal salvation or damnation for the individual person.

Thus, the emphasis is placed upon individual
freedom and guilt for the Christian. As we have seen, 6

his very God concept is the ground of this eternal-temporal
paradox.

Jesus Christ is for him the Son of the monotheis-

tic God.

But, He is also the mystical vine in whom each

individual branch is united.

He is the head of the mysti-

cal Body wherein all members are united even with the
Father.

In Christianity, there is a paradoxical balance

of both community and individuality.

This equal respect

for both the aesthetic and the ethical never became explicit
in Greek fatalism or in Jewish racism.
Thus, there are four major world views distinguished
by their temporal structures.

Hellenism is an eternal1sm.

Eternal duration is so emphasized that the temporal aimensions are seen as but aspects of it and, hence, history and
temporal succession are not so important because they are
but fleeting moments.

Judaism is a temporalism.

There is

no eternal duration but, rather, the present dimension
receives meaning when it is weighted with mindfulness of
the

di~ensions

of the past and future.

succession is the very key of meaning.

Thus, historical
'!1he race must always
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in its covenant ceremonies and

relig~aus r~tual

recall its

unique past and future, that it might prosper in time.
Christianity seeks to give the present meaning both by a
remembrance of the temporal dimensions and by a truly
eternal quest.

Thus, in ideal it is conscious of temporal

succession and eternal duration in such a way that it does
not reduce one to the other.

In the double movement leap,

it seeks to combine both in the dimension of the present.
Christendom, on the other hand, lives in a meaning. less present.

It does not weight

i~

present with the fated

meaning of eternity as did the Greek.

It does not have the

racial solidarity of the old covenant that constantly
recalls the past and seeks the promise.

It is unwilling to

risk weighting its present with an individual eternity that
is won in the temporal moment. · Thus:
"If now one will compare this view (call it Christian
or what you will) with the Greek view, I believe that
more has been won than has been lost.

True, there

has indeed been lost something of that melancholy
erotic Heiterkeit, but there has also been gained a
spiritual quality unknown to Hellenism.

The only

men who truly lose are the many who go on living
continually as

i~

it were

6,ooo

years ago sin came

into the world, as if it were a curiosity which did
not concern them.

For they do not win the Greek
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Hei terkei t, which is precisely a thin?;. which. cannot
be won, but only lose it, nor do they.win the eternal
meed of sp1r1t."7
Of course, these same temporal distinctions apply
not only to the great cultural phenomenons of Greece, Rome,
Israel, modern Eurcpe and the individual Christian.

They

apply also to all the stages on life's way and to the
pseudonyms wbo represent them.

Thus, longing as dream,

seeking, and desire are all moments of aesthetic eternal1sm.
They are distinct only in an improper ethical and temporal
sense, insofar as the young girl might represent the barbarian fascination with the present.

The seeking youth or

Greek longs for his vision in the future.

The Roman has

the attitude of the conservative law maker always looking
to the lesson of the past.

Kierkegaard does not develop

with any sustained effort or pseudonym the position of
Judaism.

But, he does portray the position of ethical

weakness or Christendom in the persons of the ladies'
tailor and the seducers.

Finally, there is the pagan

saint, Victor Eremita, who has gone beyond the contradictions
of the immediate aesthetic to t.he pure eternalism of infinite
resignation.

Thus, we see that Kierkegaard makes his

important distinctions by means of the temporal dimensions,

"

succession and duration.

But what does he mean by past,

present, future , history, and eternity?

l~

7

Kierkegaard is continually making obser:ations about
time throughout all of his writing.

But perhaps some of

n1s·most sustained meditation upon the dimensions of time
and their relation to duration appears in the E~ifying
Discourses, of his aesthetic period. 8 In his discourse
entitled The Exnectation of Faith, he writes about the man
of expectation.

This man is preoccupied with the future.

But perhaps it is not good to be preoccupied with the
future.

Perhaps by so doing, one does not fully live in

·the present.

But, if one were only occupied with·the present

and had no concern for the past or future, he would live
like the animals.

So in what sense should one be concerned

for the future and in what sense should he not be concerned?9
Kierkegaard•s answer is that one must first conquer the
.future and then he can become sound and strong in the
present.
But, what does he mean by the future and by fighting
with the future?

By the future he means oneself and all the

possibilities that one can see.

For this reason the future

is the one enemy that a man cannot conquer by himself.
For the future is himself in his imagination and one is
always stronger than himself.
ies that leave him deftenseless.

He can always see difficultBut, it is through this

fight with the future that one comes to know himself.
Without this struggle one ls left ignorant of his own

possibilities and creative energies and weaknesses. ·But,
the future is not so entirely dangerous for it is not so
entirely new.

We have had some experience of it.

made up out of the past.

It is

But, how do we go to battle with

the infinite possibilities of the future even though they
are formed only from the elements of the past?10
Kierkegaard writes that the sailor in a storm does
not struggle by looking at the countless crashing waves.
Instead, he looks up at a fixed star and so charters his
·course through changing multiplicity.
:fi.ght w1 th the future.

Thus, does a man

He lets the eternal be his guide.

For the eternal is the ground of the future.

Then he

conquers the future through faith. For faith is the eternal
power in man. 1.1 Kierkegaard makes this idea concrete only
in his later discourses where he treats faith in detail.
Thus, in The Gospel of Our Sufferings 12 we see how the
battle is won.

One can look to the future and see countless

possible sufferings.

He can become swallowed up in dread

and fall into despair.

But, if he has faith he can see

that every suffering is a good and, thus, he can live in
the present with joy.

So does he conquer the future and

return strong to the present.
Thus, we see ,rthat the temporal dimensions are
structures of the self.

The future is the self in one's

possibilities and the past is the self in one's experience.
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one• s possi bill ties depend upon expert ~n.c~ bu,t °'ecome
infinite through the imagination.

This 1nf1nity indicates

ttie eternal which ls the ground of the future.

The eternal

is, thus, the ground of the self and. yet it is at the same
time the fixed star that is beyond ·the self.

When relying

on it, one can overcome the future self and be strong in
the present.

Such are the temporal structures of the leap.

One collects himself or the temporal dimensions by concentrating upon the eternal which he finds in his struggle
with possibility.

This is the first movement of the leap.

But then he returns strong to the present.

This is the

second movement.
In his edifying discourse entitled Man's Need of God
Constitutes His Highest Perfection, 1 3 Kierkegaard clarifies
these relations between the dimensions of time and the
eternal duration even more.

Here is described the struggle

and the reconciliation of what he calls the first self and
the deeper self.

The first self has its eye on the changing

manifold of earth and 1t desires one changing thing after
another.

The deeper self has its eye on eternal stability

and it points out to the first self the unsatisfactory precariousness of earth.

And so they go to battle.

The first

self can win only by forgetting the deeper self and plunging
into the din of change."

For the deeper self is surely right
and no sophism can overcome it. 14 The deeper self is surely
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right for lt ca.n even point to new possib111t1es.

r't will

not forget experience, as the first self must, if it is to
live securely in the earth.

AF soon as the first self is

about to choose a finite and temporal reality in order to
satisfy itself, the deeper self points out that chances are
this will never wholly satisfy.

Thus, the first self, if it

is honest, is brought to a standstill.

If the first self

will not abandon its passion for satisfaction nor become
forgetful of past experience as it lusts after some future
.temporality, then it must submit. 1 5
If the first self submits, then the two selves can
become reconciled.

The deeper self will say that now the

first self can have what it wants.

But, before this happens,

the first self must reach the point wherein it no longer
infinitely wants the finite. - Thus, the leap of infinite
resignation is made. This is the first condition necessary
for self knowledge. 16 But, in order that a man might fully
know himself "greater dangers must be met and new co11flicts
must be won ... l7

It is in this new collision after the first

movement of the leap that one comes to see his helplessness
and need of God.
ment of the leap.

So it is that he comes to the second moveBut, here Kierkegaard goes no further

for it is only in the cPUrely religious writings that he
develops this movement of the leap.
In the book Sickness Unto Death, we saw that man was
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a relationship, related to himself and to God.

1'hat is,

1n his ideal form he is aesthetic, ethical· and religious
all at once.

Faith or the double movement leap is this

perfectly balanced synthesis.

Now we have seen this balance

even more concretely in terms of time.
a man is are temporal relations.

The relations which

The ideal man lives in

the present after he has conquered the future.

The future

is constructed out of the past and is grounded in the
eternal.

Thus, man can be a synthesis of the temporal

·dimensions and eternal duration.

It is in terms of these

possible temporal combinations that Kierkegaard makes his
distinctions between the various aesthetic stages ·and the
ethical and the religious.

But now we must ask how

succession fits into this.

We have clarified Kierkegaard's

.thoughts on the meaning of the dimensions and their relation
to duration but we have not paid attention to the flow of
time.

This brings us to Kierkegaard's thought on repetition,

the moment, and contemporaneity.
Repetition is the term by which Kierkegaard expresses
movement in the realm of spirit,

At its highest level and

at the only level where it is fully possible, repetition
is individual freedom.

As a result "repetition is the

interest of metaphysics, and at the same time the interest
upon which metaphysics founders, 111 9

The metaphysics which

does not assume freedom founders upon freedom for it cannot
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deduce the existence of freedom.

of

Freedom ls a me-vem·e.nt

passion and, thus, if metaphysics seeks- to be dis-

interested and objective, it must be deprived of the very
matter which it seeks to analyze.

Kierkegaard thinks that

repetition will become the key concept of modern philosophy.
He thinks that up to his time, Leibnitz was the only philosopher who had glimpsed its meaning.

This insight he

manifests in his idea that in the monad "the present is
pregnant with the future. 112
Kierkegaard thinks that

°

·repetition is for his philosophy what recollection was for
Plato and mediation was for Hegel.

Repetition refers to

the temporal structures of freedom and since the metaphysics
of his day could not approach such passionate matters,
Kierkegaard sought to clarify them psychologically.
Repetition is not possible at the mere aesthetic
level.
Berlin.

Kierkegaard shows this by Constantine's trip to
The aesthete went there to see if he could repeat

some of the earlier experiences of his previous trip.
he found that he could not.
affairs is impossible.
will of temporal things.

But

The full repetition of external

One is not free to have all that he
He does not have complete control

over them.

So Constantine retired to his home with its
"monotonous and uniform order. 1121 He found that with firm-

ness of purpose one could anesthetize oneself and attain
uniformity.

But, this ethical attempt at repetition also

173
falls, for monotonous uniformity is not freedom.

This

repetition of shrewdness is a mere forgetfulness of one's
pa:·ssion.

By such observations Constantine became convinced

that there is no repetition.

But then, through the

experiences of the young man, he is brought to a change
of mind.
The young man falls in love and he experiences the
first movement of the leap.

Through erotic inspiration,

he becomes a poet.

The power of the muse gives him a new

creative freedom.

The first movement of the leap gives him

the freedom that the Greek attained in recollection.
yet, this is not an individual freedom.

And

It is a power that

takes hold of the poet and looses his lips.

The poet

becomes one with being and with the divine and in his unity
receives the creative energy ·of the world source.

There is

the freed.om of pantheism and the young man first attained
this.
But, in his infinite resignation, the young man
became melancholy and sympathetic.

Because he would not

marry the girl, existence mocked him and he began to feel
guilty.

Thus, he approaches the second movement of the leap

and repetition.
"The problem whicl'\ baffles him is neither more nor
less· than repetition.

He is quite justified in

not seeking light upon this problem either from
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modern philosophy or from the Greek; for the GJ".eeks
perform the opposite movement, and in_ this case a
.,

~ -~

·-

-

Greek would prefer to recollect, unless his conscience were to frighten him, and modern philosophy
makes no movement generally it only makes a. fuss,
and what movement it makes is always within
immanence, whereas repetition is always a trans22
cendence."

The young man makes this move from immanence to transcendence with the help of Job.

With Job he discovers the

transcendent God and his own individuality.

He discovers

the transcendent freedom that is possible within this context which enables him alone to bring something new into
existence.
The, young man discovers three moments in Job's
transition·to

s~lf

knowledge.

At the beginning of his

trial, Job rested in the bliss of infinite resignation.
I

He could utter these patient words:

"The Lord gave, the
Lord hath taken away, blessed be the name of· the Lord. 112 3
But then, as the trial proceeded, guilt was pressed upon
Job.

However, he rebelled against this notion and against

God's seemingly unjust ways.

He cried out:

"O' that a man

might go to law with God, like a son of man with his
24
'
fellow."
Finally, the third great moment, that of the
thunderstonn, arrived.

Job repented and:
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"The Lord and Job

under~tand

one a?:other, they are

reconc11ed,,,Job is blessed and has received everything double,

This is what is called a repetition," 25

So 1t is with the young man.

He maltes the first

movement and attains the bliss of erotic inspiration.
his love he overflows with poetic rhapsody,
his period of lament,

But then comes

Finally, when he repents, he receives

a new and individual freedom.
transcendent.

In

He discovers the God who is

He has rebelled against this transcendent

-God and he repents this rebellion.

Thus, within the context

of.monotheism a new source of creative freedom is found,
It comes not from the muse which is a sign of one's union
with the divine.

This new freedom comes from within one's

self as an individual.

Of course, the insight that one has

this freedom must be received as a gift in the thunderstorm.
But it is this very gift whereby one comes to repent that
enables one to be free.

Thus, in the double movement leap

one has two creative sources of freedom,

The aesthetic

freedom has its roots in the context of pantheism and the
immanent God,

The ethical freedom is rooted in monotheism

and the transcendent God,

Repetition is the paradoxical

double movement whereby one, through the absurd, has these
contradictory

freedom~

together.

all things are renewed or doubled,

Thus, through repetition
The aesthetic and the

ethical are not only in collision and thus only half

satisfying.

They are reconciled and thus wholly satisfying

or doubled.
But notice, Kierkegaard calls this moment of the
thunderstorm a repetition.
a dynamic continuation.

That ls, it has the nature of

It keeps repeating.

It is not

merely a moment that takes place and then lasts with an
eternal duration.

No, repetition signifies not only eternal

duration but also temporal succession.

It is both aesthetic

and ethical.

In repetition the present is pregnant with

the future.

One knows through faith that he can continue

to have the freedom of inspiration's muse if he only wills
it.

Yes, the child of the future ls a child of the will.

One does not simply see in the moment of the thunderstorm
that suffering is a good and thereby rejoice without effort
.forever in this suffering.

No, one must will at every

moment to remain in this insight.

One must continually

exercise his new found individual freedom or he will lose
it at once.

Sin is precisely the forfeiting of this freedom

and one is always free to sin, yes, even tempted by dread's
heavy burden to sin.

So, repetition or freedom in both its

aspects at once is possible because of the double movement
leap.

But the leap ls always a leaping.

Faith comes in

the moment or the instant of the thunderstorm but:
-

"The martyrdom of faith (crucifixion of the understanding} is not martyrdom of the instant but
precisely the martyrdom of endurance."26
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So, in order to more fully understand this tempora,l .
succession of the enduring instant, wherein the temporal
dtmensions
and eternal duration interplay with one another,
._ .
~ -~

we must now take another look at Kierkegaard's concept of
the moment.
Kierkegaard analyzes the s·tructures of the historical moment in the Interlude of his Philosophical Fragments. 27
There he asks himself about the nature of coming into existence.

How must an event be if it is truly to come to exist

out of nothing?

That is, how can the new leap on to the

scene as a result of creative freedom?
is the historical event.

Only such an event

If succession is to be truly

different from duration, then· there must be something new,
not just an alteration of the old.

What makes this

possible?
If there were only the eternal there would be no
true coming into existence.

For the eternal is the necessary

and the necessary must remain as i_t is.
no true possibility.

The necessary has

If there is to be possibility, there

must arise something other than the necessary or the
eternal.

Any coming into existence must take place freely

and not necessarily. 28
But, anything that comes into existence is histori-

' existence.
cal for it has come into
to a past event.

The historical refers

It means that something has become actual.

Something that has come into existence may reduplicate or

come into existence a second time.

This points to the free

..

dialectic of history.

In order for something to become

historical, it must at present have this possibility in
the future. 2 9 Thus, in order that there be something that
has a past, there must have been a present that was pregnant with the future.

Succession always implies an inter-

wovenness of the three dimensions.

Thus, any historical

event has the characteristic of possibility and it retains
. that characteristic always.

Hence, it is just as impossible

to.know with certainty the historical event as it is to
know a future event.

The historical can never be known

with logical necessity.

Also, it cannot be known with any

immediate experience because of its quality of possibility
and pastness.

Thus, if one is to kiiow the historical he

has to make a leap of belief in it.

He can look at the

evidence but this alone will never give him any absolute
certitude.

The certitude about historical events comes

not from evidence but from belief.
But, concerning the historical event whereby the
eternal God became an historical man, there is even the
greater problem of the·· paradox.

Only the faith that is

given by the gift of the incarnation and accepted in the

'

consciousness of oneself as a sinner is sufficient to allow
recognition of this event.

Thus, there are two kinds of
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historical event whicn necessitate two kinds of belief if
they are to be recognized.JO

But, both kinds of event must

continue to be believed in if they are to continue to be
recognized.

For even when they are believed in they still

remain only possible for that is always the nature of ·an
historical event.

However, if one is to continue to

believe in the God-man, he will have to continue.to resolve
to believe.

Ir he resolves once and· then does not continue

to resolve, he falls into Christendom and loses the passion
of his faith.

In order to remain in the repetition of the

double movement leap, the incarnation must continually reduplicate itself in the believer.

He must continue to

experience the simultaneity of eternal duration and temporal
succession.

One freely comes to believe in this paradox

at the moment he begins to repent.

But, he must continue

to repent or his faith vanishes and the freedom which he
gains the instant he sees himself as a sinner also vanishes.
So if he is no longer conscious of his sinfulness, he 1s no
longer free.

But this brings us to Kierkegaard's concept of contemporaneity.

In this notion he shows how a person continues

to keep himself in the presence of the incarnate God, that
is, in the presence

~

the eternal duration which is at the

same tfme a temporal succession.
As we have seen31 faith can arise only in people

180

who are as contemporary with Christ as were the pe0ple of
his own day.

·-

l?-~cause

These people could be scandaiized by Him

of the lofty-lowly paradox.

But, rather than be

scandalized by the empirical evidence, they leaped beyond
the evidence and believed that he was the God-man.

They

were able to be scandalized by the evidence and yet to
leap beyond the evidence because of this contemporaneity
with Christ in His incarnation.

What is this contempora-

neity?
Kierkegaard begins to explain contemporaneity by
contrasting it with poetry and with history.3 2 When one
is related to something only poetically, it is not actual
or real for him.

It is only imaginary and possible.

historical, however, really occurred.

The

It went beyond the

mere possibility of poetry and became actual. ·But, as
past the historical is not now actual.
minant of reality - the for thee.
in another age.

It lacks the deter-

It was for somebody else

Only when one is with something in

present is it actual or real for him.
this real presence contemporaneity.
one has to possibility.

th~

Kierkegaard calls
Poetry is the relation

History is the relation one has to

the actuality of the past.

Contemporaneity is the relation

one has to the actuality for himself in the present.
. But, there are' two kinds of contemporaneity - For:

" ••• every man can be contemporary only with the
age in which he lives - and then with one thing
more:

with Christ's life on earth; for Christ's

life on earth, sacred history,

~tands

for itself

alone outside hlstory."33
Because there are two kinds of history, it turns out that
there are t·wo kinds of contemporaneity.

For sacred histcry,

which one knows through faith, has the kind of reality which
the present has, that is, reality for thee.
eternal duration become succession.
be present in every age.

Christ was the

And this mystery can

One can experience the eternal

duration in the first movement of the leap,

But one cannot

experience the eternal duration as temporal succession
except through faith,

So, now our more refined question

is - what is the contemporaneity of faith?

How does the

incarnation of Christ become more than a poetic or historical event for one?

How does the contemporaneity of the

absolute event differ even from the contemporaneity of the
ordinary event?
So far we have seen that the grace of the incarnation malrns it possible for one to believe in the incarnation.
This happens in the moment when one becomes conscious of
himself as a sinner and this faith endures as long as one's
repentance endures,

'Repentanc~

is brought about by the

double voice of conscience coming both out of the past and
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out of the future.

When one 1s still and listens to· this

voice, he imitates Christ in His obedience· to the Father.

He

wills only one thing, the good.

3y imitating Christ

in His incarnation, the believer becomes contemporaneous
with Christ.

It is in this willing of the

goo~

which one

learns to do as he sees how he has failed to will the good,
that one believes.

This is the paradox of the believer

whereby he becomes contemporaneous with the God-man.
is contemporaneity.

This is the moment.

This

This is repetition.

· This is the double movement leap.
When one achieves that eternal insight that all is
good for him, even suffering, and when he wills only this
good, then he ls contemporaneous with the Incarnate God.
He takes joy from each moment of time.
.in each moment of time.

He wills the good

He suffers in each moment of time.

And this is possible because of the eternal insight that he
has in each moment of time.

The aesthetic is willed.

knows that it cannot totally satisfy.

One suffers thereby.

But one can take joy in the aesthetic anyway.
is renewed through faith.

One fully lives in time.

the suffering of bore41.om.
joy.

The aesthetic

Faith encourages one to take joy

even in the painful possibilities of poetry.
is willed.

One

The ethical

One can even submit to

But he can do this with genuine

For he can see it as a good.

Faith turns the humdrum

succession of time into an eternal good.

Faith renews and
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doubles both the aesthetic and the ethical.

It transforms

the non-reality of poetry and history into-a contemporary
reality for the believer.

Even what is lacking in both

the aesthetic and the ethical is now, through faith, seen
as a good. - Thus, the eternal duration and temporal
succession so flow together in faith that the past and the
future are joined in fullness to the present.

The present

so extends out in faith that it encompasses all of the
past and all of the future and gives them its own present
reality.

Such are the temporal structures of the leap •

•

1R4
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C!:APTER X

-

THE STYLE STRUCTURES CF Y'-l:E LEAP

It is the painting of Fau~t 1 which best suggests
to us what we choose to call the style structures of the
leap.

Here we see the great aesthetic doubter who in his

doubt ls silent.
his secret.

And yet the ethical commands him to speak

Through sympathy he reflects into himself and

then becomes a poet, through sympathy he speaks but he
speaks not of his doubt nor of his love.

What is the

meaning of this strange poetic speaking which still keeps
secrets?

Why does Kierkegaard write of the poet:

"For the poet purchases the power of words, the
power of uttering all the dread secrets of others,
at the price of a little secret he is unable to
utter ••• and a poet is not an apostle,,he casts
out devils only by the power of the devil. 112
Yes, what are these strange thoughts which Kierkegaard has
about the doubting poet?

And, even more strange, why did

Kierkegaard himself speak like this poet throughout all of
his life?

In telling us about Faust, Kierkegaard is tell-

ing us very much about' himself.
of his style?

What is the great secret

Why did he have such a secret?

tell it even so hiddenly?

How did he
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In answering these questions we shall first ·
c;l.arify the great pattern of Kierkegaard's.style.

Then we

..•

·

shall. seek to further understand the meaning and purpose
of his indirect communication.

Finally, we shall treat

specifically the meaning and purpose of the pseudonyms.
In this way we shall come to see that even in his style
this great artist constantly manifested the structures of
the double movement leap.

Then in terms of this pattern of·

the leap we shall ferret out the secret of the poet, who
.was more than a poet, and therefore told us his secret.
one becomes accustomed to seeing the pattern of

A~

the collision and the double movement leap, he can see how
the authorship ls a manifestation of this pattern in its
very style.
pattern.

First, the entire authorship shows forth the

Secondly, each book individually puts the pattern

into our grasp.

Let us first notice the entire authorship.

The authorship is divided into three parts.
is in the beginning the purely aesthetic part.

There

Then there

is the middle part which we might look upon as that which
primarily represents religiousness A or the first movement
of the leap.

Finally, there is the last part which

explicates in detail religiousness B or the second movement
of the leap.

'

- The purely aesthetic part of the authorship
includes {l) Either/Or, (2) Fear and Trembling, (3) Repeti-
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!!.2.2.•

and. (4) c-taqoes on Life's ,,ray.·

The ryredomtnant idea

running through these books is that of the collifiion.

All

of these books are written under the sign of the Either/Or.
That sign of the two

opposin~

pillars, which never meet

and that apoear to always be contrary one to another,
already appears before us in the first volume of Either/Or.
The young man sees himself as a pure aesthete and is completely opposed to the ethical.

But already in the second

volume some hint of a reconciliation is given.

Judge

William sees the ethical as fulfilling the aesthetic.

As

Kierkegaard writes in the introduction to The Concept of
Dread, Fear and
collisions.

Tremblin~

is a portrayal of a series of

But already in Fear and

Trernblin~

is shown as culminating in the religious.

the collision

Repetition is the

companion volume to Fear and Trembling and shows one
collision in detail.

Still the main point is the same.

Repetition is impossible in either the aesthetic or ethical
but becomes possible in the religious.

The very mood of the

first three volumes is one of collision and confusion.

One

is strongly convinced of the either/or as he begins
Either/or.

But the second volume dissipates his conviction.

At first he may not even focus on the collision as the main
theme of Fear and Trembling and Repetition but with help

•
from the note in The Concept
of Dread he does this.

Once

again he feels the tension of the either/or out it is a
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tension that pushes him to the religious.

And strangely

enough even that religious bristles with collision and
tension.

These three early books seem to promise some

secret to be unlocked in the future, but of themselves they
leave one in the end only with many unanswerable questions.
Stages on Life's lvav at first seems that 1 t will
clearly separate the stages and set up a clear collision.
But again we are carried into the same whirlpool of confusion.

The ethical seems to include the aesthetic but at the

same time the ethical seems to be the religious.
there seem to be two opposing pillars.
more carefully it seems that they merge.
that the original pillars A and

~

At first

But as one looks
And then it seems

turn out to be pillar C

or the religious.
The style of the middle works of the authorship
primarily mirrors religiousness A or the first movement of
the leap.

Here Kierkegaard writes in a technical philoso-

phical way about the paradox which overcomes the collision.
This philosophical technique is a purified form of aesthetic
expression.

It is a style perfectly suitable to an

expression of the paradox.

It can lay bare the paradox of

dread out of which arises the leap.

It can analyze the

three fold paradox il\ relation to Socrates and the leap.
It can· clarify the difference between the paradox of
Abraham and that of Socrates.

The clear philosophical style

188

goes beyond the confusion of the style of the merely·
aesthetic.
ness

But it does not yet reach the straightforward-

th~t ari~es

in the purely religious writings.

· In the last phase of his authorship, Kierkegaard
uses a style of direct communication in order to say what
the religion of Jesus means.

He no longer hides anything

but he tries to spell out in detail the full both-and of
the double movement leap.
sin and faith and the

He directly shows the meaning of

scand~l

and suffering.

So there is a mirrored image of the collision and
the double movement leap in the ground plan of Kierkegaard's
authorship.
individually.

But, one also sees this image in each work
There is a progressive expression of the

collision and the synthesis by way of the leap in each work
as one moves through the authorship.

Each book is a pro-

gressively clearer presentation of the whole authorship.
The communication becomes more direct as one advances from
book to book.

But what is the significance of this move-

ment from indirect to direct communication in Kierkegaard's
style?

Why does he begin by deceiving his reader with the

hiding of a great secret?

Why in his expression is

Kierkegaard as mysterious as Faust?
The meaning

a~d

purpose of Kierkegaard's move from

indirect toward direct communication is to be found in his
theory of education.

He wanted to understand himself.

He

wanted to understand Jesus Christ.
the movement of history.

He wanted to understand

He wanted others- to do the same.

This was his fundamental drive.
that would best fit this purpose.

He searched for a style
After coming to some

degree of self-understanding in the Regina experience, he
was inspired to write for others.

He describes his theory

of education primarily as one of deceiving people into the
truth.3

He thought that men were separated from the truth

by a veil of illusion and his technique of indirect communi. cation was the only way of helping them out of this illusion.
For the truth's sake he wanted to deceive men into the truth.
From the vantage point of his Regina experience
Kierkegaard saw the mere aesthetic as illusory.
mere ethical as illusory.

He saw the

He saw the collision between the

aesthetic and the ethical as ·illusory.

It was the first

movement of the leap that revealed the illusion of the
previous stages and even began to reveal its own illusion.
He saw that his age was especially afflicted with such an
illusion.

He pointed out how the demoralization of the

modern state, especially through the press and the spirit
of anonymity, contributed to this illusion.
got beyond the illusion. 4

He knew how he

He knew that he moved along by

experiencing the contfadictions of the various stages.
Hence, he wrote and lived so as to involve men more deeply
in the aesthetic that they might see the deception of the
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aesthetic.
~hat

He wrote as the most aesthetic of aesthetes so

he might bring men beyond the

aesthet~c.

A~

he puts

1.t,_he began by accepting the other man's illusion as good
money.5
Kierke~ard's

theory of education and hence his use

of indirect communication is rooted in
and theological understanding.

psychological

hi~

Primarily he wants men to

see Jesus Christ as making the double movement leap and he
wants men to imitate Jesus in that leap.

But, as he thinks

of himself as trying to help men see a complex difficulty
arises before his mind's eye.

The leap of Jesus is

shrouded in the mystery of scandal.
is clouded.

The attention of men

Kierkegaard knows that he is trying to reach a

supernatural goal by a natural means.
men to faith but he knows

th~t

He is trying ,to bring

they can come to faith only

by their own efforts and by the grace of God.

Their own

asceticism is necessary for the first movement and God's
grace is necessary for the second movement.

What does he

have to do with the whole process?
As he ponders his task as an educator, and to him
that only means educatin~ a man to become individual,6 he
sees his role as that of the witness.
crowd as the untruth.7

He comes to see the

He thinks that only the individual

'

who becomes a witness.to the truth can deliver another
individual from the crowd.

To be a witness is to be a
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martyr.

In his psychological and theological

in~i~ht

he

b_eca:me convinced that all an educator can do is compel
-·

another to take notice.
"Compelling people to take notice and to judge is
the characteristic of genuine martyrdom.

A genuine

martyr never used his· might but strove by the aid
of impotence. "8
His.style of indirect communication was a method of impotence.
It was based in his insight that his own might or direct
. communication was powerless.
Thus, Kierkegaard's very style is rooted in his
concept of himself as a witness.
only teach by learning.

He knew that he could

He wrote in great sincerity:

not a teacher, only a fellow student."9

"I am

Even his style

indicates the constant "becoming" structure of the leaping.
His indirect communication is a product of his belief in
the existential.

As one comes to understand his style he

feels the passionate inwardness of Kierkegaard's expression.
What pathos there is in those words we have seen before:
"The thought goes very far back in my recollection
that in every generation there are two or three
who are sacrificed for the others, are led by
frightful sufferings to discover what redounds

'

to the good of others.

So it was that in my

melancholy I understood myself as singled out
for such a fate."10
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Just as ?aust broke his silence out of sympathy, so did
· ~ierke.csaard.

Kierkegaard too had his doubts even about his

._,

ability to

But he, too, became a poet even

com~unicate.

that he might deceive men beyond poetry.

When he became a
poet he also experienced his religious awakening11 and,
thus, he did not

desi~t

from using poetry to bring others

to poetry even that they might become religious •. The
religious subsumes the aesthetic and thus the aesthetic is
not absolutely contradictory to the religious.

Thus,

.Kierkegaard can use the aesthetic in bringing men to the
religious.

The double movement leap which unites the

ethical and the aesthetic can even unite the poetic and the
crowd.

When that happens the individual arises.

So it is

that indirect communication is grounded in the leap and
constantly mirrors forth the leap.

But can we understand

all this more concretely?
It is through Kierkegaard's use of the pseudonyms
that he stylistically attempts to deceive the crowd into
the truth.

An understanding of the role of Kierkegaard's

pseudonyms would help us see just how he was able to
communicate indirectly.

Very simply, the point is, he was

always a religious author even when he was writing as a
mere aesthete or as a philosopher.

'

His first task was to go

to the crowd and meet them in their own position.

·rhus, he

would express the values of the aesthetic in the most
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beautiful way he knew how.

He would express the poetic

arid philosophic ways as if they were suf'fi9ient in them,_,

s.elves.

But, all the while he knew they were not.

That is

why he never signed his own name to those writings.

They

were part of his world view and each pseudonym represented
a strand of his own consciousness.
partial and inadequate views.

But, they were all

By using the name of the

pseudonyms he pointed to their insufficiency.

Because he

was deceiving the crowd out of an illusion he had to use
falsities.

But he did not want to claim these falsities

as_.. the truth and therefore he expressed them under the sign
of the pseudonym.

He always believed in the both-and of

the double movement leap.

But in order to convince others

of this he thought he had to begin with the either/or of
the collision.

Thus, his early literature was written under

the double sign of the either/or and the pseudonym.

The

pseudonym was a smile to the side by which Kierkegaard
said, some day you will see that I deceived you but then
you will remember this smile and realize that I was only
seeking to deceive you into the truth.

By the pseudonyms

Kierkegaard disowned his own deceit even while he deceived.
Before looking at this technique of the pseudonyms
more closely, we should mention two other aspects of his

"

revealing concealing style.

Just as he deceived with the

either/or but took it back with the pseudonyms, so he

al~:;o
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deceived with the image of himself which he presented to
the crowd and took 1t back ·with the

Edifyih~

Discourses.

nUr1ng his merely aesthetic period he showed himself to
the people of Copenhagen as a mere aesthete. He convinced
them that he lacked any seriousness. 12 Even in his personal
existence he deceived others that he stood with the cro·wd.
And his technique worked.
Seducer became popular.
published an

Edifyin~

Especially The Diary of a
And yet, at the same time he

Discourse with each aesthetic work

·in order to show the religious which the aesthetic work
needed. Nobody appreciated his religious works. 1 3 He also
deceived with his personal life but revealed his real intent
with his discourses.
In keeping with the three parts of his authorship
.Kierkegaard uses three sets of pseudonyms.

The pseudonyms

of the collision period include Judge William and the
aesthetic characters.· Judge William is the author of the
'purely ethical
in appearance.

writin~s.

But they are purely ethical only

For he attempts to include the aesthetic

within his ethical perspective and he is always religious.
The two main aesthetic characters are the young and Victor
Eremita.

Victor represents the aesthetic religious or the

first movement of the aeap.

As has been earlier pointed out

the young man is revealed at three stages of his development.
We see the young man as he views the aesthetic possibilities
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aYid eventually follows that of Victor.

It is in

3enet1tion that the young man becomes Vict?r•
A~

one considers these pseudonyms of the collision

period, one can see them as masks whereby Kierkegaard can
deceive and yet go beyond the deceit.

But, one is also

aware of another dimension which they possess.

They allow

Kierkegaard to speak of his personal life without being so
obvious so as to offend his reader or Regina.

Through the

pseudonyms he can explore all of his feelings with detachment.

Perhaps it is precisely the spirit of detachment

which the mask of Constantine Constantus is capable of
evoking.

It is right here, in the depths of the relation

between the pseudonym as a device of religious education
and the pseudonym as a mask of the intimately personal,
that Kierkegaard reveals his_secret.

It was necessary for

Kierkegaard to communicate the collision indirectly, for
the collision was so dialectical that in reality it was far
more than the collision.

In Kierkegaard's great experience

of 1838, he became at once a poet and a religious man.
That was for him the moment of repetition which united the
dimensions of time with one another and with eternity.
Thus, in his one experience there was the collision and
the first movement of the leap and even a premonition of

"

the second movement of the leap.

Kierkegaard experienced

all the moments at once and he wanted to bring others to
this experience even by writing about it.

But, in order to
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w-rite about this he had to
l'rhich was one moment.
langua~e

spatiali~e,

as it were, that

Thus, in bringing his insight to

he had to breal{ 1 t into parts, whereas in reality

it was not broken into parts.

In order to whisper of the

unity of the collision and the

lea~,

communication and the pseudonyms.
them he had to break them asunder.

he used indirect

In order to speak of
But, he still needed a

stylistic technique to point to their unity.

Thus, his

peculiar style.
In the middle period of his authorship Kierkegaard
spoke through Vigilius Haufniensis and Johannes Climacus.
This writing which mirrors forth the first movement of the
leap has less of incompleteness in it than the period of
the collision.

Thus, the pseudonyms are not separated so

.far from Kierkegaard.

Johannes the Seducer in his Diary

is three steps removed from Kierkegaard himself.

Between

Kierkegaard and that Diary there stands Johannes the
writer, and the young man and Victor the editor.

But,

Kierkegaard is only removed from the contents of The Concent
of Dread by its philosophical abstractness.

Thus,

Vigilius, the watchman of Copenhagen, is only a thinly
diaphonous mask over Kierkegaard himself,

Johannes

Climacus is the leapet:" who knows of the first movement of
the leap and its difference from the second movement even
in their philosophical distinction.

He has spelled out
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the differences between religiousness A and religiousness B.
l{e is removed from the real Kierkegaard

to~

the degree that

._,_

speculation is not yet full praxis.
Finally, in the third stage of his authorship
Kierkegaard abandons indirect communication but still uses
the pseudonum of anti-climacus.

Anti-climacus is against

the mere leap beyond the earth and shows the necessity of
coming back to the earth.

Kierkegaard uses a pseudonym

here for a reason exactly opposite to the reason he used
pseudonyms in the earlier stages.

In the first and second

parts of the authorship he understood more than he wrote
and hence used a pseudonym.

In the third part he does not

understand all that he writes but believes it.

So again he

feels the need to use a pseudonym.
Through his pseudonyms Kierkegaard speaks indirectly
and thus, like Faust, reveals even by concealing.

He does

this in conscious imitation who indirectly communicated to
men the lesson of the double movement leap through His ,
Incarnation.

He does it as the teacher that he might be

effective and that he too might continue to learn.

His

style exhibits the unity and development of his primary
thought,

It constantly portrays the collision and the leap.

For that reason all
ten

pi~tures

o~

his thought can even be seen in the

we have selected from Fear and Trembling.
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CONCLUSION

My method of argumentation has been quite straightforward.

I have sought to show the equivalence of the

existential and the religious in Kierkegaard.

In order to

accomplish this I have argued that they are both equivalent
to the leap and therefore to each other.

My whole effort

has been to clarify the meaning of the leap so that in
terms of it the religious and the existential can be
correctly interpreted.
suggested even more.

But, while doing this I have
I have been in effect saying that the

leap is the central issue in Kierkegaard's thought.

From

this suggestion a problem arises, the answer to which will
form a suitable conclusion to this ·thesis.
this:

The problem is

what is the relation between Kierkegaard's goal and

method and my goal and method?
Kierkegaard's goal is primarily to make the leap
and to persuade others to make it.

Clarification of the

leap is only a means toward his goal, whereas for me it is
the primary goal.

Because of his goal his method will

include much more within it than philosophical analysis.
As we have seen he will make his appeal through such

'
techniques as the pseudonyms,
his Edifying Discourses, and
even his way of life.

His techniques of indirect communica-

tion include much more than critical reflection and a
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dialectical analysis.

With this complexity of his method in

mind we might pick out just his dialecticai analysis and
··~·

make explicit how that proceeds.

Then we can relate our

method of argumentation to this aspect of his method.
As one looks at the authorship he sees that
Kierkegaard's argument has three moments.

There is the

aesthetic moment, the philosophic moment and the religious
moment.

All three of these are part of the same dialecti-

cal argument so there is still a philosophic issue in the
aesthetic and religious moments.

Kierkegaard's way of

philosophizing is to reduce several different philosophies
to form basic possibilities and then to relate those basic
philosophies within an hierarchy.

In these ways he shows

how-one philosophy is more consistent and adequate than the
others.

He repeats the pattern of this basic argument

through the three moments of his authorship.
In the aesthetic moment of his argument he treats
what we might call the stage and love structures of the
leap.

Here he clarifies the basic terminology of his

philosophy and shows how it is pertinent to the human
situation.

He shows the collision between the aesthetic

and ethical and then shows how one gets beyond this collision
by the synthesis of the double movement leap.

At the same

time he-shows how this collision is one between aesthetic
love or eros and ethical love or marriage.

This collision

is gone beyond by erotic inspiration and neighbourly love.
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In the ph1Iosoph!ea1 moment of his authorship he
clarifies the dialectical structures of the leap.

In this

section he shows the superiority of his own dialectic by
contrasting it with the dialectics of Socrates and Hegel.
His basic argument is that his existential dialectic which
assumes sin as a reality is a more consistent and adequate
dialectic than the other two.

The criterion by which he

establishes his hierarchy of dialectics is the existential.
His dialectic is existential in the fullest sense.
In the religious moment there is a further treatment
of the temporal structures of the leap.

The aesthetic and

the ethical are related to the eternal and the temporal.
Kierkegaard. shows how faith recognizes the values of both
the eternal and the temporal and unites them in a perfect
synthesis.

Faith or

religio~sness

B is shown as the highest

existential possibility because it alone has respect for
both the eternal and the temporal.
In my argument I have made more specific the four
basic structures of the leap.

Thus, in the aesthetic

moment I treat the stage, love and experiential structures.
I divide Kierkegaard's analysis of the dialectical structure
into an analysis of the sin, reason and existential
structure.

I further divide his considerations of time

•

into a -treatment of faith, the incarnation and his style.
My argument makes explicit the repeated pattern of his
thought so as to show the equivalence of the leap, the
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religious, and the existential.

In this way I clarify his

philosophical argument which shows the superiority of
religiousness B by showing that it is the way of life that
is the most completely existential •

•
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APPENDIX A

In order to show how my thesis compares and
contrasts with some of the interpretations of Kierkegaard,
I shall now comment on five other authors.

I will approach

each author with the four issues which I have treated in
the Conclusi,on.

I do not think that such a detailed con-

sideration ls necessary for every writer in my bibliography.

The five men I have chosen know and represent

the ·standard interpretation of Kierkegaard.

I consider it

valuable to comment upon at least their ideas in order to
pinpoint what is new and what is old in my interpretation.

'
-

....
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James Collins
Stage Structures of the Leap
Collins understands the stage structures of
Kierkegaard's thought as the funda.me.ntal skeleton of his
entire authorship. 1 However, one of the chief problems
which Collins has throughoµt his· book is to harmonize his
interpretation of the stages with his interpretation of
Kierkegaard's entire thought development.

For the sake of

getting into this problem, which Collins has, of making
Kierkegaard consistent, we might consider the issue which
Collins labels "Christian Humanism." 2
Collins thinks that Kierkegaard was ambivalent conceniing retention of aesthetic or human values once the
leap to religiousness B had been made.

He thinks that

Kierkegaard wavered sometimes thinking that such values
could be retained and sometimes thinking that they must be
abandoned.

But Collins goes even a bit further and seems

to think that Kierkegaard cannot be a "humanist".

He writes:

"Yet when the aesthetic life is no longer admitted
to be absolute, there still remains the task for
Christians of renewing the face of the entire earth
and hence of reckoning in a positive way with
humanistic values ... 3
Collins thinks that Kierkegaard:

•
" ••• lacked full confidence
in the power of the supernatural order to transform natural abilities and
perfections, with~ut compromising its own transcendental character."
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The basic reason why Collins thinks that Kierkegaard
~as

this problem of being a humanist arise$ from the inter-

Rreta tion which Collins has of the stages and their relationships.

Even though Collins is careful to point out that one

does not pass only from the aesthetic to the ethical to
religiousness A and to religiousness B in just that rigid
order, and even though Collins thinks that religiousness A
can contain the ethical and the aesthetic and that the
ethical can contain the aesthetic, Collins still doubts
that the leap to religiousness B permits the survival of
the previous stage.
At this point we must ask Collins how he would conceive of the leap.

He does speak of a leap from the

aesthetic to the ethical.5

He indicates that the transition

from one stage to the other is the leap.
make any analysis of the leap.

But he does not

If he did, would not he

have to say that the full existential leap is that double
movement leap which we have described?
If Collins would agree to this, would not he have
to say that Kierkegaard's notion of dialectics is closer
to Hegel's than he admits?

Collins' point concerning

Hegel's dialectic and Kierkegaard's humanism is that
Kierkegaard finds it hard to be a humanist because he cannot
' dialectic as does Hege1. 6 However,
admit a_ synthesis in his
Kierkegaard is still different enough from Hegel in that
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his dialectic is existential whereas Hegel's is ideal.

If

our thesis is correct, then Kierkegaard does have his own
kind of existential synthesis.

It is this synthesis of

the double movement leap which enables Kierkegaard to found
his •Christian Humanism."

Kierkegaard does not lack a

foundation for explaining how the Christian can renew the
face of the earth.
Collins supports one of the key tenets of our
thesis, that the ethical alone is an existential impossi.bility.

At the same time he points out the fundamental

opposition between the aesthetic and the religious.
"His own experience, rather than any theoretical
requirements, convinced Kierkegaard that man's
real predicament is to be placed between a
thoroughly esthetic way of living and a thoroughly
religious one. No permanent footing can be maintained on a purely ethical basis, and in this
respect Kierkegaard stands opposed to all efforts
to make morality self-sufficient. Ethical principles
are intrinsically ordained to the religious outlook,
and a secular morality is either unaware of its
religious significance or only an esthetic discourse
about being moral."7
I agree entirely with this very important and well
expressed interpretation of Collins.

It goes to show the

existential impossibility of the merely ethical.

But does

Collins have to stress the fundamental opposition of the
aesthetic and religious to such a point that they cannot
be reconciled?

Does not
" Kierkegaard's notion of the double

movement leap as he develops it from Fear and Trembling
show how he can reconcile the two extremes?
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Love Structures of the Leap
•..·

In his book on Kierkegaard, Collins takes very
little interest in love. His treatment of Regina 8 is
quite unique.

Collins does not indicate that Regina had

anything to do with Kierkegaard's religious development.
Collins does think that Kierkegaard's relation to his
father was very influential in his religious development.
But in keeping with his interpretation of the fundamental
opposition between the aesthetic and the religious, Collins
.does not relate Kierkegaard's erotic love to his religious
love.
If Collins would consider Kierkegaard's experience
of, and thought about, the erotic, I wonder if he would not
have to reconsider his treatment of the leap and its stage
structures.

Would Collins agree with the following explana-

tion of the dialectical relation between the aesthetic and
the religious?

There are different kinds of aesthetes,

i.e., Johannes the Seducer and Victor Eremita.

Between

Johannes and Victor there are both likenesses and differences.

Together they both live in immediacy; they live for

the eternalized moment.

But they are as different as

Lysias and Socrates in Plato's Phaedrus,

By loving a

woman, Johannes just steals bait from the gods.
becomes·a poet or a genius or, yes, even a saint.
itl

But Victor
That is

One can leap from one level of the aesthetic, that of

207

Johannes, to another level, that of Vietor.

This is the

leap of infinite resignation that brings a·man to
religiousness A.

Is not this the experience that

Kierkegaard had through his love for Regina?

Was she not

the occasion by which he became a religious aesthete?
Through her he experienced the magnificence of the immanent
God.

But that was not yet faith in the transcendent aspect

of God.

However, Kierkegaard made the second part of the

leap by returning to the earth, which would be the ethical
.part of the leap, by becoming ready to marry.

Johannes de

Silentio could not have such faith and even if Kierkegaard
could not, though I think he did, he saw the idea as being
this double movement.

The erotic was the occasion for the

grace and once the grace came it could preserve the
.inspiration of the erotic; it could continue to make the
eternal existentially real.

If Collins would agree with

such an interpretation then could he not overcome the
difficulty of determining whether Kierkegaard can be a
humanist or not?
Dialectic Structures of the Leap
If Collins is really serious about the fundamental
importance of the stage structures throughout the whole of
Kierkegaard's thought, ' then I do not see how he can maintain his interpretation of the stage and the leap.
writes:

Collins

208

"Around this three-fold division, Kierkegaard
organizes the entire argument which runs through
the esthetic works. His later philosophical and
religious studies suppose that this original
analysis of central human motives is a sound one,
which can be applied even outside the aesthetic
context." 9
This I see as another true and admirable statement.
But then Collins makes his interpretation of the stage, so
that Kierkegaard has difficulty being a humanist.

Finally,

throughout much of his book, especially that dealing with
the religious phase of Kierkegaard, Collins shows the
.humanism of Kierkegaard.
here.

Now there is an inconsistency

Why should Kierkegaard, when he becomes most

religious in his writing, become most humanistic if there
is to be some conflict between his Christianity and his
humanism?

One explanation would be that Kierkegaard had

two contradictory phases:

the first wherein the stage

structures did not permit a humanism and the second wherein
they did.

Another explanation would be that Kierkegaard

just dropped his stage structure format.

Collins would

not want to accept either of these explanations.

Therefore,

if he admits the humanism of Kierkegaard's religious phase,
I do not see how he can maintain his interpretation of the
stage structures of the leap.

But he does admit the

humanism of the religious writing of Kierkegaard as I will
now show.·

'

In his treatment of the existential Collins has long
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passages that are in perfect agreement with our thes~s. 10
He shows how religiousness B contains much within it of
r~11g1ousness

A.

In other words, one does not leap beyond

the third stage when going to the fourth.

Collins points

out how:
" ••• in the Christian economy, all things are made
new, above all, man himself, who becomes nova
oreatura. The individual no longer seeks to exchange
his finitude for a merger with the absolute, but
gains a new sense of the worth and human value of
creatureliness. Time is not to be fled, and neither
is it merely to be endured strongly but without hope
of fulfillment. The eternal is now found to be
immanent in the temporal order, in such a way as to
give time si~nificance in itself and for eternal
happiness."
This is what I would call a perfect statement of
the dialectical structures of the leap as I see it.

But

notice this very statement of Collins contradicts what he
wrote earlier when discussing the stages as such.
How could Collins doubt the humanism of Kierkegaard
if he woUld agree that such an idea as this is dominant
throughout the whole of the Kierkegaardian authorship?
How could he doubt that such an idea is dominant if he saw
the meaning and central place of the leap?
is just as significant as are the stages.

For the leap
Without a

correct notion of the leap one does not understand the
stages.

'
Collins even relates
this synthesis to the instant
but apparently does not see the equivalence of the instant
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and· the leap.

He writes:

"This act occurs in the Instant, as kind of
synthesis of time and eternity, in which the
believer is rendered contemporaneous with
Christ. 11 12
·
If Collins would relate the eternal to the aesthetic
and the ethical to the temporal as Kierkegaard does 1n
Stages and the Postscript, then would not he have a very
hard time maintaining that there can be no synthesis of
the aesthete within the religious?
In his chapter on The Nature of the Human Individual,
.Collins again shows much evidence in Kierkegaard's thought
th~t.he

would find hard to reconcile with the idea that

Kierkegaard was lacking in "humanism."

Collins points out

Kierkegaard's great concern for political and social criticism.

He shows Kierkegaard was as much caught up in

"humanism" as were Nietzsche, Marx and Feuerbach.

When he

discusses "Humanism" and Christianity at the end of that
section he writes:
"Thus the age in which we live poses an inescapable
either/or. Either one must be loyal to man and the
earth, as Nietzsche counseled, in such a way that
one is a traitor to God, or one must learn to love
God above all things earthly and human and thus to
love men and the earth the better in Him.
Kierkegaard's hope was that the inhumane consequences of following the first alternative will
dispose us to choose the other path, so as to build
up a Christian humanity, a fellowship of individuals
united by faith and charity in Christ. 11 13

'

-Notice the meaning of the either/or and of the
synthesis in this passage.

Here Collins unites what he
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earlier called the aesthetic within the religious and yet
still has a meaningful either/or which is based on the
absoluteness of the aesthetic.
Temporal Structures of the Leap
In the above, we see that it is in love of Christ
that we come to love our brothers and the earth.

We know

that it is in love and faith that the eternal and temporal
are united.

But for some strange reason Collins will not

take up this theme of love seriously just as previously he
would not take up erotic and married love even though they
were of paramount importance for Kierkegaard.

If he would

consider the leap of love, would not the central place of
the leap in Kierkegaard's thought clarify itself for him
and overcome his problem of humanism?
At the beginning of his chapter Becoming a Christian
in Christendom Collins writes:
"The desired synthesis of moral and esthetic
interests is not to be made, however, on any
basis furnished by one or the other outlook."14
He writes this as if he is now convinced that
there can be such a synthesis even though at the beginning
of his book he would have denied such a possibility.

He

would have said it was Hegelian and not Kierkegaardian.

'
He emphasizes the importance
of becoming'contemporaneous
with Christ.
made.

For this is the way the synthesis is to be

He has mentioned Kierkegaard's treatment of the
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I-Thou relationship.

And finally Collins comes to that

all important notion of the Love of God.

he

do?

But what does

In one and one-half pages he passes it by.

He does

not show how the eternal and the temporal are linked in the
leap of love.

He does not discuss the difference and the

possible relations between poetic and Christian love.
he would I wonder what he would say about our thesis.

If
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Walter Lowrie
Stage Structures of the Leap
Lowrie refers to himself as a biographer and not as
a philosopher.

He is an excellent historian and I greatly

appreciate not only his translations but also his way of
interpreting Kierkegaard's life.
assembles them meaningfully.

He knows the facts and he

In the following considera-

tion of his interpretation of the leap I shall be concerned
with two points - how would my interpretation of the leap
serve him in clarifying his biographical data and how well
is my interpretation supported by his data?

Putting this

in another way I will ask - how does Kierkegaard's fundamental philosophical insight aid us in interpreting his
life and works and is this insight confirmed by the
biographer-historian?

In short, I am suggesting that Lowrie

is and must be a philosopher in his biographical and historical interpretation and I will now inquire into what happens
to that interpretation when one emphasizes the philosophical
over the historical and the biographical.

I will compare

and contrast his interpretation with mine and mine with his.
Lowrie cites texts wherein Kierkegaard refers to the
leap.

But Lowrie does not think it is his task to analyze

•
philosophically such concepts
as the leap.

However, if

Lowrie did make a careful study of the stage structures of
the leap, I wonder if he could lay out his biography of
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Kierkegaard in the way that he did.
~efers
M~y_l9,

For example, Lowrie

to the time from June 4, 1836 to 10;30 a.m. on
1838 as the ethical stage of Kierkegaard's life.

Lowrie writes:
"!tis out of deference for s.K.'s own nomenclature,
his sharp distinction of the three stages, that I
have adopted this title (The Ethical Stage) to
describe the present chapter •••• Where else could
we look for the ethical .stage? S. K. instructs us
that it lies between the aesthetical and the
religious - therefore this must be the peace. And
what have we a right to expect of S.K. in his
ethical stage? Surely no more than that he was
trying to be good. It must be. confessed that this
conclusion has more truth than evidence on its side,
so far as the testimony of the Journal is concerned." 15
At this point we see Lowrie letting his theory of
the stages guide him as to how to interpret Kierkegaard's
life.

But ls his theory of the stages right?

Perhaps the

difficulty which Lowrie feels arises from a wrong notion
of the stages.

Lowrie indicates that it is hard to find

such a stage.

He sees there is not much evidence for it.

Maybe there ls as little truth in his conclusion as there
is evidence for it.
our thesis has been that the collision of the
aesthetic and ethical is dialectically related to the
double movement leap.

We have never thought that one is

first in an aesthetic stage and then an ethical stage and
finally a religious stuge.

We have never thought that the

leap is a transition first from the aesthetic to the ethical
stage and then from the ethical to the religious stage.
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Lowrie would seem to support this ordinary view.

·-

We have begun our argument with what Kierkegaard

says about the leap in The Concept of Dread.

There we have

seen the leap as a transition from pagan innocence to
Christian guilt.

We have maintained that this is the same

leap that Kierkegaard describes in Fear and Trembling and
his other works.

We have argued that this is a description

of his own religious experience.

In light of this we would

argue that the ethical is not an existential possibility.
The aesthetic stage and the religious stage are livable
but the ethical is not.

One is either an ethical aesthete

or an ethical religious man and there is no middle ground.
This we have shown is the point of Kierkegaard's threefold
distinction of the ethical in The Concept of Dread whereby
.he shows the first kind of proper ethics to be impossible.
Lowrie suggests in his statement that the ethical
is that stage wherein a man tries to be· good.

But I do not

think this is at all an adequate notion of what Kierkegaard
would mean by the ethical.

First of all, Kierkegaard

connects the ethical with marriage, and, of course,
Kierkegaard never married.
exception.

He was always an ethical

Always, also in the Postscript Kierkegaard

describes ethics as a

~uccessful

striving.

But what Lowrie

describes as Kierkegaard's ethical period is not a successful striving.

Kierkegaard strives to be good but is not
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good.

Mere striving is not the ethical.

The ethical man

is good.
~~-

·

In non-Christian religion there is no proper ethics.

But within the Christian world there can be two kinds of
ethics.

That ethics which is sublated within Christianity.

Proper ethics of the second kind which is founded on dogmatics or faith is true ethics.

But then there is the

ethics of Christendom •. Theoretically this thinks it can
rest on metaphysics and practically it is the mere follow. ing of the universal order.
possibility.

It is not an existential

That is, the many who are in this ethical

order are lacking in existence.
in the Christian world.

Now Kierkegaard was living

Therefore, Lowrie is seeking to

find within his life a period when he wholeheartedly
followed the ethical patterns of Christendom.

No wonder

that such a period is hard to find.
In Kierkegaard's very literature there is not first
an aesthetic period and then an ethical period and then the
philosophical and finally the religious.
an aesthetic/ethical period.

No there is first

The young man and Judge

William right from the start meet in collision.

So it was

in Kierkegaard's life and so it is in his theory.
Love Structures of the' Leap
I greatly admire Lowrie's fine treatment of
Kierkegaard's relation with Regina.

With great patience
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Lowrie shows hims.elf to be a careful detective in ferreting
out the nuances of Kierkegaard's religious-experience.

I

-·

agree with Lowrie completely that his real conversion
resulted from his experience with Regina.

Lowrie is care-

ful to distinguish the unspeakable joy aspect of his con-

16
version from "the fact" of that conversion as such •.
However, if we approach Kierkegaard's broken
engagement from the notion of the double movement leap, I
wonder if we will not get a slightly different interpretation than Lowrie's.

He suggests that Kierkegaard did not

marry for religious reasons.

The main aspect of that

reason was that Kierkegaard. saw himself as a penitent
because of his past sins. 1 7 I agree that Kierkegaard. did
see himself as a penitent and did not want to infect Regina
with his and his family's guilt.

But wasn't the central

reason for the rupture the divine counter order?

And did

not this have to do with the erotic inspiration whereby
Kierkegaard became a religious poet?

Lowrie goes all

around this idea and gives many pertinent quotations.
he does not zero in on it.

But

He does not come right out and

see this as the first movement of the leap - that movement
of infinite resignation.

He quotes the long passage with

delight concerning the Knight of Infinite Resignation and

'

the Kn1ght of Faith~ 8 But he does not interpret the Regina
experience in terms of this.

He points out how Abraham is

218

to Isaac and s.K. is to Regina. 19

If Lowrie would settle

))_is mind on this central notion, wou.ld he not see even
~hat

here we have a distinction of the ethical phase?

The

man of the earth from whom the Knight of Faith cannot be
distinguished is that ethical man for whom there.are no
existential possibilities.
At his moment of erotic inspiration I think
Kierkegaard became fully an aesthete - he was an inspired
poet.

He became religious at least in the sense of

religiousness A.

And he now became ethical.

Previously

as a.lower level aesthete he wanted to be good.
he could be.

But now

He is now beyond the collision so as to be

both aesthetic and ethical.
has leaped into the infinite.

But that is so only because he
Now he must make the movement

whereby he becomes back to the earth.
Dialectic Structures of the Leap
Lowrie is also good even to the point of being
inspirational in his handling of Kierkegaard's distinction
between religiousness A and religiousness B.

By means of

this distinction he clearly shows the difference between
Christian faith and all other religions.

He shows how one

must first have religiousness A before he can have
religiousness B.

Lowr\e puts the paradox nicely:

" ••• it (Christianity) is the only religion which the
hope of an eternal blessedness upon something historical, which moreover by its very nature cannot be
historical, and so must become so by virtue of the
absurd ... 20
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Lowrie does an excellent job of commentary on Kier.kegaard 's
idea:
"to comport oneself at the same time absolutely with
regard to the absolute Telos and relatively with
regard to the relative."21
He shows in his commentary how Kierkegaard hereby
repudiates the protestant ethics which stresses the secular
calling.
All that Lowrie has written about the differences
and relation between religiousness A and B I see as a confirmation of my thesis.

The first movement of the leap is

religiousness A and the second movement is religiousness B.
When these movements are made together religiousness A is
the sublated aesthetic and religiousness B is the sublated
ethical.

Here we see the both-and or the fullness of the

existential.
Again, I wonder what would have happened to Lowrie's
interpretation if he would have stressed the centrality of
the leap,

In stressing the absoluteness of the Divine

which the man of religiousness A discovers, Lowrie shows
how Kierkegaard repudiates protestant ethics.

For,

protestant ethics does not stress the necessity of
asceticism.

It does not make such a firm distinction

between the good and the holy.
remembe~ed

But if Lowrie would have

throughout 'the role of religiousness A, I wonder

if he might have interpreted Kierkegaard's relation to
mysticism in a slightly different way, 22 Kierkegaard
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definitely says he is not a myst1e.

Kierkegaaro, EiS towr1e

points out, often does criticize mysticism-.

But could not

everything that Lowrie here w,ri tes about mysticism be
clarified by seeing mysticism as religiousness A?
Kierkegaard. would not want to say that the Christian ideal
was just to become a Knight of Infinite Resignation.

He

would not want to say that he was just a mystic even though
Johannes de Silentio might.

But he could say that mysti-

cism was the first part of the leap.

I think that

. Kierkegaard was a sublated mystic and that he would have to
defend the rights of the mystic.
mysticism.

Religiousness A means

That is, it is union of God and man.

But that

ls not to say that Kierkegaard ever thought he was just a
mystic.

He was definitely no mystic in the popular sense

of mysticism.
immanent.
gaard.

But he did experience the absolute as

Lowrie could admit that and be true to Kierke-

He does not have to go so far as to write:

"If it is allowable to bestow the name mystic upon
a man who did not stress the immanence of God but
rather the transcendence, etc ••• then I raise no
objection if any one prefers to call s.K. a mystic." 23
I think Kierkegaard did experience God as immanent.
In fact I think Kierkegaard says a man has to, if he wants
to become a Christian.

That is, religiousness A is necessary •

Lowrie is too •good a historian not to know that there
is something wrong with his interpretation.

He writes:

"But on the other hand he approached mysticism almos~
as closely as one could without becoming a mystic."2...,
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Why doesn't Lowrie just get it ove:r w1tn?

Why

qoesn• t he just acrm1 t Kierkegaard was a mystic even if
I{ierkegaard says he wasn't and then agree with Kierkegaard
by saying that he was not just a mystic, just as he would
say Kierkegaard was not just a man of religiousness A?
Temporal Structures of the Leap
Lowrie points out how important the theme of time
is in Kierkegaard's thought.

In fact, Lowrie thinks that

Kier·kegaard more than anyone else has brought the attention
·or contemporary man to the theme of time.

Lowrie takes up
the theme of the instant and relates it to the leap. 25 But

he does not feel that it is his task to make a detailed
analysis of the temporal structures of the leap.

In fact he

does not consider The Works of L0 ve_ carefully at all.

He

mentions that Kierkegaard emphasizes works and not faith
alone.

But he does not show how Kierkegaard conceives of

Christian love as the synthesis of time and eternity.
Lowrie even refers to Buber's I-Thou as if he isn't aware
of Kierkegaard's usage of this in Works of Love.
If one is aware of faith as a double movement leap
whereby through love one lives both in the eternal and the
temporal, I wonder if he would not have to interpret
Kierkegaard's religiouh experience of 1848 with more
dialectical finesse than does Lowrie.
wh~t

It seems to me that

Lowrie refers to as the 18)8 experience is the first
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movement of the leap and the 1848 experience is the second
~ovement

-~-

_

of the leap.

Lowrie shows very clearly how the second religious

experience has to do with faith in God who helps us in the
temporal situation.

That experience had to do with God

forgetting as well as forgiving Kierkegaard's sins.
Lowr1e's summary of some excellent quotations which he
cites from Kierkegaard on this relation between God helping
us in time and his forgetting our sin is:
"Not only had he failed as yet to appropriate the
thought that God can forget as well as forgive, but
(in close connection with this) he was incredulous
of the power of God to help him temporally when he
saved him eternally."2 6
Lowrie shows how the experience of 1848 was a movement
beyond this incredulity.

But when one thinks of this experience in relation
to the leap, a very strange sort of problem arises.
Kierkegaard knew of this aspect of the religious experience
way before 1848.

Already in Fear and Trembling he describes

the double movement leap and he knows that if he would have
had faith he would have married Regina.

In fact, as Lowrie

is keen to see, Kierkegaard did consider the double movement
at that time for himself.

Kierkegaard. refers to his sin and

his melancholy over it as a leak in his boat in which he

'

floated-over the 70,000 fathoms and as a thorn in his flesh.
Thus Lowrie writes:
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"The earlier occasion wnen he 'bh.ougbt Qf 'repairing
the leak' and drawing out the thorn was when he was
engaged to Regina .;. and at that time he concluded
that it was hopeless."27
Now I am not at all sure that Kierkegaard concluded
that it was hopeless.

The question. is - what is the

relation between his experiencing the second movement of
the leap and his knowing about it?

Did he first experience

it and then realize its possibility in thought?

Or did he

first see its possibility in thought and then experience?
Lowrie ls aware of the dialectical problem here to a degree.
He shows how the "metamorphosis of 1848" as he calls it was
led up to by certain presentiments of 1847 and how it was
fully experienced on in 1S49.

He points out how it has to

do with the whole problem of direct and indirect communication.

But isn't it more complicated than Lowrie admits?

Wouldn't Kierkegaard have found it possible to marry Regina
if she would not have become engaged to Schlegel?

Or at

least was he not ready to accept the earth as early as
1844?

Surely he knew of the double movement leap all along.

I would think he came to know of it through experience.

In

the Works of Love he shows in great detail how divine love
breaks into time.

All I suggest is that in seeking to

understand the metamorphosis Lowrie has to push the dialectics back at least th~ee years beyond 1847.

Kierkegaard's

notion of the double movement leap demands this.
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Lo.ttis

~pre

Stage Structures of the Leap
I agree almost entirely with Dupre's superb handling
of Kierkegaard's dialectic.

He is extremely exact in
pointing out how the aesthetic 28 and the ethica1 2 9 are
"sublated in that term's t-wofold meaning of being
suspended and of being preserved, on a higher level."30
He makes explicit the relation between the exist-

ential and the religious and shows that they have to do
with the synthesis of the ethical and aesthetic •
..

. "The spirit first becomes real on the religious level.
Previously, the synthesis of the finite and the
infinite (in which, as we saw, the essence of the
spirit consists) was not yet accomplished, since
the choice of myself on the ethical level was
limited to the finite (though on the background
of the infinite). Therefore, only the religious
man exists in the full sense o_f the word, that is,
as synthesis of the temporal and eternity."31

He argues that the religious must contain the
aesthetic.3 2 But when I look carefully at Dupre's interpretation of the leap a discrepancy arises.

I can best bring

this out by focusing on Dupre's interpretation of the
relation between religiousness A and religiousness B.

He

writes:
"As was pointed out in the second chapter, Kierkegaard
regards the instant not as an element peculiar to
Christianity, bu~ as a central element in every type
of religion. The religious life on a sheerly natural
ba·sis, the so-called religiousness A, culminates in
the consciousness of guilt before God. In this
affirmation of oneself before God, natural religion
arrives at an instant in which eternity touches
existence in time, but without penetrating it. By a
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free admission or his guilt man aff·irms his intrinsic
relation with God and thus brings something absolute
into his existence. For this leap inzo the absolute
no direct intervention of God is required. The
instant of ~el1giousness A has nothing to do with
Grace: t1me and eternity remain irreconcilably
opposed."33
·
I do not.think Dupre can rightly say that Kierke-

gaard thinks that the man of natural religion has a consciousness of guilt before God.

In fact, Kierkegaard in the

Concept of Dread, as Dupre well knows, argues that by
making the qualitative leap one becomes a sinner.

Dupre

knows of:
. "the existence of despair on thn aesthetic stage,
where there is no actual sin."J
Of course, Dupre connects religiousness A and the
aesthetic.

But as he works his way through this he gets

into some difficulties.

That he is not in harmony with

Kierkegaard further manifests itself when he writes:
"the transition from innocence to guilt occurs in
the fall into sin itself, and at that moment man
is no longer free."35
Kierkegaard thinks that freedom comes only to the
man who is conscious of his sin and therefore is a sinner.
All this suggests that there is a level of the
Kierkegaardian dialectic which Dupre has not yet penetrated.
Even though Dupre affirms the dialectical balance of sinfulness and faith in genef'al, I do not think he follows the
concrete thought of K1erkegaard on this matter exactly.

I

do agree with Dupre that religiousness A is attained without
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grace properly speaking,

But is Dupre justified in ·

predicating the instant of religiousness A?

I think not,

He is more right in his statement above when he writes:
"eternity touches existence in time, but without penetrating it."

For paganism there is, strictly speaking, as
Dupre will affirm,3 6 no true temporal succession. So
eternity cannot touch time,
no freedom.

There is no time as ·there is

All this comes in the instant when one leaps

into faith and fades into sin.
Because of his difficulties with this issue Dupre
follows others in setting up a false problem which he does
not adequately solve.

Completely contrary to his notion

that there is sin in natural religion he writes:
"We have already mentioned the existence of despair
on the aesthetic stage, where there is no actual sin.
But there is more. On the one hand, Kierkegaard
asserts that despair is a sickness which, outside
Christendom, is universal ••• on the other hand,
Kierkegaard has defined sin as despair before God.
But since only a Christian has a correct concept of
God, it seems that sin, in the true sense of the
word, can exist only in Christianity. And this conclusion has been affirmed by Kierkegaard himself.
Then how can sin and despair ever coincide, if the
one exists only within, and the other only outside
of, Christianity?"J7
One of the strange confusions that Dupre makes
throughout his book and further examines is this taking of
Christendom and Chris1tlanity as equal.

Ir he wants to say

there is no despair in Christianity all right,

But

definitely he cannot say there is no despair in Christendom.
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The difference between Christendom and Christianity is
qespair.

So it is precisely in Christendom that one can

,_.,

s_ee how despair and sin can coincide.
Man is always becoming.
way; he is leaping.

But that is not all.

Even the man of faith is on the

Consequently, even he recognizes him-

self as sinful even though faith and sin are opposites.
And insofar as he recognizes himself as sinful he sees that
he is moving out of despair.

The point is:

the man of

faith or the man of Christianity is being saved from sin
and despair.

But for the Christian they coincide exactly.

He is moving beyond both.
So Dupre is ambiguous on the place of sin in
religiousness A.
it cannot be.

He says it is other but then shows that

Finally he does not clearly distinguish

Christendom and Christianity or one aspect of religiousness
A and religiousness B and thereby generates a false problem
that "potentiality" language does not adequately deal with
for there is no such problem.
Love Structures of the Leap
The implications of this confusion can be seen when
we examine his theory concerning Kierkegaard's own religious experience.

Dupre does not make explicit that

Kierkegaard's theory or the leap explains his own experience, but Dupre does speculate on Kierkegaard's experience.
Dupre's approach is first of all to point out the
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psychological deformities of Kierkegaara.•s personality and
then he shows hows
"these psychological weaknesses acquired a new
meaning from religion."38
This continues to be a very interesting attempt at
dialectical explanation on Dupre's part, but again I continue to think it just misses.

I will now continue to

show in terms of Kierkegaard's experience why I think Dupre
misunderstands religiousness A and therefore the relation
between religiousness A and

rel~giousness

B.

Dupre writes:

"The rupture with Regina had been inspired not by
· purely religious motives, but by psychic impotence.
However, it led him to a deeper religious consciousness and thus earned a functional role in the whole
of his vocation. ttJ"J
Dupre is just wrong when he thinks that the rupture
was not inspired by purely religious motives.

Of course,

as we have shown, there were several kinds of motives.
Some were connected with psychic quirks but some of them
were purely religious.

The whole issue of the "divine

counter order" in the Stages, I would say, is purely
religious.

The suggestion by the young man in Repetition

about being inspired to religion by his muse is, I think,
autobiographical.

Victor Eremita's speech in the Stages

points out the purely religious motives leading up to a
ruptur~ •.

The reason 'I am so sure of this is because I

interpret Kierkegaard's experience in light of his theory
of the double movement leap.

It is this rupture that leads
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to the first movement of 1nfinite resignation.

Kierkegaard

always praised celibacy because it had this power of
revealing the God of love to man.

True it only brings a

man to religiousness A but that is a necessary aspect of
religion if the synthesis means anything.
Since Du.pre does not see how celibacy is connected
with this religiousness A we might wonder how he ·conceives
of this rupture as having a salutory effect in Kierkegaard's
life.

Dupre is thinking of .what he writes concerning the

rupture and authentic religion •
... . "Kierkegaard, too, had abandoned all earthly desires,
in the person of Regina, and had thereby reached a
religious threshold. But, as he put it, he never
became a Knight of Faith like Abraham, because he
merely arrives at the point of renouncing the mundane,
without ever fully achieving the new reality of faith.
'Had I had faith; he wrote in his diary, I should
have remained with Regina'".Ll-0
"I believe that this insight in Fear and Trembling
opened the way for Kierkegaard to true religion. All
that precedes it was so greatly deformed by his
abnormal upbringing and warped psychology that it
appears to be a disguised projection of4subconscious
drives rather than authentic religion." 1
·
Dupre thinks that religiousness B, that i'S, its
faith aspect as distinct from the religiousness A that is
contained within it is authentic religion.

He reduces the

resignation of religiousness A to the results of a warped
psychology.

I think

~upre

is excellent in pointing out

how Kierkegaard came to religiousness B.

I, too, see Fear

and Trembling together with Repetition as the first state-
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ment of authentic religion in Kierkegaard.

But I am· sure

Kierkegaard would be highly d1.s·pleased with. Dupre's
reduction of natural religion and its relation to celibacy
to warped psychology.
dialectics.

In fact this is not even good

Religiousness B will transform religiousness A

but religiousness B would not have been without religiousness A.

It is not justified to reduce infinite resigna-

tion to mere lunacy.
Dialectic Structures of the Leap
His confusion concerning the role of religiousness
A enables Dupre to make some highly suspicious statements
when he analyzes Kierkegaard's psychic feelings for
Christianity.

Dupre wonders how Kierkegaard kept his faith

and writes:
"Kierkegaard's attitude toward Christianity
oscillated constantly between attraction and
aversion. This aversion was at the basis of the
ferocious attac~ of his last years against the
Danish Church." 2
Such a remark as this fails to take account of
Kierkegaard's distinction between Christendom and Christianity which, of course, Dupre is so well aware of.
Kierkegaard did not oscillate constantly between attraction
and aversion toward Christianity.

He had an aversion for

•
Christendom and he attacked
the Danish Church because of
that.
Kierkegaard saw the necessity of celibacy which is

2.31

an aspect of religiousness A.
Ghristendom.

And he has an aversion for

These two notions are relat'ea.

Christendom

is a complacent ethical watering down of Christianity.

It

has precisely left out the natural experience of God which
can come through such means as celibacy.
the first movement of the leap.

It has· not made

Dupre understands how the

second movement is a faith in God such that one can accept
the temporal.

However, he consistently misunderstands the

role of religiousness A.

As a result he does not fully

. understand religiousness B because, of course, that is not
po~sible

without religiousness A.

Religiousness B without

religiousness A easily becomes mere Christendom.

This is

why Dupre so often sees Christianity and Christendom as
equal.
I have mentioned that I do not think Dupre has penetrated into Kierkegaard's dialectic as far as he might.
Dupre has a chapter on the Dialectic of Sin and one on the
Dialectic of' Faith.

He knows that they are related.

Consciousness of sin is necessary for faith.

But he does

not tie them together as tightly as would Kierkegaard.
Dupre speaks of the leap into sin. 4 3 He speaks of the leap
of faith. 44 But he never analyzes these two leap~ to find
out if they are the Sfme or different.

If he did I think

he would be forced to see the double movement nature of the
leap.

Then I think he would have to clarify his notion of
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religiousness A.

This would help him to understand more

..

accurately the role of celibacy in Kierkegaard's thought
and.experience and that in turn would force upon him a
clearer distinction between Christendom and Christianity.
Temporal Structures of the Leap
Dupre very nicely points out that for Kierkegaard
the incarnation is the supreme revelation of God~s love. 45
When the eternal freely becomes temporal, love manifests
itself.

In his chapter on the Imitation of Christ, Dupre

clarifies how man must realize this synthesis within himself to be existentially full.

A breakdown in this synthe-

sis is despair. . Dupre even follows Kierkegaard in his
analysis of true love insofar as it differs from earthly
love.

In his section on the Works of Faith Dupre shows

·the kind of ethics that Christianity demands in order not
to be hypocritical.

Dupre points out how Kierkegaard hereby

went beyond "Luther's incapacity to grasp two notions
46
dialectically."
I think Dupre•s theory concerning the
development of Kierkegaard's ethics is interesting.

But

what I think would be most helpful would be a relating of
Kierkegaard's notion of Christian love and his notion of
Christian faith.
of the temporal

This, of course, could be done in terms
struc~ure

of the leap.

Love manifests itself as the synthesis of the
eternal and the temporal.

This synthesis is the very
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synthesis of the leap of faith.

Kierkegaard from his

beginning had this basic notion and hence I mistrust any
speculation about some radical development concerning his
ethical theory.

I see him as only making explicit what

his notion of the double movement leap permitted all along.
With this in mind I would even add that Christian love not
only makes an active Christian ethic possible but it allows
the aesthetic and erotic love to be sublated too.
Kierkegaard. deals with this at great length in Works of
Love.

Again, I think Dupre may have missed it because of

not seeing the full implication of that great synthesis of
the leap.

'

.

'
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Eduard Geismar
Stap;e Structures of the Leap
Ge1smar sees the theory of the stages as arising·
out of Kierkegaard's reflection upon his own experience.
One of the interesting ideas that Geismar has, concerning
these stages, is that concepts have different meanings
within each of the stage contexts.

In his analysis of

Repetition, Geismar concentrates on showing what repetition
means first in the aesthetic context.
longed for but cannot be attained.

He shows how it is

In the ethical context

Ge1smar sees repetition as; related to monotony.
religious context repetition is seen as possible.

In the
Geismar

sees this repetition as a restoration of the moral integrity
which the young poet lost when his .beloved became a muse
·and he had to become an ethical exception by not marrying
4
her. 7 Geismar sees this problem of religious rebirth or
repetition as the most important problem in any man's life
and he thinks thats
"Each individual book in the Kierkegaardian
literature is devoted to some single phase of a
life problem. Taken together all these many books
point to the central question for which Christianity
offers a solution. This solution consists in nothing
less than the restoration of each man's pristine
moral integrity through the forgiveness of sins ... 48
I, too, think ' with Geismar that this is the central
problem for it is nothing less than the problem of the leap.
Of· course, Kierkegaard not only has the problem of showing
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what forgiveness means and how one attains it in the·
i:eligious context, he even has the problem_ of showing that
..

·

a_e.sthetic and religious contexts are so different that the
aesthete will not even know of sin. ·The interesting aspect
of Geismar•s insight is that the leap is a transition from
one context to another.

What is longed for such as repeti-

tion in the aesthetic context is allowed in the religious
context and. is not the mere monotony of the existentially
sterile ethical context.

Geismar does not at this point

make explicit the notion that the religious contains the
best. of the aesthetic but he does imply it.
When he discusses the relation between religiousness
A and religiousness B he becomes quite excited in arguing
against the Barthian school and others.
contains the prior.

The latter form

The point at issue has to do with

resignation, suffering, and guilt which Geismar thinks are
the chief characteristics of the religious.

Many German

commentators try to say that the man of religiousness B
leaves these behind when he makes the leap.

At this point

Geismar calls upon the oft quoted statement of Professor
Hirsch who wrote:
"The manner in which the Postscript is usually
understood in Germany is roughly as follows:"
Here we have a description of the ethical and
religious life de!voted solely to the purpose of
keeping it entirely distinct from the Christian
religious life, and from faith in the paradox.
This view could properly be awarded first prize
in a competition to see who could say the most
stupid thing about Kierkegaard."49
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This is an extremely important point in my thesis.
It has to do with the possibility of th& exigtent1al at
:....·.

the,merely ethical level.

The men whom Geismar and Hirsch

are criticizing come at the issue from the other side and
say that Christianity gets beyond the existential by leaping
beyond resignation, suffering, and guilt.
tion of Kierkegaard is totally perverse.

This interpretaKierkegaard's

point is that religiousness B contains this aspect of
religiousness A.

And notice it is religiousness A.

It is

not the mere ethical, as Kierkegaard always maintained the
mere ethical is not even an existential possibility.
Geismar is very strong in his emphasis on the_
importance of the ethical decision if one is to make the
leap.

He stresses Kierkegaard's notion:
"In the msment of decision, the eternal is the
future ... :;,

In this moment of decision the eternal enters the temporal.
Geismar clearly sees this moment as the leap which contains
the elements of resignation, suffering, and guilt.
"The moment of decision faces the future with its
uncertainty; once made, the decision alters the
personality. After the decision he is no t the
same man as he was before the decision ... 51
.. By a leap we reach the absolute maximum of
subjectivity in the Christian consciousness of
sin, with it~ imperative need for a new point of
departure.".5
"The way to Christianity goes through a decision, a
crucial decision in the temporal moment; faith is
an existential leap."5.3
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The chief point to be noted in this interpretation
of Geismar's is that man's ef'fort has much-to do with the
leap.

Geismar does stress grace also, but here he is

showing what man must do for that grace to become effective.
He must become resigned.

That is, religiousness A is the

ordinary pathway toward religiousness B.

Religiousness B

not only contains religiousness A, but religiousness A
prepares the way for religiousness B.
With Geismar's general treatment of the stage
.structures of the leap I have no quarrel.

But as he

expresses his understanding of Kierkegaard's own life, I
do not feel so much at ease with him.
Love Structures of the Leap
Geismar is uneasy with Kierkegaard's attitude
·toward celibacy, and yet he praises Keirkegaard's notion
of resignation, suffering, and guilt.

It seems to me that

Geismar does not like resignation, suffering, and guilt in
the concrete but only at an aesthetic distance.

Of course,

what Kierkegaard says about marriage toward the end of his
life is a special problem and I will take it up as such.
But Ge1smar writes:
"His diaries from the last three years are full of
comments on ~exu~l matters which to my mind are
revolting. " 5
"We cannot fail to see a lack of respect for work
and for marriage, as this respect interpenetrates
the Lutheran doctrine. And I for my part cannot
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help believing that this disrespect has some
relation to the attitude he assumes toward·. woman
1n the earlier writings 1 erotic emotion. l!i.thout
sexuality, sexuality as something mean."55
Geismar in his pious Lutheran way does.not seem to
see any value in celibacy.

It does· not connect 1n his

mind with the resignation, guilt, and suffering that are
necessary for the leap,

He tries very hard to figure

Kierkegaard out and comes up with three kinds of answer.
The first has to do with psychic d1agnosis.56

He

thinks that Kierkegaard was a special kind of manic- ·
depressive who in writing could express either side of his
person no matter what state he was then in.

Also

Kierkegaard remained like a youth all his life and separated
eros from sex, praising the one and belittling the other.
Because of this double problem he entered a manic state
when he saw the beauty of eros and then had to break the
engagement when he went into the depressive state and
emphasized the ugliness of the sexual.

This sort of stuff

makes Kierkegaard. look like a mere robot.

I do not deny

that there is something to it, but what is necessary to
make it interesting is a phenomenology of the family whereby
we could see this tendency growing up in Kierkegaard's
relation to his parents and in the relation between them
and their parents.

'
Kierkegaard
tried this a bit.

Next, Geismar points out how Kierkegaard was
inspired by his love for Regina in both a poetic and
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religious way.

Geismar writes:

"The tragic love affair set fr~e in h1.l'll simultaneously;
the poetic afflatus and the religious determination.") 7

i

Now if Geismar considered what he quoted from·
Repetition about the young man who could not marry his
muse,5 8 might he not have to change his thought a bit?
Perhaps it was not the tragedy of the love that was his
muse, but rather, because Regina was his muse his love
became tragic.
In his third observation Geismar even hits on this
· idea:
· "Luther sets up marriage and the rearing of childre.n
as religion of the highest kind. Kierkegaard's .
objection is drawn from the effect of woman upon
man's idealism. Every man begins his life with a
certain amount of idealism but then he gets
married, and his Juliet deprives him of the lost
child of idealism, on the pretext that he has no
right to risk the welfare of his wife and children.
Here we have the root of Kierkegaard's zeal for
discreditiug the family interest in connection with
religion. ")lj
The reality that Geismar misses is that Regina
'·

heightens his idealism even to the point that he becomes
a poet and saint as Victor Eremita put it, and the young
man in Repetition experienced it.
Kierkegaard valued celibacy because he saw it as
connected with the resignation, suffering, and guilt that
brings a man to religibusness A.

But as Johannes de

-

Silentio put it, the real Christian ideal is to make the
double leap and after discovering the God of love to c.ome

..
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back to the earth through faith in marriage.
was not really opposed to marriage as

~ttch 9

Kierkegaard
He was just

opposed to ideas like those of Luther and Geismar that
marriage is religion of the highest kind.

Erotic.love and

married love can be made compatible with and through
Christian love, but they are not Christian love.
Dialectic Structures of the Leap
Now that we have focused on this discrepancy between
Geismar and Kierkegaard, let us watch carefully what happens
as Geismar approaches the dialectical structures of the
leap.

True to his good general direction he zeros right

in on the essentials:
"Man is a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal.
From this it follows that the central problem of a
human life is to express this .synthesis adequately
and truly. Man lives in time. But everything
temporal has its ultimate ground in the eternal,
and on the other hand has in the eternal its
ultimate goal. To exist means to express the
eternal in time, to translate the eternal content
of the human self into a living reality in time.
What do we see when we thus confront our task?
When an existing individual is oriented in this
manner, the eternal is for him not the eternal pure
and simple, but wears the aspect of futurity and
reveals itself as something that comes to be. In
the moment of decision, the eternal is the future." 60
This description of the dialectical synthesis is
accurate as far as it goes.
it goest

But notice carefully how far

It only goes' so far as to emphasize how the

eternal comes into time in the dimension of the future.
Kierkegaard made this emphasis in the Edifying Discourses.
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But that is only the synthesis of natural religion. · And
i.t is not even a true synthesis.

The future- reveals the

..

eternal.

It 1s not joined with the eternal.

Always when

he is concerned with the Christian synthesis Kierkegaard
emphasizes how the eternal is connected with the. dimension
of the present.

If a man has faith he is reborn.

not merely discover the eternal in the future.

He does

Abraham

would not hope in the future that another son would come
to him as he thought he would kill Isaac.

No, he so

believed in the face of the absurd that even if a son never
came. somehow God's promise would be fulfilled.

This was

real for him right now.
I wonder if Geismar is not missing the part that
infinite resignation has to play in Kierkegaard's leap?
Two discrepancies are now evident:

he does not appreciate

Kierkegaard's view of celibacy and he does not put the
emphasis on the present dimension when the temporal and
eternal are synthesized.

But by infinite resignation one

does face the ultimate scandal of the problem of evil.

No

temporal dimension contains the eternal, not even the
future.

He is opened to the eternal as such.
Kierkegaard is not trying to say that the synthesis

takes place between the future and the eternal but as one

'

fights-himself in the indefinite future he discovers himself as eternal.

Geismar is right when he says "the

eternal is the future."

But that is not the synthesis he
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,

thinks he is talking about.

It is not Kierkegaard's

synthesis of the temporal and the eternal.· Geismar seems
to make two errors concerning infinite resignation.

On the

one hand he does not appreciate its severity - he does not
appreciate celibacy.

On the other hand he over extends it

and thinks one is a Christian by it.

He does not see how

one gets beyond it by something quite different, ·namely,
:faith.
In order to check this discrepancy further we shall
-now examine how Geismar treats Christian love.

For as we

have· revealed that is the activity wherein synthesis really •
takes place.

That is where we can see most clearly the

temporal dimension of the leap.
Temporal Structures of the Leap
Geismar gives a beautiful tribute to Kierkegaard
for his expression of ideas in Works of Love.

Geismar tells

us how he first came to understand from these works what is
meant by the words "God is love."

Geismar stresses the

eternal nature of love and talks about how it abides.

But

he does not show how the works of love are the meeting place
of time and eternity in that special Christian synthesis.
He does not stress the works or the temporal side.
talk ab?ut the

~

He does

' problem of Lutheranism and says
fide

that Kierkegaard is making a new stress on works.

But

Geismar does not show how these works are related to Grace.

Z4J

,

He seems to think that Kierkegaard does not stress Grace as
much as did Luther because of his historical situation.
Btlt.Kierkegaard's entire thought is about Grace even though
he does not always explicitly say it.

He shows how certain

acts can be the occasion for Grace, and he shows· how other
acts flow from Grace.

That is, he shows how some temporal

acts prepare the way for more discovery of the eternal and
then how man can continue to act because of that eternal
vision and with that vision in time.
Geismar sees man's decision as the event wherein
the eternal and the temporal merge.
wherein the eternal is discovered.
of a merger is not a synthesis.

But that is the event
And besides, that kind

He does not see the acts

of love as the event where time and eternity meet in the
.present.

A decision is necessary for this synthesis, but

so is God's Grace - the Grace which enables man to receive
a second time the temporal.

'
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·Reidar Thomte
Stage Structures of the Leao
In Thomte's book there are two levels of interpretation:

that of selection and that of interrelational

explication.

I think that Thomte does an admirable job

of selection.

He goes through Kierkegaard's works and

summarizes key aspects so that he can show what Kierkegaard
means by the religious.

Most of Thomte's work consists in

this kind ·of sele<?tion and summary.

However, at times he

does begin to interrelate certain notions of Kierkegaard's
so··as to explain them in terms of each other.

In this

activity he reveals his understanding of Kierkegaard and
makes more clear why he chooses to select the passage he
does for summarization.
·highly accurate.

I feel that his understanding is

I say this because I agree very much with

the kird of interrelational explication that he does.
only wish that he would do more of it.

I

And I think if· he

did more of it some of the minor contradictions which now
reveal themselves in his interpretation would be eradicated.
To my mind the two best examples of interrelational
explication in his book have to do with his interpretation
of three of the Et1ifying Discourses and with the notion of
"the second immediacy."
'

Concerning the first Thomte writes:

"Three of the discourses deal with what Kierkegaard
in his philosophical writings terms the infinite
double movement, i.e., the renunciation of the world
(resignatiog), and the regaining of ~t (the movement
of faith)." 1

Thomte goes on to interpret each of these discourses
in terms of the double movement leap, 62 and in so doing
throws light on the leap as well as the discourse.

When

Thomte explicates faith as immediacy after reflection he
writes:
"By the term immediacy after reflection he means
exactly what he formerly had called "repetition,"
namely the restoratig~ of the personality to its
pristine integrity."
Following this suggestion one can relate what Thomte
writes in his summary of RePetition 64 to what he is saying
about faith.
If Thomte would have extended this method of explication he could have interrelated all of Kierkegaard's
thought on the religious as it is centered in the notion
of the leap.

If he would really grapple with the problems

that present themselves such as what is the relation between
the leap as the double movement, as the fall into sin, as
the solution to the Socratic knowledge paradox, as the
synthesis of time and eternity in the work of love, then he
would force himself to come up with an idea of the stages
and their relations which would weed out the contradictions
in his present interpretation.

His book gives an excellent

summary of Kierkegaard's books that deal with the stages.
He does a good job in trying to find a criterion around
which the hierarchy of the stages is structured, namely,
that of existence. 65

He shows how the religious is the

246

fullness of the existential and thereby the highest stage.
But he has problems concerning the stage structures of the
leap that his lack of interpretation does not enable him to
solve.

For

stage.

At times Thomte sees the ethical as a real existen-

exam~le,

there is the notion of the ethical

tial stage prior to religion A.

Thus he writes:

" ••• for there are actually two transitions; first,
from the ethical to religion A, g~en from religion A
to the paradoxical religiosity."
Then at times Thomte does not treat the ethical as
a stage separate from religion A.

Thus,

."How does Kierkegaard's theory of communication relate
itself to the philosophy of the stages?
1. When life is viewed aesthetically the relationship
between teacher and pupil is entirely relative.
2. When life is viewed ethico-religiously (within
the category of religion A) each person is regarded
according to his nature as equally adapted for
eternity ani essentially related to the eternal.
The teacher steps aside and is· merely "on occasion."
3. When life is viewej from the standpoint of
paradoxical religion or the specifically Christian
religion, man is not by nature essentially related
to eternity for sin has intervened."67
From this it can be seen that insofar as Thomte
merely uses the method of selection and summary, he is at
the mercy of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms and his developing
authorship.

He cannot get inside of Kierkegaard's thoughts.

Unless Thomte does not get an interpretative base by building up Kierkegaard's central thought, he will not have an

'

explicit criterion for interpreting the meaning of the
stages, etc.

As a result he cannot show what something

within the ethical means and how the apparent contradictions
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are to be understood.

·-

Love Structures of the Leap
Thomte concerns himself little with Kierkegaard's
life or with relating Kierkegaard's thought to his biography.
Thomte does consider Kierkegaard's religious experience
twice, 68 and each time it has to do with the experience of
1848.

Not once does Thomte consider the religious signifi-

cance of Regina.

However, that in itself is not so bad

because Thomte does not at all take up the biographical
aspect of Kierkegaard's thought.

I doubt the wisdom of

such an approach as I would in the case of Socrates or
Augustine.

But when I consider Thomte's approach to the

love structures of the leap even apart from the biographical
issue, I find them wanting.

It seems that Thomte must

·relate the love structure to the leap in order to explicate
satisfactorily the religious.

But he does not.

He does select passages which treat of eros and
marriage.

How could he help it when dealing with

Kierkegaard's aesthetic writings?

But he does not seem to

see the significance of what he is quoting insofar as it
is related to the religious.

For example, he will summarize
the thought of Victor Eremita in Stages 6 9 but when he gets

all done he will

writ~:

"The erotic relationship per se is of minor importance.
Essentially it is used for orientation in the religious
sphere ... 7o
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But Thomte does not really say what he means by
orients ti on and he does not show why that ts of' min.or
importance.

If one looks at Thomte's thought on eros care-

fully some peculiarities are to be found.

When he is

treating Works of Love he will write· about Kierkegaard,
contrasting Christian love with friendship.7 1 But he does
not say a word about the contrast with eros even-though
that is obviously at least as important as friendship in
Kierkegaard's contrast.

Also he will talk about marriage

as being possible within Christian love, but he does. not
at all consider how eros is compatible with neighbourly
love though I think Kierkegaard's writings are more concerned about that.
Thomte does not seem to see the significance of
eros for religion.

He does not reveal the religious signi-

ficance of the Regina affair.

In his preface he does

express a debt of gratitude to Geismar.

Perhaps he follows

Geismar in his interpretation of eros without even going so
far as to see the idealizing power of eros as did Geismar.
In short, Thomte only makes selections concerning

the love structures of the leap but does not reveal his
understanding of them.
Dialectic Structures 6f the Leap
Thomte shows a fine appreciation of Kierkegaard's
dialectical balance.

He stresses the double movement leap
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and sees the significance of the distinction between·
religion A and B.

In fact he thinks that one of Kierke-

gaard's most important contributions is to distinguish
Christianity from natural religion.

He sees the role of

sin in the transition and treats the leap in Kierkegaard's
Concept of Dread.

All of this is, I think, excellent.

But my basic criticism is that he does not carry this
approach far enough and thereby falls into some contradictions.
He seems hazy on the ways the stages are synthesized.
He writes:
"In Kierkegaad's presentation there is a definite and
sharp breach in the continuity of the three stages.
No man can live in two spheres at the same time. I~
a person's life is transported from the aesthetic
sphere to the ethical sphere the aesthetic part of
his nature is not destroyed bu~ dethroned, i.e., it
is under ethical domination."/
How meaningfully can one relate the notion of a
definite and sharp breach with the notion of dethronement?
This is a key distinction on relationship and one needs to
look carefully at the double movement leap in all of its
application such as repetition, the eros marriage relationship, and the sin faith relation in order to explicate it.
Thomte is on the way toward this but halts too soon.
For this reasqn even his distinction concerning
somethtng as vital as the existential becomes blurred.
He distinguishes four kinds of pathos:
tial, ethical and religious.

aesthetic, existen-

What is existeritial pathos
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apart from either aesthetic or religious pathos?

It· is bad

enough to speak of ethical pathos as if that were distinct
f_rom either the aesthetic or the religious.

But to dis-

tinguish the .existential from them is really meaningless.
A good understanding of the existential in terms.of the
double movement leap would keep Thomte out of this kind of
problem.
Thomte follows Geismar in his treatment of the
religious as resignation, guilt, and suffering. 7 3 He does
this in terms of the conflict between earth and eternity.

Bur as

with Geismar one might agree with his general state-

ments but disagree in concrete application.

One oddity that

does appear even in his general treatment is seen in this
statement.
"Only when the individual is related to an eternal
happiness by the most decisive existential pathos
can there be a question of becoming a Christian."?4
From what precedes I do think that Thomte links the
most decisive existential pathos with religion A that then
enables one to move to religion B.

But the greatest pathos

comes from the paradox of both A and B at the same time.
Temporal Structures of the Leap
Thomte is well aware of the temporal structures of
the leap and thus wilt write:
"The relationship of the stages may also be described in terms of their relationship to time."75
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But when he gets into the detail of interpreting
these structures he seems to say little that is very clarifying.

Thus he writes:

"Religion A emphasizes time still more by presenting
the task of a decisive tr~nsformation of the personality to occur in time."7o
·
What is important temporally in religion A is the
breakthrough into the eternal.

One needs to relate this

to the aesthetic time structures for religion.
the aesthetic context.

A is within

Thomte's analysis never penetrates

this far because he will not relate the different aspect
of.,Kierkegaard's religious thought to that extent.
When making a temporal contrast between Greek and
Christian religiosity, Thomte does point out the tendency
of recollection toward the past.

But he stresses that

.Christianity stresses the future. 77
emphasis.

This is a false

For the particular dimension of Christianity is

the present as can be seen in Repetition where Kierkegaard
also contrasts Repetition with mediation which has a future
orientation.
Of course, Thomte does follow Kierkegaard's texts

so well that contrary to this false interpretation he does
stress faith as contemporaneity.7 8 In his analysis of
Works of Love Thomte u.ses a diagram from Geismar79 and
shows how love has to do with the absolute relation to the
absolute and the relative relation to the relative.
is fine.

This

But Thomte doesn't bring out all their implica-
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tions.

He does not fully link the Works of Love with the

ikltation of Christ and the leap. 80
As I have mentioned Thomte attempts to retain
marriage within Christianity 81 but he does not always have
this good dialectical sense.

Thus he will stress that:

"The human religiosity is the religiosity of
lmmanence."82
Which is true?

But then he goes on to write:

"The Christian religiosity or the paradoxiQal
religiosity is altogether transcendental."~)
That is patently false.

Why is it paradoxical if

it is not that it is a combination of the immanent and. the
transcendental or the eternal and the temporal?
.

Why does

Kierkegaard always stress the absolute necessity of
religion A if it is not to be· included dialectically within
religion B?
In the final analysis, I do not think Thomte fully
sees the meaning of religion A.

'

This is indicated in his

lack of insight into eros and mysticism.

I think he is

quite good in his selection and summary and is on the track
of a comprehensive and penetrating interpretation of the
leap as central to Kierkegaard's notion of religion.
he does not fully
-

foll~w

this out and as a result gets

caught in some contradiction.

But
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APPENDIX B

Upon completin&; his authorship Kierkegaard spent
the last years of his life preparing for and writing his
Attack Upon Christendom.

Durin~

this last period of his

life his expression is completely lacking in dialectical
balance.

In fact, there are very many passages in the

Journal of his last years and in the Attack that completely
. contradict the authorship as we have interpreted it in our
th~sis.

These passages center around the topic of marriage

and the main idea can be seen in the following samples:
(1) "The sexual is the culmination of human egoism.
Hence from a merely human standpoint, both the woman
and the man regard their life as lost and a failure
if they do not marry. Only the married man is a
proper citizen in this world; the celibate is a·
stranger (and this is .iust what Christianity wants
the Christian to be)."1
(2) "In Protestantism there is no beating about the
bush in this regard; here it is simply taught that
marria~e is what is well-pleasing to God, and I see
the day coming when it will be discovered by learned
theology that the God of the Christians is not called
Jehovah or Adonai, and is not even neuter gender, but
is a woman called Maggie Matchmakert"2
(3) "O infinite majesty, even if you were not love,
even if you were cold in your infinite majesty I
could not cease to love you, I need something
majestic to love •••• There was and there is a need
of majesty in my,soul, of a majesty I can never tire
of worshipping. In the world I found nothing, no,
r·found no more majesty than there is beard on a
youn~ girl's cheek - even less than that, for I
found it ridiculous."3
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(l~)
"As for myself, I cannot boast that I at once
understood everythin~ as I did later; if I had.not
once for all been wrecked on sonethin.~ special, I
too should have ·been married."
·

"Something quite special held me back, and now after
a long time I see that what was special to me is what
Christianity calls the general, the normal: I see
that Christianity holds by a man's single state and
rather makes marria(!:e the special case."
"So here again a Providence has been with me. And in
truth. For how should a man, born and brought up in
this Danish-Protestant eudaimonism, have any eye for
what is.Christian, unless a Providence helped him by
first letting him experience constantly, in special
conflicts, what Christianity is in a formal sense?"4
(5)
"In God's Word the single state is recommended.
'But•, says.man, 'that sort of worship doesn't suit
.me, and I am certainly not an ungodly man either.
Such an important step as marriage (which, be it
noted, God advises against, and thinks that not taking
this "important step: is the important thing" I
surely ought not to take without assuring myself of
God's blessing.' (Bravo!) That ls what this man of
God, the Priest is for; he blesses this important step
'the importance of which consists in not doing it',
and so it is well pleasing to ·God - and I have my will,
and my will becomes worship, and the Priest has his
will, he has ten dollars, not earned in the humble
way of brushing people's clothes or serving beer or
brandy at the bar; no, he was employed in God's
service, and to earn ten dollars in that way is •••
divine worship." (Bravissimo! )5

These passages are typical throughout the last
phase of Kierkegaard's writing.

They are also very important.

For if they were taken in themselves they could easily give
one a distorted view of Kierkegaard's basic philosophy.

In

fact, they often are read outside of the basic context and

'

radically misinterpreted.

Thus, Dupre, for example, sees

Kierkegaard in his later years as becoming bitter against
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sex and contradicting the balanced
writings.

theolo~y

of his

e~rlier

So in interpreting them we must-first ask:

what is their basic philosophic meaning?
how they fit with Kierkegaard's thought as

Then we can ask

a whole.

Very briefly Kierkegaard argues that Christianity
like any of the deeper views of life 6 demands chastity
and celibacy.

This is so because sexual expression promotes.

egoism while abstinence reveals the majesty of God.
Christendom actually promotes egoism and hides the majesty
·of God in its blessing of marriage.
In our thesis we have argued that Christianity for
Kierkegaard is a perfectly balanced synthesis of the
aesthetic and the ethical.

This means that he appreciates

the aesthetic values of first love and marriage and finds
room for them within Christianity.

We have seen his great

tribute to marriage in the second part of Either/Or and in
the second part of Stages on Life's Way.

In Works of Love,

Training in Christianity, and Purity of Heart he praises
marriage and sanctions it within Christianity.

We have

argued that even erotic love can be important as the
occasion whereby one reaches religiousness A as was the
case with the young man in Repetition and Victor Eremita
in Stages on Life's Wjty.

So if Kierkegaard were to be

understood in the last phase of his life as being opposed
to erotic and married love, then he would be contradicting

r

r'
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the central philosophy of his authorship ur I would have
g~avely

misinterpreted that philosophy of the authorship.

~U,t_the

matter is not that serious for if one understands

what he ls doing in the last phase of his life, one sees
that it ls perfectly consistent with his authorship.
Kierkegaard has always argued that religiousness A
is an absolute prerequisite of religiousness B.

.That is,

one must make the first movement of the leap before he can
ever make the second movement.

This means that before one

can ever become a Christian he must first pass through the
rigid asceticism which leads to infinite resignation.
Chastity and celibacy are very important means toward this
end.

In the characters of Victor Eremita and the young man

of Renetition, Kierkegaard has shown the importance of
chastity.

His own experience with Regina, insofar as that

experience was one of distance from her, revealed to him
the majesty of God.

He has always argued for the necessity

of celibacy and at least chastity for a period of time ,for
any Christian.
But here in the last phase of his career he seems
to stop at religiousness A and to disregard religiousness B.
If that were the case he would be stopping at natural
religion and disregarding that which is specifically
Christian.

' his basic philosophy as we have
In terms of

spelled it out in our thesis, Kierkegaard would be abandon-
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in0 Christianity or the second movement of the leap if he
were really serious about the contradiction between
'llarriage and Christianity.

So what is he doing?

Surely

he is not saying that Christianity equals somethine;

li~e

Tibetan Buddhism, is he?
The point of Kierkegaard's last phase is that he
is attacking Christendom.

And what is Christendom?

It is

precisely a false image of Christianity that is false
because it has not made the first movement of the leap.
So in his attack he puts his whole emphasis upon showing
the necessity of the first movement of the leap which is
very intimately bound up with chastity and celibacy.

In

his attack he uses the style of satire ••• he exaggerates and
pays no attention to dialectical balance because of his
.Purpose.

He wants to attack ·Christendom only.

He has

already shown how true Christianity is a balance of the
aesthetic and ethical.

Now he puts that question of

balance aside for the moment and with singleness of mind
shows one essential characteristic of Christianity that
his age has forgotten, namely, religiousness A.

Actually

Christianity or religiousness B is impossible in his age.
But that Christianity is a combination of religiousness A
and the ethical.

In

~is

age Christianity was reduced to

Christendom or the mere ethical.

Therefore, in this

connection, we need to reclaim religiousness A that

r

Christianity might be correct.

That ls why he stresses

r

q~l1bacy.

It is an asnect of religiousness 3.

As Lowrie has so well uointed out, Kierkegaard was
well aware that he was setting aside balance for the sake
of the attack.

Lowrie writes:

"It is certain, however, that this 'thoroughly
polemicalized' youn~ man had a natural bent for
satire, He kneT·~ also that satire necessarily
involves exaggeration, For this reason he held
completely in check his rare dialectical ability to
see both sides. In the Instant this very dialectical man was no longer dialectical. 11 7
In a fine passage from the Journal which Lowrie
quot19s, Kierkegaard explains his tactics.
"If the absolute is to be introduced - and this age
excels to the most dreadful degree in taking up
everything characteristically 'to a certain degree' prudence requires one not to do what commonly one
would preferably desire to do, both for one's own
sake and for the sake of others, before making the
decisive attack, that is, to go to the rulers and
say it to them, in order to see if possibly they
mi.ght not yield a little, No, one cannot do this
because - well, the misfortune is precisely this,
that one cannot be sure, however strongly one might
express oneself, that they would not take it up
'to a certain degree•, .and so one would have bungled
one's task of introducing the absolute, No, like
the spring of the wild beast, or like the swift blow
of the bird of prey, so it is the absolute must be
introduced especially in theRface of this characterless 'to a certain degree'."
Kierkegaard attacks Christendom as a mighty eagle
dropping out of the ·sl{y on 1 ts prey.
he might heal.

But he attacks that

As he'realized in the Thunderstorm of

Reoetition and in Fear and Trembling when he discovered the
distinction between the Knight of Infinite Resignation and

r

tr
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the.
o~ce

Kni~ht

of Faith, marriage is possible through faith

one makes the first movement of the leap through

chastity and discovers the majesty of God.
marry and still preserve that

sen~e

Then he can

of majesty.

would not deny that in his last years.
marriage alone is not at all religious.

Kierkegaard

He just shm,rs that
If one has not

been chaste to the point that it religiously pays off in
the first movement of the leap, then one is not yet ready
for marriage.

Christendom is not yet ready for marriage.

Once it discovers the ascetic, then it can consider
marriage with that.

'
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